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DRIVE-THROUGH DELIVERIES: IS
"CONSUMER PROTECTION" JUST WHAT THE
DOCTOR ORDERED?
DAVID A. HYMAN*
Although consumer protection against managed care has become
extraordinarily popular in the last few years, Professor David
Hyman demonstrates in this Article that there are good reasons to
be skeptical about the merits of legislative and regulatory efforts in
this area. Professor Hyman analyzes one of the most popular
consumer protection initiatives to date: legislation limiting or
eliminating the economic incentive for "early" postpartum
discharges-commonly referred to as "drive-though deliveries."
Once the issue came to public attention, laws limiting drive-
through deliveries were enacted throughout the nation with
breathtaking speed. Despite overwhelming legislative enthusiasm,
Professor Hyman argues that the case in favor of such laws is
actually quite flimsy. Professor Hyman demonstrates that the
case for extended postpartum stays was based on unrepresentative
horror stories and reluctance to make explicit cost/benefit tradeoffs
in matters of public health and safety.
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"Should we let a bunch of HMO bureaucrats push women
and infants out of the hospital at their most vulnerable
moment? Or should we stand up for motherhood?"'
INTRODUCTION
Although managed care has essentially captured the health
insurance market, it has had less success with the hearts and minds of
the American people.2 Complaints about avoidable death and
disability, delay, inconvenience, micro-management, profiteering,
declining quality, and petty bureaucracy are legion. Calls to do
something about the "excesses" of managed care have rung out from
interest groups as disparate as the editors and columnists of the
nation's newspapers, representatives of academic medical centers,
medical ethicists, lawyer-academics, physicians and nurses, the
plaintiffs' bar, unions, and various self-styled consumer advocates.4
1. Geoffrey Cowley & Karen Springen, Are Drive-Through Deliveries So Bad?,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 1997, at 65, 65; see also Barbara Vobejda, "Moms and Babies" Prove
to Be Irresistible Force on Capitol Hill, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1996, at A17 ("It's mothers
and babies .... They're sacrosanct .... It's a politician's dream issue.").
2. See David A. Hyman, A Second Opinion on Second Opinions, 84 VA. L. REV.
1439, 1460 (1998) (noting the lack of popular enthusiasm for managed care); see also
Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash, HEALTH AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 80, 80-82 (presenting survey data indicating public concern about
performance of managed care organizations).
3. See David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should
Consumers Call 911?, 43 VILL. L. REV. 409,409-18 (1998) [hereinafter Hyman, Consumer
Protection] (cataloging complaints).
4. See id. at 410-11,414-18 (documenting calls for action).
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Hostility toward managed care is so widespread that one of the
biggest applause lines in the recent movie As Good as It Gets comes
when a character uses a string of obscenities to describe her health
maintenance organization (HMO).'
Predictably, the response to this animosity has been a virtual
blizzard of legislation. In the last four years, most states have
considered consumer protection legislation, and a majority of states
have enacted consumer protection statutes.6 At the federal level,
both Republicans and Democrats have offered competing versions of
a "Bill of Rights" for people enrolled in managed care plans.7
President Clinton has used executive orders to implement a variety of
consumer protections in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.8 A
Presidential Commission has weighed in on the subject as well.9 The
issue appeared in 1998 campaign ads,'" was featured by President
5. See Steve Chapman, How Did HMO Become a Four-Letter Word?, CHi. TRIB.,
May 21, 1998, at 31.
Actress Helen Hunt has always been adorable, but audiences have never found
her more charming than in the scene in "As Good as It Gets" when her character
angrily disparages her health maintenance organization in terms so vile I cannot
repeat them. The tirade invariably prompts a round of applause.
Id.; see also Ellen Goodman, Managed Care Gets Thumbs Down From Just About Any
Audience, BALT. SUN, Mar. 31, 1998, at 9A (noting that "audiences ... spontaneously
burst out into applause" after viewing the scene).
Perhaps inevitably, in some circles in Washington, Ms. Hunt is now seen as an
expert on the need for consumer protection against managed care. See Lizette Alvarez,
Nasty, Costly Battle Shapes up over Changing Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1998, at
Al ("Not long after Senator Edward M. Kennedy introduced a bill this spring to overhaul
managed care, his staff put out a feeler to the unwitting heroine of the movement, Helen
Hunt .... Would she be interested in promoting the bill?"). This is not the first time
actors have been tapped for such roles on the strength of their performance in a film.
Current Senate Minority Leader (and then-Representative) Tom Daschle arranged for
Jane Fonda, Jessica Lange, and Sissy Spacek to testify before the House Democratic
Caucus Task Force on Agriculture on the "Human Dimensions of the Farm Crisis." See
131 CONG. REC. S11298-s11300 (daily ed. May 9, 1985) (Sup. Does. No. X.99/1.131/Pt.9).
The principal qualification of these witnesses was that each had appeared in a movie about
the farm crisis.
6. See David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong with A Patient
Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming January 2000) (manuscript at 10, on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Hyman, Regulating Managed Care];
David A. Hyman, Managed Care at the Millennium: Scenes from a Maul, 24 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming November 1999) (manuscript at 8, on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Hyman, Scenes from a Maul].
7. See Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 8.
8. See iL
9. See id.; see also David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: With
Friends Like These ... , in 1998 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 283, 290-93 [hereinafter
Hyman, With Friends Like These] (reviewing the efforts of the President's Advisory
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care System).
10. See Howard Kurtz, Attack Ads Carpet TV; High Road Swept Away, WASH. POST,
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Clinton in his 1999 State of the Union Address," and has occupied a
prominent part of the legislative agenda for the 106th Congress. 2
Unfortunately, there are good reasons to question the value of
many of these efforts. Few legislators have the necessary training or
inclination to weigh the often conflicting evidence on the benefits of
specific proposals. 3 Evidence on the cost of such proposals is
frequently unavailable, and estimates are subject to considerable
uncertainty. 4 Choosing among the universe of potential consumer
protections presents complex distributional considerations.5 In
addition, the drafting of "consumer protections" is readily hijacked by
entrenched health care providers, who have their own interests at
heart. 6 When these factors are coupled with the emotional overlay
accompanying health care issues and the government's unwillingness
to bear the cost of many of the proposed reforms, it should come as
no surprise that consumer protection in the field of managed care "is
Oct. 20, 1998, at Al ("Health maintenance organizations are an especially hot issue this
year, with 'bureaucrats'- sometimes literally pictured as rubber-stamping boobs-drawing
Democratic fire.").
11. See Clinton Outlines His Vision for Nation's Transition to the 21st Century, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20,1999, at A22.
12. See Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 2 (discussing the proposed
legislation).
13. See Jerome P. Kassirer, Editorial, Practicing Medicine Without a License-The
New Intrusions by Congress, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1747, 1747 (1997) ("[C]ongress is not
the appropriate forum for making complex medical decisions. The data on which many
important medical decisions are based are often contradictory and still in evolution.
Legislators do not have the context nor the capacity to weigh medical evidence
adequately.").
14. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, Managed Careless, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 16, 1998, at 6,
6 ("Citing a study by the accounting firm of Muse and Associates, reformers say [the
Patient Access to Responsible Care Act] would increase premiums by at most 2.6 percent;
their opponents ... say the increase could top 22 percent."); Amy Goldstein & Helen
Dewar, Health Care Bill's Price Debated; CBO Says Democratic Plan Would Hike
Premiums 4%; GOP Differs, WASH. POST, July 17, 1998, at A7 (finding considerable
variation in the estimated costs of consumer protection bills).
15. See Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What Are the
Issues?, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1007,1025-26 (1996).
If written to protect the most vulnerable consumers, regulations are likely to
restrict some choices and impose costs that do not benefit the average consumer.
For example, regulations that make MCOs [managed care organizations] offer
certain benefits help those consumers who are most likely to use [the services]
but raise insurance premiums for all consumers.
Id. (citations omitted).
16. See Hyman, Consumer Protection, supra note 3, at 456 ("When statutes are
proposed and backed by those who provide the mandated services, it is a safe first
approximation that any consumer benefit is largely incidental-and frequently
nonexistent."); Peter T. Kilborn, Bills Regulating Managed Care Benefit Doctors, N.Y.




particularly prone to legislative posturing and overreaching."'17
Consider what is easily the most popular "consumer protection"
initiative to date: legislation mandating the coverage of a minimum
length of stay after the birth of a child. Such laws limit or eliminate
the economic incentive for an "early" postpartum discharge-
commonly referred to as a "drive-through" or "drive-by" delivery."8
Once the issue came to public attention, legislatures throughout the
nation enacted such laws with breathtaking speed. Maryland was the
first state to act, passing its law on May 25, 1995.19 By the end of
1995, four more states had followed suit, and by the end of 1996,
twenty-four additional states had passed laws.20 Federal legislation,
backed by cosponsors "as diverse as Ted Kennedy and Jesse Helms"
was signed into law on September 26, 1996.21
Despite this overwhelming legislative enthusiasm, the case for
the mandated coverage is actually extraordinarily flimsy. There is
little evidence indicating that postpartum stays of the specified length
provide any benefit, regardless of how one defines "benefit." Even if
such stays provide a benefit, it does not follow that the benefit
justifies the associated cost or that the same results could not be
achieved in some other way at less cost.
Worse still, these laws treated drive-through deliveries as a
narrow, free-standing problem. The legislation did nothing about the
availability of post-discharge services; the quality of services rendered
before, during, and after postpartum hospitalization; the distortions
17. Hyman, Consumer Protection, supra note 3, at 454 (" 'Mom and apple pie'
legislation, of which consumer protection against managed care is clearly an example, is
particularly prone to legislative posturing and overreaching.").
18. See William Safire, Just Driving By, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, § 6 (magazine), at
24 (tracing the origin of the phrases "drive-by" and "drive-through" delivery). The
balance of this Article refers to such discharges as "drive-through deliveries." It is
important to note the normative implications of labeling a postpartum discharge as "early"
or "drive-through." By framing the issue in this fashion, opponents of the practice started
with a built-in advantage. See Eugene Declercq & Diana Simmes, The Politics of "Drive-
Through Deliveries". Putting Early Postpartum Discharge on the Legislative Agenda,
MILBANK Q., June 1997, at 175, 184 ("The widespread adoption of the phrase 'early
discharge' was a victory in itself for advocates because it described the problem in a way
that suggested mothers and babies might have been sent home prematurely."); Vobejda,
supra note 1, at A17 ("Perhaps it is the expression itself, 'drive-by deliveries,' that
propelled this issue so quickly from grass-roots grumbling to the congressional fast lane.").
To even out the normative stakes, this Article intermittently refers to the alternative to a
drive-through delivery as an "extended postpartum hospitalization."
19. See Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 176-77.
20. See id.
21. Id. (discussing the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2935 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-4, -51
(1996))).
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created by hospitals' use of per-diem pricing; or the manner in which
managed care organizations (MCOs) make coverage decisions.'
The campaign against drive-through deliveries does illustrate
some problems familiar to students of regulation. The case for
extended postpartum stays was based almost entirely on wrenching,
but extraordinarily unrepresentative, horror stories23 and overheated
rhetoric.24 The "reform" exploited social reluctance to make explicit
cost-benefit tradeoffs in matters of public health and safety.5 The
health care providers who testified in favor of the proposed
"consumer protection" neglected to mention that the issue was
22 For a discussion of the various forms of managed care and the tools employed by
MCOs, see infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 46-60 and accompanying text. On the perils of anecdote-driven
legislation, see David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L. J. 797, 804-
07 (1998) [hereinafter Hyman, Lies]. See also Hyman, Consumer Protection, supra note 3,
at 453-54 ("In drafting consumer protections, there is little guarantee that the legislature
will actually target the right problem because its selection is heavily influenced by bad
anecdotes and perceived public appeal. Even if the legislature fortuitously picks a
reasonable target today, there is no guarantee it will do so tomorrow.").
24. See infra notes 61-78 and accompanying text. Medical organizations were not shy
about participating in and contributing to the rhetorical firestorm. For example, at the
only hearing held by Congress on the issue of drive-through deliveries, the American
Medical Association's (AMA) representative complained that
the money that is saved from this does not got back into the plan like it does in
the not-for-profit organizations, but goes to the stockholders. They are depriving
mothers and babies of appropriate care and raising the amounts of money that
their stockholders and their presidents and CEOs get.
Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act: Hearings on S. 969 Before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 45 (1995) (Sup. Docs. No.
y4.L11/4:S.HRG.104-327) [hereinafter Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing] (statement of
Dr. Palma Formica, AMA Board of Trustees).
25. Public opinion polls have consistently demonstrated that most Americans believe
everyone should have access to all necessary health care services, regardless of ability to
pay. See Daniel Yankelovich, The Debate That Wasn't: The Public and the Clinton Plan,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 7, 12. A Harris poll found almost universal agreement
(91%) with the idea that "everybody should have the right to get the best possible care-
as good as the treatment a millionaire gets." Id.
Although these views are understandably honored in the breach, they empower
advocacy groups to argue that public policy should proceed from the assumption that a
human life is beyond price. Professor James Blumstein has accurately described such
rhetoric as "symbolic blackmail." James F. Blumstein, Financing Uncompensated Care:
An Approach to the Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 511, 522 (1988). These tensions are
resolved in predictable ways when the tradeoffs must actually be made. See GUIDO
CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 26 (1978) ("Evasion, disguise,
temporizing, [and] deception are all ways by which artfully chosen allocation methods can
avoid the appearance of failing to reconcile values in conflict."); Clark C. Havighurst &
James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of
PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 6,7 (1975) ("A policy dialogue in which a taboo surrounds any
concession to the reality of limited resources is bound to be rich in posturing and assertion
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merely the opening salvo in their campaign against managed care-
and that their preferred remedy was a return to the model of
professional dominance whose excesses led to managed care in the
first place.26
Part I of this Article provides some background on insurance,
managed care, and cost-quality and quality-quality tradeoffs. Part II
reviews the state and federal legislation that emerged in 1995 and
1996 mandating coverage of a minimum postpartum hospital stay.
Part III analyzes the case for such "consumer protection" laws and
concludes that there is little or no evidence that such laws will provide
any real benefit to consumers. Part IV explores the empirical
literature on health care quality and argues that legislators have
ignored the real problem (variable quality) and instead have
embraced symbolic legislation addressing a non-existent problem.
Part V evaluates "who won what" as a result of such legislation. Part
VI offers a narrative perspective on the issue. A brief conclusion
follows Part VI.
I. INSURANCE AND MANAGED CARE OVERVIEW
A. Fundamentals of Insurance Economics and Law
Insurance is a mechanism for shifting, spreading, and distributing
risk.27 Health insurance allows an individual to pre-pay some portion
of his anticipated medical expenditures for the coming year and to
spread the costs of some of the associated but more unpredictable
health-related risks. The scope of the risks that are shifted and
spread is dictated by a contract: the health insurance policy.
Health insurance policies are issued to groups and individuals.
Group insurance lowers the administrative and marketing costs of
insurance and decreases the significance of adverse selection. When
group insurance is provided as a result of employment, it also
qualifies for favorable tax treatment.28 Coverage in both group and
26. See Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 15. Legislators could have
figured this point out if they had been paying attention. The written submission of the
AMA for the federal hearing on drive-through deliveries declared forthrightly that
"managed care employees should not be permitted to interfere in the clinical decision-
making of physicians." Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 55. The AMA
is usually more circumspect about its ultimate objectives. See idL at 56 ("The AMA is not
anti-managed care.").
27. See KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBtrrING RISK 1-2 (1986).
28. See I.R.C. § 106 (West 1996), amended by I.R.C. § 106(a) (West Supp. 1999)
("I[G]ross income of an employee does not include employer-provided coverage under an
accident or health plan."). The value of this subsidy has been estimated at $76.2 billion
1999]
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individual markets is based on the aggregation of consumer
preferences.
Most insured employees secure their insurance through their
employers. Employer plans vary greatly in coverage and in the out-
of-pocket costs charged to employees. Even across these diverse
contractual settings, certain risks, such as cosmetic surgery, are never
insured; others, such as fertility treatment and radial keratotomy, are
voluntarily insured only if the policy is a "rich" one. Those risks
which are not transferred are self-insured.
More generous coverage is more expensive. Copayments and
deductibles help fine-tune the coverage (and deal with the problem of
moral hazard) by allowing for a mix of self-insurance and third-party
coverage. Not surprisingly, a policy with a substantial copayment and
deductible is cheaper than one that pays for all medically necessary
expenses. Similarly, a policy with generous hospitalization benefits is
generally more expensive than one that encourages outpatient
treatment, provides coverage at a limited number of inpatient
facilities, or strictly limits length of hospital stays.
Willingness to purchase health insurance is heterogeneous and
greatly affected by the premium.29 As the premium increases, the
policy becomes less affordable for people at the margin. Those who
are selling the policy must decide whether better coverage is worth
offering if it prices the policy out of a particular market. Those who
would willingly have bought a more limited policy must self-insure
(i.e., become one of the approximately 43 million uninsured
Americans) once the cost of the minimum product exceeds their
willingness to pay.
per year in fiscal year 1999, making it the single largest tax expenditure. See National
Health Policy Forum, Retooling Tax Subsidies for Health Coverage: Old Ideas, New
Politics, 3 (visited Oct. 15, 1999) <http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs/8-728t(web).pdf>. Many
commentators have criticized this statute for effectively tying health insurance to
employment and doing so with a subsidy that is worth the most to those who need it the
least. See, e.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Rethinking the
Tax Treatment of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 BYU L. REV. 1229 passim;
David Kendall & Will Marshall, Health Reform, Meet Tax Reform, AM. PROSPECr, Spring
1995, at 74, 74. Although these criticisms are well taken, there are advantages to even this
peculiar structure, including the dampening of adverse selection and the utilization of an
agency relationship to offset the bounded rationality of any given individual. See Hyman,
Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 25.
29. See Hyman, Consumer Protection, supra note 3, at 437; see also David A. Hyman,
Professional Responsibility, Legal Malpractice, and the Eternal Triangle: Will Lawyers or
Insurers Call the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 399 (1998) [hereinafter Hyman,
Professional Responsibility] (noting that "consumer preferences are heterogeneous, but
cost is an important issue for many people").
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The demand for health care also varies in ways that are generally
predictable along a number of parameters, including age, race, and
sex. For example, individuals in their twenties and thirties require
more sports medicine than those in their fifties; those in their fifties
require more cardiac rehabilitation than those in their twenties;
elderly men require urologists; younger women require obstetricians
and family-planning services; children require pediatricians; African-
Americans require more treatment for hypertension and renal failure
than European-Americans; European-Americans require more
treatment for malignant melanoma than African-Americans.
Because insurance only shifts and spreads risk for which the policy
provides coverage, the specification of such coverage necessarily
implies a series of tradeoffs within the common pool, with significant
distributional implications within and across identifiable groups. For
example, coverage of routine mammograms for women in their
forties may preclude coverage of bone marrow transplants for
advanced breast cancer patients. Coverage of family-planning
services may preclude coverage of more aggressive screening for
sexually transmitted diseases. Coverage of aggressive screening for
prostate cancer may result in more limited coverage of screening for
uterine cancer. Legislative mandates can reallocate resources within
the common pool, but new or enhanced services are covered at the
expense of other services, increased premiums, or both. In short, you
don't get something for nothing, even from an insurance company.
Health insurance coverage is also invariably limited to
"medically necessary" expenses. Thus, hospitalization is a covered
benefit only if the necessary services must be provided in a hospital.
For obvious reasons, the secondary attributes of a hospitalization-
including rest, recuperation, food, shelter, and education-are not
sufficient free-standing reasons for hospitalization. Until recently,
insurance companies simply accepted an individual physician's
certification that hospitalization was necessary, but insurers have
grown increasingly aggressive in specifying whether they will
authorize coverage of a hospitalization and how long they will
continue to authorize payment. 0
In general, the regulation of health insurance has been left to the
30. See George Anders & Laurie McGinley, Actuarial Firm Helps Decide Just How
Long You Spend in Hospital, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1998, at Al ("A decade ago, most
patients got whatever care their doctor recommended, subject only to insurance-company
squabbles about cost. Now, hospitals and health plans are setting up detailed checklists
ahead of time, telling doctors how to accelerate treatment of almost any serious illness.").
1999]
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states.31 Historically, the states took full advantage of this authority
and aggressively regulated the terms of insurance contracts.32
However, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA)33 creates a large loophole in this structure because it
effectively preempts state-level regulation of employer-provided
health insurance without supplying substantive regulation of its own.
Thus, employment-based health insurance is effectively unregulated.
When an employer purchases insurance from a state-regulated
insurer (an "insured" plan), ERISA provides that the state can
indirectly regulate the employee-benefit plan.35 If, however, the
employer furnishes its own insurance (a "self-funded" employee
benefit plan), the plan effectively is not subject to any state
regulation. 6 It does not overstate the case to note that ERISA
effectively creates a health benefits free-fire zone, and with 50 million
Americans in self-funded plans and another 100 million Americans in
insured plans, a clear majority of the insured population find
themselves in a regulatory no-man's-land. 7
B. Managed Care Overview
When managed care comes up in conversation, most people
think about HMOs. In reality, managed care encompasses a wide
31. The McCarran-Ferguson Act specifies that the states have primary regulatory
authority over insurance. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994). However, Congress retains
the right to legislate specifically in this area, and it has done so a number of times. See,
e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 100 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
32. See ROBERT H.JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 437-39 (1996).
33. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1191 (1994).
34. See Wendy K. Mariner, State Regulation of Managed Care and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1986, 1986-87 (1996).
35. See id. at 1987.
36. The precise boundaries of ERISA preemption have always been controversial, but
the issue has become particularly heated since the Supreme Court's opinion in New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
656-62 (1995) (declining to find preemption of New York's rate regulatory system, and
employing logic suggesting that lower courts should be more cautious in finding ERISA
preemption). Cases decided subsequent to the Travelers decision have come to
inconsistent conclusions. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d
812, 815 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Arkansas Patient Protection Act was preempted
and noting "the precise scope of ERISA preemption of state law has left courts, including
the Supreme Court, deeply troubled"); Washington Physicians Serv. Ass'n v. Gregoire,
147 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the preemption of the Washington
Alternative Provider Statute); Dukes v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 351-
52 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding that ERISA did not preempt state common law claims);
Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 52-53 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding
ERISA preemption of state common law claims).
37. See Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 9.
[Vol. 78
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array of arrangements for the financing and delivery of health care
services.38 In sharp contrast to indemnity insurers, MCOs manage
care and costs by methods such as requiring preauthorization for
medical expenses, restricted access to specialists, restricted panels of
providers, higher copayments (and sometimes denial of coverage) for
out-of-network care, capitation, bonuses, practice guidelines,
retrospective denials of coverage, "real-time" utilization review,
restricted coverage of prescription drugs, and limitations on
benefits.3 9 The academic literature on the quality of care provided by
MCOs is generally quite favorable.' In global terms, MCOs offer a
38. See John M. Eisenberg, Economics, 273 JAMA 1670, 1670 (1995) ("[T]he wide
variety of managed care organizations share mainly an attempt to control costs."). In
managed care organizations, the
financing and delivery of care can be integrated to a greater or lesser extent; the
corporate structure can be non-profit or for-profit; providers can be employees of
the managed care organization or independent contractors; providers can be
selected and compensated and the risks shared in a wide variety of ways.
David A. Hyman, Accountable Managed Care: Should We Be Careful What We Wish for?,
32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming December 1999) (manuscript at 15, on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
39. See Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-Care
Plans Make with Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1681 (1995) (concluding that
managed care plans use complex systems for selecting, paying, and monitoring physicians);
Dahlia K. Remler et al., What Do Managed Care Plans Do to Affect Care? Results from a
Survey of Physicians, 34 INQUIRY 196, 200 (1997) (presenting data on the impact of
managed care techniques on physicians and determining that utilization review and
discounted fees are the most prevalent practices).
40. See Donald M. Berwick, Payment by Capitation and the Quality of Care, 335 NEW.
ENG. J. MED. 1227, 1228 (1996) ("In general, the literature in this area ... consistently
shows that costs are lower in managed care systems, with quality equal to or better than
that in fee-for-service care."); Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 716 (1994) (presenting generally favorable evidence on the quality of
care provided by MCOs); Fred J. Hellinger, The Effect of Managed Care on Quality, 158
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 833, 833 (1998) ("[M]anaged care has not decreased the
overall effectiveness of care. However, evidence suggests that managed care may
adversely affect the health of some vulnerable subpopulations."); Robert H. Miller &
Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980: A Literature Analysis, 271
JAMA 1512, 1513-17 (1994) (collecting studies showing that the quality of care provided
by HMOs is comparable to or better than that provided by fee-for-service plans); Robert
H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality of Care?,
HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 7 [hereinafter Miller & Luft, Quality of Care] (updating
earlier research and finding mixed, but generally favorable, evidence on the quality of care
provided by MCOs).
To be sure, some studies have found that the quality of care provided by MCOs is
lower than in fee-for-service practice. Moreover, there is an overriding question as to
whether studies from the early days of managed care, when homogeneous subscriber
populations were served by non-profit MCOs, are applicable to the current environment
in which neither of these characteristics exist. See Miller & Luft, Quality of Care, supra, at
13-18. However, the most negative conclusion one can reach is that "HMOs produce
better, the same, and worse quality of care, depending on the particular organization and
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more restricted choice of and access to providers and treatments in
exchange for lower premiums, deductibles, and copayments than
traditional indemnity insurance.
C. Cost-Quality and Quality-Quality Tradeoffs in Health Insurance
Health care services generally contribute to patient health, but
not all services are equally beneficial. Fraud aside, considerable
controversy exists about whether and how expenses that make a
variable contribution to health should be constrained.41 There is
general agreement that it is appropriate for private insurance to
provide coverage for services so long as marginal benefits exceed
marginal costs.42 There is equally general agreement that it is
particular disease." Id. at 14.
41. See generally MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE
LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS (1997) (reviewing the
advantages and disadvantages of three alternative medical spending decision makers:
patients, doctors at the bedside, and third parties such as government, insurers, or citizen
groups); Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1451 (1994)
(reviewing various mechanisms for implementing cost-containment in light of preference
variability).
Despite this diversity of views, health policy scholars are essentially unanimous
that cost-benefit tradeoffs are inevitable. See, e.g., VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL
LIVE?: HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 29 (1998) ("We must recognize that
we can't have everything .... "); Henry Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health
Care: The Choice Before Us, 247 SCIENCE 418, 419 (1990) (discussing methods for
reducing costs); David M. Eddy, Health System Reform: Will Controlling Costs Require
Rationing Services?, 272 JAMA 324, 327-28 (1994) (discussing the need to cut costs by
reducing the "volume and intensity of health services"); Lester Carl Thurow, Learning to
Say "No," 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1569, 1569 (1984) ("Instead of stopping treatments
when all benefits cease to exist, physicians must stop treatments when marginal benefits
are equal to marginal costs.").
However, some physician-commentators do not understand that scarcity is not an
artificial construct or a conspiracy against the less fortunate. See, e.g., Marcia Angell, Cost
Containment and the Physician, 254 JAMA 1203, 1207 (1985) ("In a country that is this
year spending about $300 billion on defense and $25 billion on tobacco, and in which
$500,000 is spent for a 30-second television advertisement during the Super Bowl, we
should be prepared to argue for spending whatever is necessary for effective medical
care.").
42. To be sure, there is a non-frivolous argument that matters are not so simple.
Under normal circumstances, a rational individual would be willing to invest his resources
in health care until marginal costs exceed marginal benefits. However, an individual might
well choose to spend considerably less on health care if expenses in other areas resulted in
a higher payoff. Given the choice between death by starvation tomorrow and death from
a chronic disease at some time in the future, most people would conclude that it is rational
to spend one's resources on food instead of medicine if one cannot afford both. Because
the price of health insurance is a significant factor for many purchasers, tradeoffs within
this zone are not at all unreasonable. Of course, such tradeoffs are not unique to health
care. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, And Such Small Portions: Limited
Performance Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access Trade-Off, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL
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appropriate to exclude coverage for services that provide no benefit.
However, considerable controversy exists over the exclusion of
services that provide a positive benefit when the benefit is less than
the social cost ("cost-benefit-no-man's-land").43  Indeed, the
prevalence of third-party insurance encourages patients to demand
such services, because from their perspective, the subsidized cost is
less than the benefit." Attempts to constrain coverage of services in
the cost-benefit-no-man's-land invariably trigger complaints about
the evils of rationing and profit-driven health care.
Dividing medical interventions into these categories is an
obvious oversimplification. Ex ante, it is frequently difficult to decide
into which zone a particular service will fall. Even if it is clear that a
medical intervention is non-cost-worthy, accusations of rationing have
a chilling effect on cost-containment efforts. Nevertheless, in recent
years, MCOs have moved aggressively to deny coverage of services
that they deem non-cost-worthy-and they seem to have classified
extended postpartum stays in that category.45
ETHICS 959, 973-78 (1998) (noting the tradeoffs between the cost, quality, and availability
of legal services).
43. See Clark C. Havighurst, Contract Failure in the Market for Health Services, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 47, 51-54 (1994) (reviewing the realities of the cost-benefit-no-
man's-land).
44. Professors Havighurst & Blumstein provide charts depicting the cost-benefit
tradeoff from the individual and social perspectives. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra
note 25, at 18. Because an individual with insurance has an out-of-pocket cost much less
than the true cost, the social cost-benefit-no-man's-land is far larger than the individual
cost-benefit-no-man's-land. In the interest of simplicity, this Article focuses on the social
cost. The growth of managed care arrangements has modified the dynamic somewhat
because individuals now face fewer financial (but greater structural) barriers to the
consumption of health care services-precisely the model suggested by Professor Kenneth
Arrow to deal with the moral hazard problems that result from the existence of health
insurance:
[I]f individuals are free to spend as they will with the assurance that the insurance
company will pay, the resulting resource allocation will certainly not be socially
optimal. This makes perfectly reasonable the idea that an insurance company
can improve the allocation of resources to all concerned by a policy which rations
the amount of medical services it will support under the insurance policy.
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard.- Further Comment, 58 AM. ECON.
REV., 537,538 (1968).
45. Because of the aggregation that is implicit in group coverage, MCOs are a far
from perfect mechanism for encouraging the making of tailored cost-benefit tradeoffs, but
they are still an improvement on unmixed indemnity coverage-and there are offsetting
benefits associated with aggregated coverage at various price-points. See Hyman,
Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 25.
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II. REGULATING POSTPARTUM LENGTHS OF STAY
A. Making the Case Against Drive-Through Deliveries
The case against drive-through deliveries was built with
anecdotal reports of infants who died following rapid postpartum
discharges. A typical example of the genre was the tragic case of
Michelina Bauman. 6 Following a normal pregnancy and delivery,
Michelina was discharged with her mother on May 17, 1995, at
twenty-eight hours postpartum.4 7 On her first night home, Michelina
was fidgety and would not eat.48 On May 18, the Baumans made a
number of calls to their pediatrician, but reportedly were informed
that the infant's behavior was not unusual.4 9 After Michelina
developed a rash, her parents called the pediatrician again, but
reached the answering service.50 The Baumans then contacted their
MCO, which routinely sent a nurse to the home within forty-eight
hours of discharge to assess the infant and mother.51 After her
parents described Michelina's symptoms, a nursing supervisor advised
them to call the pediatrician again.'2 The pediatrician called back at
5:30 p.m., but Michelina Bauman had already died from an
infection. 3
The hospital claimed that the infection would have been
detected-and the death possibly prevented-had the health plan
46. The narrative in the text is drawn primarily from the oral and written testimony of
Michelina's parents at a hearing before the Senate Committee on Labor & Human
Resources. See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 79-80 (statements of
Steve and Michelle Bauman). The same story is reflected in a host of other sources. See,
e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, Discharged Too Soon?, WASH. POST, June 27, 1995, at Health
Insert 11; Terese Hudson, Quick Fixes, Hosps. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Sept. 20, 1995, at
36,36.
47. Depending on the source, Michelina was discharged at either 24 or 28 hours
postpartum. Compare Hudson, supra note 46, at 36 (24 hours), and John Merline, The
Backlash Against Managed Care, CONSUMERS' RES., Nov. 1996, at 15, 15 (24 hours), with
Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 19, 79 (28 hours), and Karen Riley,
Support Grows for Maternity Stay Law, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13,1995, at B6 (28 hours).
48. See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 20, 80 (statement of Mrs.
Bauman, statements of Mr. and Mrs. Bauman).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. Due to a mix-up, the MCO first learned of Michelina's birth when they
were contacted by the parents. See ic The MCO typically sent a visiting nurse within 24
hours, but was contractually obligated to do so only within 48 hours. In a sadly ironic
note, the MCO contacted Mr. Bauman's place of employment on May 19, 1995, to
schedule the home visit-within the 48 hours of discharge promised by the health plan, but
the day after Michelina died. See id.
52. See id
53. See icL (statements of Mrs. Bauman).
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been willing to pay for a stay of forty-eight hours.54 The health plan
responded that it was not responsible for the timing of the discharge
and that there was no evidence that the timing had any impact on the
outcome in any case.5 The Baumans had no doubts where to lay the
blame; they declared that Michelina's death certificate should have
read "Death by System" and that HMO actually stands for "How
Many Others?" 56  They subsequently filed suit against both the
pediatrician and the health plan5 The case was featured in multiple
national media reports, and the Baumans testified before Congress on
the issue of postpartum stays.
Stories of this sort virtually ensured that MCOs could not defend
54. See id. at 20, 26 (statements of Mrs. and Mr. Bauman); CBS Evening News (CBS
television broadcast, July 25,1995). But see infra note 56 (presenting the views of the chief
of medical affairs at the treating hospital as to whether the infection would have been
detected and death could have been prevented).
55. See Boodman, supra note 46, at 12; CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast,
July 25, 1995).
56. See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 19, 80 (statement of Mrs.
Bauman). Despite the tragic outcome, the parents' assessment of its causes is far from
self-evident. It is unclear whether the outcome in this particular case would have been any
different, regardless of how long Michelina Bauman stayed in the hospital. The chief of
medical affairs at the treating hospital was interviewed for a newspaper article and noted
that
[i]t is impossible ... to say for sure whether an additional 24 hours in the hospital
would have saved the baby's life; streptococcus B infections in newborns have a
high mortality rate .... "Would the death have been prevented if this baby had
been in the hospital? Maybe. Would the baby's illness have been caught
somewhat earlier had she been in the hospital? Probably."
Boodman, supra note 46, at 12 (quoting Michael B. Grossman, Kennedy Memorial
Hospital, Washington Township, New Jersey).
In like fashion, it is far from clear whether the tragic outcome was attributable to
the actions of the pediatrician, the health plan, some combination of both, or neither-
although Mrs. Bauman seemed particularly unhappy with the performance of the
pediatrician. See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 21 (statement of Mrs.
Bauman) ("The baby was given a clean bill of health by the pediatrician .... We did
exactly what [the pediatrician] asked us to do, but not once [during the phone calls we
made to her] did she tell us to bring the baby into the emergency room .... [Had she done
so,] our baby would be alive today."). The hospital performed an internal review that
found no wrongdoing in "the events surrounding the baby's discharge and the
pediatrician's actions." Boodman, supra note 46, at 12.
Finally, the illness to which Michelina Bauman succumbed can strike any time in
the first two weeks of life, so a postpartum stay of 48 hours has no necessary connection to
the prevention of such tragedies. See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at
41 (statement of Dr. Sharon Levine, Associate Medical Director, Permanente Medical
Group, Inc.).
57. See Bauman v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 420, 421 (D.N.J.
1998), affid in part, rev'd in part, Nos. 98-5222, -5262, -5263, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22464
(3d Cir. Sept. 16, 1999).
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the merits of rapid postpartum discharges. 8 Empirical studies casting
light on the issue were ignored, and the debate was driven by a
handful of anecdotes. 9 The normative boundaries of the debate were
framed by the pejorative use of "drive-through deliveries" and
"drive-by deliveries" to describe the discharge practices.60
The net effect of this packaging of the issue was demonstrated
when legislation prohibiting drive-through deliveries was considered
by Congress. The Congressional Record is replete with condemnation
of insurance companies' greed and MCOs' willingness to place the
lives of women and infants at risk.61 When the Newborns' and
58. The managed care industry formed a self-styled Coalition for Optimal Maternity
Care to advance their position that drive-through deliveries are safe. See Leslie Barker,
The Difference a Day Makes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 2, 1996, at 1C, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Dalnws File ("In debates before the bill passed, the Coalition for
Optimal Maternity Care argued that no conclusive study supported the need for a specific
length of stay for childbirth.").
59. See Laurie McGinley, A Family Hails Bill Providing Maternity Stay, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 1996, at B1 ("[T]he research was overshadowed by horrifying anecdotes."). As
two other commentators noted:
The issue has enormous potential to elicit an emotional response from the public,
as occurred in the case of heavily reported testimony in New Jersey by parents
whose baby's life might have been saved with more time in the hospital, or that
of the Massachusetts mother whose early discharge might have contributed to
her congestive heart failure .... In light of such powerful anecdotal testimony,
presentation of national neonatal hospital readmission rates had little impact.
Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 185.
To be sure, and as detailed infra at note 165, there were considerable difficulties
with the empirical studies, including their size, non-randomized nature, and the nature of
the endpoints that were studied. However, the debate never even reached these technical
questions; simply stated, the anecdotal bad outcomes defined the agenda. See Debra E.
Kuper, Comment, Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act: Putting the Brakes on
Drive-Through Deliveries, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 667, 673-75 (1997) (presenting various
anecdotes); Suzanne Seaman, Comment, Putting the Brakes on Drive-Through Deliveries,
13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 497, 503-05, 510 (1997) (presenting several
anecdotes and concluding that these stories spurred the legislation).
60. See Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 184 ("The issue was defined largely by
advocates in a way that served their interests: greedy insurers were risking the health of
mothers and of our most vulnerable and innocent population, babies."); see also supra
note 18 and accompanying text (describing the normative implications of using these
terms).
61. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S10021 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (Sup. Docs. No.
xl.1/A:142121) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) ("Our country can no longer afford to let
money, rather than the health needs of mothers and babies, be our paramount concern.");
142 CONG. REc. H6317 (daily ed. June 27, 1996) (Sup. Docs. No. xl.l/A:141/106)
(statement of Rep. Miller) ("The health of the baby, not of insurance company portfolios,
should be our No. 1 concern."); 142 CONG. REc. E767 (daily ed. May 10, 1996) (Sup.
Docs. No. xl.1/A:142/65) (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("This bill responds to the concerns
of pregnant women and... physicians.., who have become increasingly concerned about
the risks involved [with early postpartum discharge].... This is happening more and more
frequently because insurance companies are deciding that early discharge is in [their] best
1999] POSTPARTUM HOSPITAL STAYS
Mothers' Health Protection Act ("Newborns' Act") was considered
on the floor of the Senate, Senators from across the political spectrum
condemned drive-through deliveries as "unconscionable" (Senators
DeWine and Helms),62 "scary" (Senator Biden),63  and "simply
unacceptable" (Senator Snowe). 6 Individual Senators argued that it
was "common sense" for an insurance policy to include the mandated
coverage (Senator Bradley)6 because physicians could not detect
certain common medical problems within the first twenty-four hours
of birth (Senators Bradley, Moseley-Braun, Kennedy, Snowe, Bryan,
and Feinstein),66 and, therefore, there were "clear health problem[s]
with women who are discharged too early" (Senator Bradley).67 The
mandated coverage would "be beneficial to countless mothers and
their newborn children because it [would] restore health care
decisions to those best suited to make them-the mothers and their
doctors" (Senator Helms)68 and "increase[] the odds that the next
generation gets off to a healthy start" (Senator Wyden) 69
Senators Wellstone, DeWine, Boxer, Chaffee, and Helms
recounted how their personal experiences, including discussions with
interest [even when both the doctor and new mother believe that the longer stay is
medically appropriate]."); 142 CONG. REC. S4640 (daily ed. May 2, 1996) (Sup. Docs. No.
xl.1/A:142/59) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller) ("Many large insurers are refusing to pay
for more than 24 hours of maternity care. I do not know where managed care is going to
take this country. [I] am extremely worried about it, and I am even more worried about
for-profit HMOs and managed care.").
62. 142 CONG. REC. S9908 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1996) (Sup. Does. No. xl.1/A:142/121)
(statement of Sen. DeWine); Id at S9910 (statement of Sen. Helms).
63. Id. at S9905 (statement of Sen. Biden).
64. Id. at S9913 (statement of Sen. Snowe).
65. Id. at S9904 (statement of Sen. Bradley). Senator Bradley repeated this
characterization of the issue when he appeared on the ABC news program Nightline. See
Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 185. Governor Christine Todd Whitman similarly
noted that the New Jersey statute mandating similar coverage was "'common sense to
give women a chance to recover and babies a chance to get a good head start.'" Jay
Nordheimer, New Mothers Gain 2nd Day of Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1995, at B1
(quoting Governor Whitman).
Finally, President Clinton echoed this characterization when he signed the bill.
See President's Remarks on Signing the Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development and Independent Agencies' Appropriations Act, 1997, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1676, 1677 (Sept. 26, 1996) ("This law is common sense and now it will be the law
of the land.").
66. See 142 CONG. REC. S9914 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1996) (Sup. Does. No.
xl.l/A:142/121) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); id. (statement of Sen. Bryan); id at S9913
(statement of Sen. Snowe); id at S9912 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id at S9911
(statement of Sen. Moseley-Braun); id at S9904 (statement of Sen. Bradley).
67. Id. at S9904 (statement of Sen. Bradley).
68. Id. (statement of Sen. Helms).
69. Id at S9909 (statement of Sen. Wyden).
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their daughters and daughters-in-law, led them to vote for such
legislation." The issue also struck a chord with the public. Senator
Bradley revealed that he had received 85,000 pieces of mail backing
the Newborns' Act after an article appeared in Good Housekeeping
magazine about the legislation-an observation that lost some of its
persuasive force when Senator Bradley noted that he had gotten even
more mail on the arcane subject of interest deferral.7 '
Similar rhetoric was reflected in other venues. Newspaper
columnists condemned drive-through deliveries in outraged tones.72
Two prominent New Jersey pediatricians branded drive-through
deliveries "'maternal abuse, child neglect, and physician
harassment'" in the pages of the official journal of the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP).73 The American College of Obstetrics
and Gynecology (ACOG) denounced rapid postpartum discharge as
"an uncontrolled experiment" on the health and safety of American
women and children and called for a moratorium on drive-through
deliveries until their safety could be established.74 A foreign medical
70. See id. at S9910 (statement of Sen. Helms); id. (statement of Sen. Chaffee); id. at
S9908 (statement of Sen. Boxer); id. (statement of Sen. DeWine); id. at S9907 (statement
of Sen. Wellstone).
71. See id. at S9904 (statement of Sen. Bradley) (referring to Jeanie Russell
Kasindorf, Home Too Soon; Premature Hospital Discharge of Newborn Infants, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING, Oct. 1995, at 116 passim). Senator Biden similarly observed that the
issue was called to his attention by someone who had read the same Good Housekeeping
article. See id. at S9905 (statement of Sen. Biden).
72. See, e.g., Robin Abcarian, Is 48 Hours So Much to Ask?, L.A. TIMES, May 15,
1996, at El ("The outraged have joined forces in an unprecedented and deeply satisfying
attempt to force insurance companies and HMOs to pay for a woman to stay in the
hospital for at least 48 hours after giving birth."); Boodman, supra note 46, at 11; Editorial,
Drive-Through Delivery, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996, at A16, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wtimes File; Ellen Goodman, Lower Speed Limit on Highway to Drive-Thru
Deliveries, BOST. GLOBE, July 9, 1995, § 7, at 63; Betsy McCaughey, Don't Send Babies
Home So Soon, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at A23, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wtimes File.
73. Seymour Charles & Barry Prystowsky, Early Discharge, in the End: Maternal
Abuse, Child Neglect, and Physician Harassment, 96 PEDIATRICS 746, 746 (1995).
74. Julie Rovner, USA Divides over Early Discharge of Mothers, 346 LANCET 171,
171 (1995) (" 'The routine imposition of a short and arbitrary time limit on hospital stay
that does not take maternal and infant need into account could be equivalent to a large,
uncontrolled, uninformed experiment that may potentially affect the health of American
women and their babies .... '" (quoting the ACOG statement)); Sandra G. Boodman,
Congress Moves to Limit Early Discharges After Childbirth, WASH. POST, July 4, 1995, at
Health Insert 6 ("ACOG called the practice a 'large, uncontrolled, uninformed
experiment' that may needlessly endanger newborns because it provides too little
opportunity for doctors to observe or to test a baby or to teach parents how to adequately
care for one.").
Although ACOG's statement might appear compelling, it is so hedged with
qualifiers ("could be equivalent" and "may potentially affect") as to be meaningless.
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journal even got into the act, calling the practice "one of the most
egregious examples of the type of cost-cutting that misinforms
corporate medicine."75
Hillary Rodham Clinton condemned the practice in her
newspaper column, at a speech during the Democratic National
Convention, and in an appearance on the Oprah Winfrey Show.76
President Clinton announced his support for the legislation in a
Mother's Day radio address.77 Professor Arthur Miller addressed the
More significantly, ACOG did not address the fact that relatively few medical practices
have been validated by randomized controlled trials-including the existing patterns of
postpartum care, which the Newborns' Act effectively enshrined as federal law. See infra
notes 176, 261 and accompanying text. For example, fetal monitoring became a routine
and well-accepted component of obstetrical practice without the benefit of such controlled
trials. When large-scale studies of fetal monitoring were finally performed, it became
clear that fetal monitoring created costs without benefits, despite the vehement views of
many obstetricians to the contrary:
More than 20 years and 11 randomized trials later, electronic fetal monitoring
appears to have little documented benefit over intermittent auscultation with
respect to perinatal mortality or long term neurologic outcome. Furthermore,
probably in part because of the widespread use of fetal monitoring, the rate of
Cesarean section has increased, with a resulting increase in maternal morbidity
and costs but without apparent decrease in the incidence of cerebral palsy.
Karin B. Nelson et al., Uncertain Value of Electronic Fetal Monitoring in Predicting
Cerebral Palsy, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 613, 613 (1996) (citations omitted).
The now routine use of ultrasound during pregnancy raises similar issues. Unlike
fetal monitoring, routine ultrasound does not appear to result in any harm, but it does
impose costs without medical benefit. See Bernard G. Ewigman et al., Effect of Prenatal
Ultrasound Screening on Perinatal Outcome, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 821, 825 (1993)
(finding no medical benefit from routine ultrasound screening of pregnant women).
Predictably enough, "[e]minent obstetricians immediately denounced the report as
clinically useless, however scientific its methodology, because it failed to place any value
on the patients' peace of mind during pregnancy." Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R.
Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in
Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455,466 (1994).
In 1993, the cost attributable to this peace of mind was between $500 million and
$1 billion. See Warren E. Leary, Study Finds Waste in Ultrasound Use, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 1993, at A17. Given the shellacking that they received in the campaign against drive-
through deliveries, it is not all that surprising that MCOs have not moved against
unnecessary prenatal ultrasounds. See Jon Van, Ultrasounds Still Cloudy, Costly Issue,
CM. TRIB., Dec. 2, 1997, § 1, at 1 ("Virtually every pregnant woman today expects to get
at least one ultrasound image of her fetus ... ").
75. Editorial, Manipulated Care, 348 LANCET 903, 903 (1996).
76. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Our Family, Like Your Family, Is Part of a Larger
Community, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1996, at A31; Hillary Rodham Clinton, Safeguards
Needed for Childbirth, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1995, at 11F; Kasindorf, supra note 71, at 116.
77. See Robert Pear, Clinton Says Maternity Plans Need to Offer 2 Hospital Days,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996, at A27. President Clinton pulled out all the stops on the
subject of drive-through deliveries:
Tomorrow millions of Americans will honor our mothers with hugs and bouquets
and visits for dinner. Others of us will simply offer up a silent prayer for the
mother who still lives in our heart, but who has left this Earth. I miss my own
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subject in one of his famous roundtables. 78 Despite this widespread
enthusiasm for a legislative solution, the debate over drive-through
deliveries never reached the merits. Instead, the issue was resolved
on the basis of anecdotes, popular hostility, and "common sense."
B. State Legislative Initiatives
Twenty-nine states prohibited drive-through deliveries within
eighteen months of the issue appearing on the policy agenda. 9 With
limited variations, the state statutes followed two distinct models:
mandatory specified coverage and mandatory standard-driven
coverage. The mandatory specified coverage statutes required
insurers to cover an inpatient hospitalization for a definite time
period-typically forty-eight hours for a vaginal delivery and ninety-
six hours for a Cesarean section." The mandatory standard-driven
coverage statutes required insurers to provide coverage of an
inpatient hospitalization for the amount of time suggested by ACOG
and AAP or to defer to the judgment of the attending physician.8
Because the statutes mandated coverage and not care, women
mother very much, especially on Mother's Day. I can't give her roses tomorrow,
but with your help we can honor all mothers by giving mothers-to-be something
far more important-the assurance that when they bring a baby into this world,
they will not be rushed out of the hospital until they and their health care
provider decide it is medically safe for both mother and child.
Transcript of the President's Radio Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 733, 733 (May 11, 1996).
78. See Your Money & Your Life: America's Managed Care Revolution (PBS
television broadcast Sept. 6, 1995) (Arthur Miller, moderator), transcript available at
<http:llwww.wnet.org/archivelmhc/Info/TV/Transcript.html>.
79. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
80. For example, New Jersey's statute specifies that insurers are required to cover "a
minimum of 48 hours of inpatient care following a vaginal delivery and a minimum of 96
hours of inpatient care following a Cesarean section for a mother and her newly born child
in a health care facility." NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-61(a) (West 1996). Most of the other
states have followed this strategy. See Elizabeth H. Thilo et al., The History of Policy and
Practice Related to the Perinatal Hospital Stay, 25 CLINICS PERINATOLOGY 257, 262-63
(1998) (noting that Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin mandate coverage of a certain number of hours of
postpartum hospitalization).
81. For example, Alabama's statute requires insurance plans to provide coverage that
"shall be consistent with the most recent version of the 'Guidelines for Perinatal Care'
prepared by the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists." 'ALA. CODE §§ 27-48-1, -2 (LEXIS through 1998 Reg.
Sess.). Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire,
Tennessee, and Washington also followed this strategy. See Thilo et al., supra note 80, at
262-63.
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were not required to deliver their children in hospitals, nor were they
required to stay in the hospital until their coverage was used up. The
states adopted varying strategies for addressing this issue. Most states
left the decision to the attending physician, either with or without
consultation with the mother.82 Three states specified that the
mothers was required to make the decision.' Most states prohibited
MCOs from offering positive or negative inducements to the mother
and.physician to encourage early discharge.'
Some states authorized discharge in less than the specified time
so long as there was post-discharge follow-up, but legislators quickly
became unenthusiastic about such arrangements if they were
employed too frequently. For example, when Maryland prohibited
drive-through deliveries in 1995, it allowed a rapid postpartum
discharge if there was a follow-up home visit. However, this
provision was removed in 1996 because it was perceived as offering
insurers a means of circumventing the statutory mandate favoring
extended postpartum stays.8 5
The most interesting feature of the state statutes was their
tendency to expressly exclude certain portions of the population from
their protections. Of the twenty-nine states that initially enacted such
8Z See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-96-207, MATERNITY CARE:
APPROPRIATE FOLLOW-UP SERVICES CRITICAL WITH SHORT HOSPITAL STAYS 18
(1996) (Sup. Does. No. GAI.13:HEHS-96-207) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] ("In 11 states,
early discharge is permitted only upon the recommendation of the attending physician and
then only if the mother consents or is at least consulted. Seven other states provide for the
decision to be made by the attending physician, usually based [on medical necessity or] the
AAP/ACOG guidelines.").
83. See id. ("In Kentucky, New York, and New Jersey, the decision about when to go
home rests solely with the mother.").
84. See iL ("Seventeen states that mandate minimum stays for new mothers or
require that maternity care decisions be consistent with AAP/ACOG guidelines also
provide some degree of [professional] protection to physicians making such decisions.").
Missouri and Ohio also prohibit insurers from offering money or gifts to encourage
mothers to leave the hospital. See id. at 18 n.32.
85. See id. at 18. As the General Accounting Office noted:
Under the original Maryland law, the insurer could choose to cover less than a
48- to 96-hour stay if a newborn met the AAP/ACOG criteria for medical
stability and at least one postpartum home visit (including newborn screening)
was authorized. Because the home visit was much less expensive than another
day of hospital care, many insurers chose early discharge. This was of such
concern to Maryland legislators that the law was subsequently amended to
provide that the decision regarding length of stay be made by the mother after
conferring with her physician.
Id; see also Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 189 ("Early evidence suggested that the
new law had no impact on postpartum lengths of stay in [Maryland], and the 1996 revision
expanded and strengthened the provisions of the law.").
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legislation, eighteen states excluded Medicaid beneficiaries. s6
Because Medicaid pays for approximately 40% of the births in the
United States, with the percentage considerably higher in some states,
the on-budget costs of such legislation obviously played a role in the
decision to exclude the Medicaid population from the statutory
ambitY7 Indeed, California considered such legislation, but deferred
action for one year after it determined that the costs associated with
prohibiting drive-through deliveries for its Medicaid population were
too high.88 Similarly, nineteen states excluded state employees from
their statutes' protection.89 As with the Medicaid population, state
governments would incur on-budget costs if they had to purchase
coverage for extended postpartum stays for state employees. Thus,
most state legislatures displayed concern for the plight of women and
infants "victimized" by drive-through deliveries only as long as state
governments did not have to foot the bill to fix the problem.
C. Federal Legislative Initiatives
It quickly became apparent that state-based regulation of drive-
through deliveries was ineffective. As outlined previously, ERISA
wholly preempts state regulatory authority over the 50 million
86. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 21 ("Of the 29 states with maternity care
requirements, 11 made them applicable to the state Medicaid program .... "); see also
Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 192 ("Only in eight out of the 23 states for which we
have data on Medicaid coverage do the new laws clearly apply to women on Medicaid:
Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and
Virginia.").
87. See Katherine Swartz, Babies Are Coming: Don't Cap Medicaid, 277 JAMA 421,
421 (1997) ("In 1994, there were 12 states in which Medicaid paid for 45% or more of all
births. Nationally in that year, Medicaid paid for 39% of all births."). The federal
government pays the lion's share of Medicaid expenses, but even with the federal funds,
Medicaid remains a major expense for most states. See Richard Manski et al., Medicaid,
Managed Care, and America's Health Safety Net, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 30, 30 (1997)
("Expressed in terms of its percentage of state budgets, Medicaid doubled from 10 percent
to 20 percent [between 1988 and 1993] to the point that it is currently the second largest
budget item for most states.").
88. See David R. Olmos, Bill to Extend HMOs' Birth Care Is Shelved, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1996, at A3 (noting that the bill, which would have required coverage of minimum
inpatient maternity stays, was delayed after a legislative analyst's report concluded that it
would cost the state Medi-Cal program as much as $50 million in 1997). California
ultimately passed such legislation in 1997. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.62
(West Supp. 1999). California was not the only state with short postpartum stays for
Medicaid beneficiaries. See Stephanie L. Ferguson & Carolyn Long Engelhard, Maternity
Length of Stay and Public Policy: Issues and Implications, 11 J. PEDIATRIC NURSING 392,
393 (1996) (discussing the "Home Tomorrow Program" administered by the Virginia
Medicaid program).
89. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 21 ("Of the 29 states with maternity care
requirements,... 10 [made them applicable] to state employees.").
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Americans in self-funded employee benefit plans.90 In some states,
this preemption meant that the state's prohibition on drive-through
deliveries had no impact on the majority of its employed population.91
In addition, individuals who crossed state borders to work or to
receive health care could find themselves without the protections that
their state legislators had thought were appropriate. For example, an
individual who worked in state A and received her health insurance
from an insured employee benefit plan would have the scope of her
maternity coverage dictated by the laws of state A, even if she lived in
state B and delivered her baby in state C. Similarly, if an individual
lived and worked in state A and delivered her baby in state B, the
scope of her maternity coverage would again be dictated by state A.
Short of imposing a mandate directly on hospitals to provide the
specified care, states B and C simply could not affect postpartum
lengths of stay for individuals who secured their insurance from
another state.92 As understanding of these "regulatory mismatches"
expanded, it became clear that a comprehensive solution required
congressional action.93
Several bills prohibiting drive-through deliveries were introduced
in Congress in 1995, but Senate Bill 969 became the vehicle for
consideration of the issue.94 In August 1995, the Senate Labor and
Human Relations Committee held its only hearing on the subject.
Senators from both parties issued stern warnings about the hazards of
90. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S9905 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1996) (Sup. Docs. No.
xl.l/A:142/121) (statement of Sen. Biden) ("The bottom line of this is that, in Delaware,
only about 15 percent of the people with health insurance would be affected by a State law
that my State is passing."); see also id at S9907 (statement of Sen. Wellstone) ("In
Minnesota I think it is about only 40 percent of the people .... ).
92. Massachusetts finessed the ERISA problem by imposing the burden directly on
in-state hospitals. See Kuper, supra note 59, at 686. Chicago considered a similar
approach, which involved taking away the hospital's license and its right to secure water
without charge if it did not keep postpartum women for the requisite number of hours.
See id.
93. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 191-96 (1982) (defining a
"regulatory mismatch" as a poor fit between the tools available to a regulator and the
problem being regulated).
94. The federal proposals included H.R. Con. Res. 79, 104th Cong. (1995) (Sup. Docs.
No. Y1.4/9:H.Con.Res.104-79); H.R. 1936, 104th Cong. (1995) (Sup. Does. No.
Y1.4/7:H.R.104-1936); H.R. 1948, 104th Cong. (1995) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.4/7:H.R.104-
1948); H.R. 1950, 104th Cong. (1995) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.4/7:H.R.104-1950); H.R. 1955,
104th Cong. (1995) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.4/7:H.R.104-1955); H.R. 1970, 104th Cong. (1995)
(Sup. Docs. No. Y1.4/7:H.R.104-1970); and S. 969, 104th Cong. (1995) (Sup. Does. No.
Y1.4/1:104). Senate Bill 969 was the focus of the hearing held by the Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources. See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at
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drive-through deliveries.95 The witness list was stacked in favor of the
legislation. Four witnesses provided heart-wrenching testimony
about how their infants had died or nearly died as a result of a drive-
through delivery.96 Representatives of the AMA and ACOG
denounced the way MCOs were interfering with physicians' ability to
exercise their professional discretion and warned in dark terms about
the hazards of drive-through deliveries.97 A neonatologist from
Dartmouth Medical Center reported the results of her study finding
an elevated risk of readmission and visits to the emergency
department if mother and infant were discharged within forty-eight
hours of birth.98 Representatives from two MCOs were left for last.
They testified that their organizations had experienced considerable
success and a high degree of patient satisfaction with short
postpartum stays.99 Additional statements supporting the legislation
were filed with the Committee by the AAP,00 the Chicago
Department of Public Health, 1 1 a neonatologist in California,1 2 and
95. See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 1-14, 51-52, 69-70
(statements of Senators Bradley, Frist, Kassebaum, Kennedy, Pell, and Wellstone).
96. See id. at 15-23, 77-80 (statements of Karen Davies, Virginia Leigh Fallon,
Michelle Bauman, and Steve Bauman).
97. See id. at 32-36,52-58 (statements of Dr. Michael T. Mennuti, Chair, ACOG, and
Dr. Palma Formica, Board of Trustees, AMA).
98. See id. at 30-32, 80-81 (statements of Dr. Judith E. Frank, Dartmouth Medical
School).
99. See id. at 36-39, 58-69 (statements of Dr. Richard Marshall, Chief of Pediatrics,
Harvard Community Health Plan, and Dr. Sharon Levine, Associate Medical Director,
Permanente Medical Group, Inc.). On the satisfaction level of managed care enrollees
with rapid postpartum discharges, see id. at 66 (statement of Dr. Sharon Levine) (noting
patient satisfaction rates with rapid postpartum discharges in excess of 90% in one MCO).
Indeed, one of the MCO representatives noted that in Sacramento, 65% of patients were
satisfied with their time of discharge, and 20% complained it did not occur early enough.
See id; see also Mary Lord, Check In, Deliver, Go Home, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. Dec.
5, 1994, at 98, 99 ("[E]arly discharge programs appear to be popular with patients. Some
83 percent of Kaiser Permanente maternity patients polled recently, for example,
expressed satisfaction with their hospital stay.").
Both MCO representatives emphasized that careful patient selection, education,
and follow-up were critical, and that the decision to discharge should be a medical one. As
one of the MCO representatives observed, arbitrary coverage restrictions of any sort were
problematic, whether dictated by statute or by the insurer. See Newborns' and Mothers'
Hearing, supra note 24, at 38-39 (statement of Dr. Sharon Levine).
100. See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 76-77 (statement of the
AAP).
101. See id. at 70-71 (statement of the Chicago Department of Public Health).
102. See id. at 81-83 (statement of Dr. Augosto Sola). Dr. Sola reported his anecdotal
experience that a number of infants were suffering brain damage or dying as a result of
undiagnosed hyperbilirubinemia and asserted that such cases would have been diagnosed
and appropriately treated if postpartum stays were longer. See id. Dr. Sola's results were
published in abstract form. See Augusto Sola, Abstract, Changes in Clinical Practice and
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the Association of Women's Health, Obstetric and Neonatal
Nurses. °3  The American College of Nurse-Midwives filed a
statement opposing the legislation.1°
Although there was a substantial delay due to budgetary disputes
between the 104th Congress and President Clinton, the Newborns'
Act eventually passed Congress virtually unanimously and was signed
by President Clinton on September 26, 1996.105 The Newborns' Act
incorporated elements from many of the state statutes, but
encompassed all insurers in the United States, including self-funded
employee benefit plans. The preliminary findings reflected Congress'
considered judgment that:
[T]he length of post-delivery hospital stay should be based
on the unique characteristics of each mother and her
newborn child, taking into consideration the health of the
mother, the health and stability of the newborn, the ability
and confidence of the mother and the father to care for their
newborn, the adequacy of support systems at home, and the
access of the mother and her newborn to appropriate follow-
up health care .... 106
Effective January 1, 1998, the Newborns' Act requires coverage
of at least forty-eight hours of hospitalization following a normal
vaginal delivery and ninety-six hours of hospitalization following a
Cesarean section.1°7 Earlier discharge is possible if the physician, in
consultation with the mother, decides it is appropriate. 0 8 The Act
prohibits offers of monetary payments, rebates, or additional services
to mothers to encourage them to accept less than the minimum
benefits. The Act also prohibits adjusting physicians' compensation
Bilirubin Encephalopathy in "Healthy Term Newborns," 37 PEDIATRIC RES. 145A, 145A
(1996).
Two other articles presented additional data on this point. See Audrey K. Brown
& Lois Johnson, Loss of Concern About Jaundice and the Reemergence of Kernicterus in
Full-Term Infants in the Era of Managed Care, in YEARBOOK OF NEONATAL AND
PERINATAL MEDICINE xvii, xviii, xvix-xxvi (1996); Mhairi G. MacDonald, Hidden Risks:
Early Discharge and Bilirubin Toxicity Due to Glucose 6-Phosphate Dehydrogenase
Deficiency, 96 PEDIATRICS 734,734-38 (1995).
103. See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 70-73,76-77 (statement of
the Association of Women's Health, Obstetric and Neonatal Nurses).
104. See id at 72-73 (statement of the American College of Nurse-Midwives).
105. See Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204,
110 Stat. 2935 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-4, -51 (1996)).
106. See id § 602.
107. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185. The same provision restricts the ability of insurers to
require physicians to obtain authorization for any particular hospitalization, so long as it is
less than the mandated coverage. See id.
108. See id
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to induce them to discharge patients more rapidly.10 9 Thus, women
who are discharged in less than forty-eight hours after a vaginal
delivery or ninety-six hours after a Cesarean section cannot receive
home nursing visits unless the visits duplicate the services they would
have received in the hospital.110
Like many of the state statutes, the Newborns' Act excludes
Medicaid recipients from its protections."' Although the bill that
ultimately became the Newborns' Act originally encouraged the
substitution of post-discharge care for postpartum hospitalization, the
statute as enacted is silent on this issue.12
For those states that already had passed legislation, the
Newborns' Act provided that state law would govern if it was at least
as strict as the federal legislation." During the fourteen month delay
between the passage of the Newborns' Act and its implementation, a
number of additional states enacted their own legislation." 4
Reaction to the Newborns' Act and the corresponding state
legislation has been overwhelmingly positive. Newspaper editorials
and columnists have hailed the laws."15 At least nine law review notes
have supported these initiatives for restraining the worst impulses of
109. See id. Although the Newborns' Act does not address the possibility of a
disagreement between mother and physician, the plain language of the statute indicates
that the physician has decision-making authority, so long as the mother is consulted. See
id.
110. Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Under the Newborns'
and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,546, 57,554, 57,555 (1998)
(interim rules) [hereinafter Newborns' Regulations].
111. Almost one year later, a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 applied the
Newborns' Act to state Medicaid programs, but only if the state participates in a Medicaid
managed care program. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4704, 111
Stat. 275,498 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-2(b)(8) (West Supp. 1999)).
112. Senate Bill 969 specified that:
a health plan that provides coverage for post-delivery care provided to a mother
and her newly born child in the home shall not be required to provide coverage
of in-patient care [of the specified length] unless such in-patient care is
determined to be medically necessary by the attending physician or is requested
by the mother.
S. 969,104th Cong. (1995) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.4/1:104:S.969).
113. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185.
114. See Newborns' Regulations, supra note 110, at 57,552 ("It should be noted that
since the enactment of [the Newborns' Act], twelve additional States have enacted laws or
regulations .... ).
115. See, e.g., Editorial, A Step That Shouldn't Be Necessary, HARTFORD COURANT,
Oct. 3, 1996, at A18 ("What ought to have been common sense now has the force of
federal law .... "); Cynthia Tucker, The Unprofitability of Health Care, S.F. CHRON., Dec.
9, 1995, at A20 ("The poster children for market forces gone awry are newborns and their
moms, forced to leave the hospital, on average, in 24 hours-whether they are medically
ready to go or not .... ).
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managed care and for helping to "put the brakes" on drive-through
deliveries."6 The general sentiment is that the Newborns' Act was a
necessary step to protect consumers in the medical marketplace.
Emboldened by their success, enthusiasts have pushed to extend
similar protections to women who have undergone mastectomies.1 7
Unfortunately, the real medical, economic, and policy issues raised by
such legislation have been buried beneath the general enthusiasm
about a true "motherhood and apple-pie" law. The balance of this
Article addresses these issues.
116. See Freeman L. Farrow, Note, Drive-Through Deliveries: In Support of Federal
Legislation to Mandate Insurer Coverage of Medically Sound Minimum Lengths of
Postpartum Stays for Mothers and Newborns, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1039 (1996);
Susan D. Hargus, Note, Define Minimum In-Patient Care That Health Insurers Must
Provide for a Mother and Newborn, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 201 (1996); Kuper, supra note
60; Christine A. McAteer, Note, Health Care Mandates: The Delivery Debate, 26 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1691 (1996); Beth Mandel Rosenthal, Note, Drive-Through Deliveries and
the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 753 (1997);
Seaman, supra note 60; Tracy Wilson Smirnoff, Note, "Drive Through Deliveries".
Indiscriminate Postpartum Early Discharge Practices Presently Necessitate Legislation
Mandating Minimum In-Patient Hospital Stays, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 231 (1996). Two of
the law review notes were considerably more critical than the others, but were still
supportive of the legislation. See Note, Health Care Law-"Drive-Through Delivery"
Regulation-Massachusetts Requires Hospital Stays of Forty-Eight Hours for Newborns
and Postpartum Mothers, 109 HARV. L. REv. 2116 (1996); Kate E. Ryan, Note, Mandating
Coverage for Maternity Length of Stays: Certain Problems with the Good Idea, 11 J.L. &
HEALTH 271 (1996).
117. See, e.g., President William Jefferson Clinton, 1997 State of the Union Address
(Feb. 4, 1997), reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at A14 ("Just as we ended drive-
through deliveries of babies last year, we must now end the dangerous and demeaning
practice of forcing women home from the hospital only hours after a mastectomy.");
Raymond Hernandez, Accord in Albany Seeks Change in Policy on Mastectomy Care,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1997, at B1 (discussing a bill that would allow women the option to
stay in the hospital as long as they and their doctors choose following a mastectomy).
Knowing a loser when they see it, MCOs have essentially capitulated. See Laura
Johannes, Managed-Care Group Softens View on Hospital Stays After Mastectomies,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1996, at B6 (reporting that an MCO trade organization adopted a
policy urging its members not to deny hospital stays following mastectomies); Laura
Johannes, More HMOs Order Outpatient Mastectomies, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1996, at BI
(reporting that one MCO reversed its outpatient mastectomy policy "largely in
recognition of the 'emotional issues' involved in the surgery. 'Some battles just aren't
worth fighting .... '" (quoting Lee Newcomer, Chief Medical Officer of United
Healthcare Corporation)).
Although Congress has been unable to pass legislation prohibiting such practices
to date, see Judy Mann, Breast Cancer Patients Deserve Better, WASH. POST, May 15, 1998,
at E3, legislative ingenuity continues apace; a proposed patients' bill of rights in Maryland
provides for coverage of 48-hour minimum hospital stays for testicular cancer surgery and
24-hour stays for lymph node dissection and lumpectomies. See Timothy B. Wheeler,
Added Patient Rights Sought, BALT. SUN, Jan. 23, 1999, at lB.
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III. DRIVE-THROUGH DELIVERIES: GOOD OR BAD?
The appropriate postpartum length of stay is an exceedingly
complex issue, heavily influenced by both social and economic
considerations. In recent years, there has been a fairly precipitous,
broad-based decline in the rate and length of hospitalization for all
conditions, including postpartum stays. The length of a postpartum
hospitalization also varies significantly on a regional basis. The
empirical scholarship on the appropriate postpartum length of stay
does not support the conventional wisdom that there are significant
perils associated with early discharge. Part III addresses each of these
points in turn.
A. U.S. Hospitalization Trends
This century has witnessed a quick rise and an even more
precipitous decline in inpatient treatment.n In the past, hospitals
routinely admitted patients for rest, observation, and "leisurely
workups."'' 9 Those days are long over. Now, many treatments are
provided on an outpatient basis, and even post-surgical stays have
been shortened to an extent undreamed of less than a decade ago.n °
118. Indeed, postpartum hospitalization itself is a comparatively recent development.
In 1900, less than 5% of women delivered their children in a hospital. See Valerie M.
Parisi & Bruce A. Meyer, To Stay or Not to Stay? That Is the Question, 333 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1635, 1635 (1995). By 1945, this figure had climbed to almost 80% of all deliveries.
See id.
Outside the United States, the length of postpartum hospitalization varies
tremendously. See John R. Britton et al., Early Discharge of the Term Newborn: A
Continued Dilemma, 94 PEDIATRICS 291, 291 (1994) ("Recently, 1- to 3-day postnatal
stays have also become more popular in other western countries such as the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Scandinavia, where 6- to 10-day hospitalizations had been
customary in the past."); Lord, supra note 99, at 99 (presenting data on ten countries, with
length of stay ranging from 24 hours to two weeks); Thilo et al., supra note 80, at 265-68
(same). In the United Kingdom, a 24-hour stay has become "increasingly common,
whether the mother wants it or not." Sarah Lyall, Less Time in Hospitals for Mothers in
Britain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, at A21. However, the United Kingdom relies heavily
on midwives to provide post-discharge support. See id.
119. As one commentator has noted:
Physicians who received medical training during the early days of Medicare may
recall when patients with newly diagnosed uncomplicated diabetes and
hypertension were admitted for leisurely workups. Disputing the attending
physician's decision to transfer a patient to the intensive care unit for
"observation" may have succeeded only in incurring his or her wrath-the issue
of cost was seemingly irrelevant at the time.
Jeanette M. Smith, Effectively Costing out Options, 276 JAMA 1180, 1180 (1996).
120. See Jan Ziegler, Drive-Through Delivery: Bargain or Blunder?, Bus. & HEALTH,
Sept. 1995, at 19, 19 (noting that the trend to accelerate discharge has "cut across medical
specialties. As little as two years ago ... the average heart patient undergoing by-pass
surgery spent 14 to 16 days in the hospital. Now these same patients go home in five to
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Changes in hospital reimbursement from cost-based per diem to
prospective payment based on discharge diagnosis have accelerated
the trend.'2 ' U.S. rates of hospitalization and average length of stay
are now at all-time lows.'2
Not surprisingly, these trends are reflected in postpartum lengths
of stay. Figure 1 demonstrates that the average length of maternal
postpartum hospitalization declined steadily from 1970 through 1996,
and that the decline started well before managed care became a
significant aspect of health care in the United States."z
FIGURE 1
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seven days."). During the hearing on Senate Bill 969, Senator Frist echoed this point:
In my own field of heart surgery, when I was doing routine coronary artery
bypass surgery, 8 years ago, we would keep people in the hospital for 12 days.
Because of pressures-the same sort of pressures that are applying here, mainly
from managed care companies and insurers-that went to 10 days, 8 days, 7 days,
and now is down to about 4 days."
Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 9-10.
121. See David A. Hyman & Joel V. Williamson, Fraud and Abuse: Regulatory
Alternatives in a "Competitive" Health Care Era, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1133, 1139 n.41
(1988) (noting the impact of the prospective payment system on hospital length of stay).
122- See AMERICAN HOSP. AS'N, HOSPITAL STATISTICS 2 (1998).
123. The chart was created using the data from Sally C. Curtin & Lola Jean Kozak,
Decline in U.S. Cesarean Delivery Rate Appears to Stall, 25 BIRTH 259, 261 tbl.2 (1998). A
similar chart presenting data from 1970 to 1992 is found in Trends in Length of Stay for
Hospital Deliveries-United States, 1970-1992, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 335,335 fig.1 (1995) [hereinafter Trends].
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As this chart reflects, in 1970, the average length of stay after a
vaginal delivery was 3.9 days, and the average length of stay after a
Cesarean section was 7.8 days. By 1996, the average length of stay
after a vaginal delivery had decreased to 1.8 days (a 57% decrease),
and the average length of stay following a Cesarean section had
decreased to 3.5 days (a 54% decrease). If one broadens the time-
frame a bit, the decline is even more striking; postpartum length of
stay ranged from ten to fourteen days in the 1940s and gradually
dropped to five to seven days in the 1950s and 1960S.124 Indeed, the
definition of an "early discharge" has steadily dropped over the past
several decades."a
FIGURE 2
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124. See Martha Shirk, Snappy Birth Day, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Oct. 9, 1994, at
1C ("Women in their 50s and 60s, who routinely spent a week in a hospital after giving
birth to their children, are astonished by the idea of mothers going home the day after
giving birth."); Lynn Steinberg, Back Home with Baby, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 24, 1994, at Cl (" 'In 1949, when I was born, moms were in the hospital for 10 days,'
said Dr. Donald Shifrin, president of the Washington chapter of the American Academy
of Pediatrics.").
125. See, e.g., Britton et al., supra note 118, at 293 (noting that discharging in two to
five days was considered a "drastic step" in 1959); Woody Kessel et al., Early Discharge:
In the End, It Is Judgment, 96 PEDIATRICS 739, 739 (1995) ("There is no single standard
definition for early discharge. In the United States it is currently defined as less than 48
hours for healthy newborns. In the past decade, it was defined as 2 to 4 days; and in the
1980s it was 5 to 7 days.").
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If one looks at actual lengths of stay during a more compressed
time period, it is remarkable how quickly one-day postpartum stays
have become commonplace. Figure 2 indicates the distribution of
maternal lengths of stay following a vaginal delivery in the United
States in 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995.126 One-day stays accounted for
only 7.6% of vaginal deliveries in 1980, but had almost tripled by
1990, increasing to 21.2%. In the next five years, one-day stays more
than doubled again, to almost 47% of vaginal deliveries.
FIGURE 3
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The distribution of lengths of stay following Cesarean sections
during the same time period have a similar pattern.127 Figure 3
demonstrates that almost 85% of women who had a Cesarean section
stayed in the hospital for longer than five days in 1980, but the
number had dropped to approximately 30% by 1990 and was less
than 13% in 1995. Conversely, approximately 3% of women who had
Cesarean sections in 1980 had three days or less of postpartum
hospitalization, but the figure climbed to 32% by 1990 and to almost
70% in 1995. Individual states present a similar pattern. In
Wisconsin, the percentage of discharges within forty-eight hours of a
126. NAT'L CTr. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., PUB. NO. 99-1711, NATIONAL HOSPITAL DISCHARGE SURVEY: ANNUAL
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vaginal delivery increased from 18% of births in 1991 to 52% of births
in 1994.128 A similar pattern was observed in Ohio; the proportion of
Medicaid infants discharged following a short stay (less than one day
after vaginal delivery or two days following a Cesarean section)
increased from 21% in 1991 to 59.8% in 1995.129
FIGURE 4
AVERAGE STAY AFTER VAGINAL DELIVERY BY REGION
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These charts, which demonstrate widespread utilization of short
postpartum stays, might lead one to believe that postpartum hospital
stays are fairly uniform across the United States. Nothing could be
further from the truth. As Figure 4 reflects, average maternal
postpartum length of stay following a vaginal delivery has been
substantially longer in the Northeast and substantially shorter in the
West than in the rest of the nation for many years.130
128. See M. Bruce Edmonson et al., Hospital Readmission with Feeding-Related
Problems After Early Postpartum Discharge of Normal Newborns, 278 JAMA 299, 301
tbl.1 (1997); see also Anne M. Marbella et al., Neonatal Hospital Lengths of Stay,
Readmissions, and Charges, 101 PEDIATRICS 32, 34 fig.2 (1998) (depicting the distribution
of postpartum lengths of stay in Wisconsin from 1989 to 1994).
129. See Uma R. Kotagal et al., Safety of Early Discharge for Medicaid Newborns, 282
JAMA 1150, 1150 (1999). Because this study appeared while this article was in page
proofs, it is not discussed in detail.
130. See NCHS DISCHARGE SURVEY, supra note 126, at 37 tbl.31; NAT'L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. 86-1748,
UTILIZATION OF SHORT-STAY HOSPITALS BY DIAGNOSIS-RELATED GROUPS: UNITED
STATES, 1980-1984, at 33 (1986) (Sup. Docs. No. HE20.6209:13183) [hereinafter 1980-
1984 NCHS STUDY]; NAT'L CR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
POSTPARTUM HOSPITAL STAYS
As Figure 5 reflects, postpartum stays following Cesarean
sections demonstrate a similar pattern.1 31
FIGURE 5
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Similar patterns emerge if one focuses on the geographic
distribution of actual lengths of postpartum stays. One unpublished
study evaluated postpartum length of stay for approximately
1,137,000 newborns delivered vaginally in four regions of the country
in 1993.132 As Figure 6 demonstrates, the frequency of one day of
postpartum hospitalization after a vaginal delivery ranged from a low
of 13.3% of deliveries in the Northeast to 73.1% in the West.
HUMAN SERvs., PUB. No. 83-1735, IN-PATIENT UTILIZATION OF SHORT-STAY
HosPrrALS BY DIAGNOSIS: UNITED STATES, 1980, at 24 tbl.4 (1983) (Sup. Docs. No.
HE20.6209:13174) [hereinafter 1980 NCHS STUDY].
131. See NCHS DISCHARGE SURVEY, supra note 126, at 37 tbl.31; 1980-1984 NCHS
STUDY, supra note 130, at 33; 1980 NCHS STUDY, supra note 130, at 24 tbl.4.
132. See DAVE FOSTER & LINDA SCHNEIDER, HOSPITAL LENGTH OF STAY AND RE-
ADMISSION RATES FOR NORMAL DELIVERIES AND NEWBORNS: RELATIONSHIP TO
HOSPITAL, PATIENT, AND PAYER CHARACTERISTICS 8 (1995) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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Newborns delivered by Cesarean sections had a similar, but less
skewed distribution; 22.1% were discharged in two days or less in the
West, 3.9% were discharged in two days or less in the Northeast.133
Another study evaluated the frequency of one day of postpartum
hospitalization in 14,000 women who delivered vaginally in 1994 in
four regions of the country and found the percentage ranged from
approximately 34% in the Northeastern United States to
approximately 88% in the Western United States.M4 There is also
significant variation within states; one study found that the frequency
of early discharge in six regions of Ohio for Medicaid births varied
from 37.3% to 82.9% in 1995.15
Of course, these regional variations might be explained by
variations in insurance coverage. As noted previously, the
conventional wisdom is that postpartum lengths-of-stay have dropped
because MCOs are refusing to pay for such care. One study tested
this claim by simultaneously evaluating the impact of location and
insurance coverage on the percentage of one-day postpartum
discharges.136 Approximately one-third of the women were covered
133. See id. at 9.
134. See Julie A. Gazmararian & Jeffrey P. Koplan, Length-of-Stay After Delivery:
Managed Care Versus Fee-for-Service, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at 74,76.
135. See Kotagal et al., supra note 129, at 1152, tbl. 2.
136. See Gazmararian & Koplan, supra note 134, at 74.
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by an HMO,13 7 another one-third were covered by a point of service
plan (POS),138 and the final one-third were covered by an indemnity
plan."' The distribution of enrollees varied in different parts of the
country; HMO enrollees dominated in the West, and POS enrollees
dominated in the Northeast.140 As Figure 7 reflects, local practice
norms have a major impact on postpartum length of stay-and at
least in the West and Northeast, they overwhelm the impact of one's
insurance coverage.'4
FIGURE 7
ONE DAY POSTPARTUM STAYS BY REGION AND INSURANCE TYPE














Similar results have been obtained in other studies. In New
Jersey, the average inpatient length of stay for vaginal delivery in
1995 and 1996 fell within a narrow band, regardless of whether the
mother was covered by New Jersey Blue Cross, Medicaid, an HMO,
137. An HMO typically provides coverage for care received from a network of
authorized providers, but, except for emergencies when no authorized provider is
available, does not cover care received from an out-of-network provider. See id. at 75.
138. Unlike an HMO enrollee, a POS enrollee has coverage for care received within
the network of authorized providers, but also has the option of receiving care from an out-
of-network provider and obtaining some level of coverage for such care. See id.
139. In a standard indemnity insurance model, enrollees can see any provider they
choose and receive coverage in accordance with the terms of their insurance policy. See
id.
140. See id. at 76.
141. See id.
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self-pay, or commercial (indemnity) insurance.142 In Minnesota, an
analysis of 180,000 deliveries from 1990 to 1994 indicated that the
percentage of one-day postpartum hospitalizations for normal
newborns with indemnity coverage "generally tracked" that of
newborns with managed care coverage. 143
These sizeable regional variations in postpartum hospitalization
patterns, which are primarily attributable to local practice norms,
undercut the model of maternity care embraced by the state statutes
and the Newborns' Act. 14 Several commentators have observed that
in California, one-day stays after a vaginal delivery are the virtual rule
and stays of twelve hours or less are common. 145  Illinois is an
intermediate case; in 1995-1996, 56% of women with vaginal
deliveries were discharged after one day, and 72% of women who had
Cesarean sections were discharged in less than four days.146
Conversely, in New Jersey and Massachusetts, one-day stays are very
much the exception. In 1993, only 7% of newborns in New Jersey
142. See State of NJ., Dept. of Health & Senior Services, In-Patient Average Length of
Stay (Days) by Primary Payer (visited Oct. 14, 1999) <http://wwv.state.nj.us/health/
hcsa/95payl.htm>.
143. GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 4-5.
144. Such regional variation is by no means unique to postpartum care:
Health services researchers have long been aware of large variations in the use of
medical care among communities and regions ... in health care markets,
geography is destiny: the care one receives depends in large part on the supply of
resources available in the place where one lives-and on the practice patterns of
local physicians.
Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care in the United States, Ctr. for Evaluative Clinical
Sciences, Geographic Variations in Health Care (visited Aug. 19, 1999)
<http:lvww.dartmouth.edul-atlas/intro.html>; see also John Wennberg & Alan
Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 1102, 1107 (1973)
(describing wide variations in practice patterns throughout the United States).
145. See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 48 (statement by Dr.
Sharon Levine, Associate Medical Director, Permanente Medical Group, Inc.) (presenting
testimony that in the Kaiser health plan in Northern California, 40% of postpartum
women went home in less than 24 hours and the average length of postpartum
hospitalization was 40 hours, while in Southern California, the average length of stay was
21-24 hours); Paula Braveman et al., Early Discharge of Newborns and Mothers: A
Critical Review of the Literature, 96 PEDIATRICS 716, 716 (1995) (noting that in the
western United States, "stays of 12 to 24 hours or less after uncomplicated vaginal birth
and 48 to 72 hours after uncomplicated Cesarean delivery [were] standard"); Maribeth
Inturrisi & Lael Lambert, Length of Stay for Uncomplicated Vaginal Birth: A Perinatal
Continuous Quality Improvement Project, 12 J. PERINATAL & NEONATAL NURSING 11,
12 (1998) ("In California, most women went home within 24 hours."); Ziegler, supra note
120, at 19 ("Stays of 12 to 24 hours or less following an uncomplicated vaginal birth and 48
to 72 hours following an uncomplicated C[esarean] section are now standard, particularly
in the western United States.").
146. See Kristiana Raube & Katie Merrell, Maternal Minimum-Stay Legislation: Cost
and Policy Implications, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 922, 922 (1999).
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and 10% of newborns in Massachusetts were discharged within a day
of birth.147 These studies confirm that as of 1995, abbreviated
postpartum stays had become routine in most, but by no means all, of
the United States.14'
States that had the highest percentage of short postpartum stays
were slow to adopt legislation restricting such practices, while states
that had the lowest percentage of short postpartum stays were
quickest to adopt such legislation. 49 This pattern is peculiar; from a
relative-risk perspective, one would have expected that states that
had the highest percentage of drive-through deliveries would face the
highest risk from such practices and, thus, would be most enthusiastic
about such legislation-unless, of course, the legislation was the result
of lobbying by providers seeking to maintain their preferred practice
patterns in states with relatively low numbers of rapid postpartum
discharges.150 At least in New Jersey, this is exactly what happened.15'
Some of the trend toward short postpartum stays is probably
attributable to the general shortening in hospital lengths-of-stay for
all conditions.52 Of course, larger social issues are at play as well:
147. See Rachel M. Schwartz & Russell Kellogg, Findings of the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation Study: One Day Hospitalizations for Mothers and Infants: Readmission Risk,
in 10 NAT'L PERINATAL INFO. CrR. SPECIAL RES. REP. 1, 12 (Oct. 1997), available at
<http://www.npic.orglNLX2/newsletterX2.html>.
148. See Laura N. Sinai et al., Phenylketonuria Screening: Effect of Early Newborn
Discharge, 96 PEDIATRICS 605, 605 (1995) (reporting survey results indicating that overall,
24% of full-term newborns were discharged by 24 hours of life, but the percentage of
newborns discharged within one day of birth ranged from zero to 100% depending on the
hospital).
149. See Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 192 ("It is therefore in the western
region of the country, where postpartum lengths of stay are currently shortest, that
legislative actions to lengthen stays are least successful."). Other authors have also noted
this pattern:
Interestingly, some of the states that recently have enacted legislation mandating
hospital stays of 48 hours after normal delivery are in the Northeast (New Jersey,
Massachusetts, and New York), where lengths-of-stay are the longest and do not
vary by plan type and where managed care penetration is lower than it is in other
parts of the country.
Gazmararian & Koplan, supra note 134, at 79.
150. Cf. Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 192 ("This distinction may reflect wider
acceptance of [rapid postpartum discharges in the western United States] or the desire of
states in the East and the Midwest to prevent further growth of the systems already
adopted in the South and the West.").
151. See Charles & Prystowsky, supra note 73, at 746 ("In New Jersey, physicians were
not consulted by home [sic] maintenance organizations (HMOs) before early discharge
began. There was only the assurance that early discharge had gone well in California....
[When things did not work out from physicians' perspective,] we had no recourse but to
seek appropriate legislation.").
152 See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text; see also Charlotte Catz et al.,
Summary of Workshop: Early Discharge and Neonatal Hyperbilirubinemia, 96
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pressure to "demedicalize" birth has clearly played a role.'53 By
common consensus, however, the dominant factor in the shortening
of postpartum stays to their current levels was the determination by
payors (insurers and MCOs) that such stays were not medically
necessary and their efforts to discourage extended stays through
various means, including outright denial of coverage. 154 Prior to the
enactment of the Newborns' Act, most MCOs and insurers appear to
have been providing automatic coverage of at least twenty-four hours
of postpartum hospitalization for a normal vaginal delivery and
seventy-two hours of hospitalization for a Cesarean section.155 A
number of prominent MCOs had embraced shorter stays,'156 and one
PEDIATRICS 743, 743 (1995) ("Cost containment strategies such as managed care have
resulted in a continued trend toward shorter lengths of stay for all hospitalizations in all
age groups. As a part of this trend, early discharge of neonates has also become
common.").
153. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 5-6 ("Since the 1970s, many maternity
patients have requested shorter hospital stays because of a growing interest in less medical
intervention for childbirth."). The trend is a marked change from 1960, when:
[E]ssentially all births in the United States were planned to take place in
hospitals.... In the 1970s, however, this pattern of care shifted. Some women
wanted to give birth at home, or, if home birth was not possible (or was deemed
unsafe), to leave the hospital and return home as quickly as possible after giving
birth.
Parisi & Meyer, supra note 118, at 1635.
154. See, e.g., Britton et al., supra note 118, at 291 ("[E]conomic considerations often
limit the choice of families and their physicians. Third party payers usually fund only the
shortest possible in-patient stays, thus constituting a driving force behind the trend to
earlier discharge."); MacDonald, supra note 102, at 734 ("[A]s they fund progressively
shorter hospital stays, managed care and health insurance companies constitute a major
driving force toward earlier postpartum discharge."); Parisi & Meyer, supra note 118, at
1636-37 ("Although the early discharge programs of the 1970s were developed in response
to demand from consumers, the reckless trend toward decreased insurance coverage for
maternity stays, in some cases resulting in stays as short as eight hours, appears to be
based solely on considerations of costs.").
One HMO followed an increasingly prescriptive approach to shortening
postpartum stays:
First the HMO tried offering women who agreed to go home within one day a
certificate good for four hours of free housekeeping services, plus the normal
home nursing visits. This deal doubled the number of voluntary one-day
discharges, but the HMO remained dissatisfied. "It wasn't up to our
expectations," said the spokesman. "Now it's a mandatory one-day coverage."
MICHAEL MILLENSON, DEMANDING MEDICAL EXCELLENCE 305 (1998).
155. See Joyce Smith & Julius A. Karash, New Mothers Get an Extra Day-Free,
KANSAS CITY STAR, Jan. 10, 1996, at B1 ("It's now common for insurers to limit the stay
to 24 hours after a vaginal delivery and 72 hours after a Caesarean delivery, unless there
are complications.").
156. See David R. Olmos, Early Release Policy at HMOs Draws Fire, L.A. TIMES, June
16, 1995, at D1 (noting Cigna Healthcare of Southern California's policy of discharging
mothers and newborns within 12 to 24 hours for normal deliveries and within 48 hours
after Cesarean sections, and noting a similar discharge policy at the Los Angeles County-
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MCO had floated the idea of a standard postpartum stay of eight
hours.5 7 Because MCOs and insurers refused to pay for extended
postpartum stays, hospitals and doctors came under considerable
economic pressure to discharge patients when their coverage ran
out.158 MCOs argued that they were willing to provide coverage if an
extended postpartum stay was medically necessary, but suggested that
few women and infants actually have a medical reason to stay in the
hospital beyond twenty-four hours.59
The stage was set for the confrontation outlined in Part II.
Unfortunately, the extensive medical literature on the subject of the
appropriate length of a postpartum stay was almost entirely ignored
or was used as sound-bites in the free-for-all that erupted over drive-
through deliveries. Parts III.C to III.F systematically evaluate the
benefits and costs of extended postpartum stays.
B. Postpartum Stays: How Long Is Long Enough-and for What?
iHistorically, postpartum stays have served a number of distinct
purposes, including recuperation, monitoring, and education of the
mother as well as monitoring and metabolic screening of the newborn
infant. During the debate over the Newborns' Act, critics charged
that the probability of a post-discharge problem, such as infection,
jaundice, dehydration, or undetected metabolic deficiencies was
inversely proportional to the length of the postpartum hospitalization
and cited a number of anecdotal cases and a few empirical studies to
University of Southern California Medical Center, which mainly serves indigent patients).
At one Kaiser hospital, "a 12-hour stay is now standard for uncomplicated vaginal
deliveries." Shirk, supra note 124, at 1C.
157. See Olmos, supra note 156, at D1. Representatives of Kaiser took the position
that the program was intended to begin the process of evaluating postpartum women for
discharge within eight hours of delivery, but not necessarily to discharge them at that
point. See id.; Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 47-48 (statement of Dr.
Sharon Levine, Associate Medical Director, Permanente Medical Group, Inc.). At the
hearings on Senate Bill 969, Senator Bradley's attempts to cross-examine Dr. Levine on
this issue were less than successful because Dr. Levine described the practice at Kaiser
hospitals in Northern California, and Senator Bradley attempted to discredit her
testimony using data from Kaiser hospitals in Southern California. See Newborns' and
Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 48 (statement of Sen. Bill Bradley). Nevertheless, at
another Kaiser hospital, the nurse-manager for prenatal services estimated that "by 2000,
it'll be six hours." Shirk, supra note 124, at 1C.
158. See, e.g., Farrow, supra note 116, at 1040-41 (noting the various ways that
economic pressure was brought to bear on doctors); Boodman, supra note 46, at 12
(same); CBS This Morning (CBS television broadcast, June 8, 1995), available in 1995 WL
3219519 (broadcasting an interview with Dr. Nancy Dickey, AMA, complaining of
increasing pressure from MCOs to discharge patients quickly).
159. See Shirk, supra note 124, at 1C.
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support their claims.16° Supporters of abbreviated postpartum stays
had their own empirical studies indicating that rapid postpartum
discharge was safe and beneficial, but also argued that there were
hazards associated with extended hospitalization, that length of stay
was no indicator of the quality of services received, and that
alternatives to hospitalization were better for both women and
infants.161  This section systematically evaluates the empirical
evidence with regard to these issues.
The backdrop for the dispute over drive-through deliveries was
provided by guidelines issued jointly by ACOG and AAP in 1992 to
specify recommended postpartum treatment.16  The guidelines
recommended a postpartum stay of forty-eight hours after a normal
vaginal delivery and ninety-six hours after a Cesarean section unless a
lengthy list of conditions were satisfied. With regard to vaginal
deliveries, the guidelines coyly noted that "it is unlikely that the
fulfillment of these criteria and conditions can be accomplished in less
than 48 hours." 63 Although physicians in most parts of the United
States were discharging postpartum women and newborn infants well
160. See Britton et al., supra note 118, at 291 ("Opponents ... argue that an element of
risk may be involved because detection of significant illness may be either missed or
delayed outside of the hospital."); Catz et al., supra note 152, at 743. Reported risks
include hyperbilirubinemia,
potential adverse effects on newborn screening, poor preparation for breast-
feeding, inadequate surveillance of mothers and neonates for health problems in
the postpartum/neonatal period, reduced opportunities for parent training in 'at
risk' populations, disruptions of immunization practices, and shifting of economic
burdens to families and non hospital-based providers.
Catz et al., supra note 152, at 743.
161. See Braveman et al., supra note 145, at 720 ("Early discharge might be beneficial if
in-hospital practices are unsupportive of breast feeding."); Britton et al., supra note 118, at
291, 294 ("Proponents of early discharge claim that it is safe and may be advantageous
from both a medical and psychosocial standpoint.... [T]he superiority of a longer
hospitalization in facilitating improved outcomes has not been established, and arguments
that continued hospitalization poses increased risk are equally tenable.").
162. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS/AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES FOR PERINATAL CARE 105-08
(1992)[hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR PERINATAL CARE]. AAP issued supplemental
guidelines for newborn discharge in 1995. See Committee on Fetus and Newborn,
American Academy of Pediatrics, Hospital Stay for Healthy Term Newborns, 96
PEDIATRICS 788,788-89 (1995).
AAP and ACOG began jointly issuing these guidelines in 1983 to provide
guidance to providers and policy-makers. The 1983 guidelines did not address delivery by
Cesarean section. Recommendations for postpartum length of stay following a Cesarean
section were added in 1988. The most recent version of the guidelines appeared in 1997
and is generally consistent with the 1992 guidelines on the issue of postpartum length of
stay. The evolution of these guidelines is described in Thilo et al., supra note 80, at 259-
60.
163. GUIDELINES FOR PERINATAL CARE, supra note 162, at 105-08.
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in advance of this recommended period,164 the guidelines provided a
ready source of authority for those arguing that drive-through
deliveries were inappropriate.
As it happens, the safety of rapid postpartum discharge has been
studied extensively over several decades. Many of the studies suffer
from obvious flaws or are difficult to compare With one another
because of differences in the definition of "rapid postpartum
discharge" and because of disparities in the nature of the post-
discharge services that were offered.165 However, no study has
demonstrated any statistically significant increase in infant or
maternal mortality after a rapid postpartum discharge. 66 One recent
study of neonatal mortality demonstrated that of the infants who died
in the neonatal period, 90% "were symptomatic in the first 8 hours of
life, 93% in the first 12 hours, and 99% by 18 hours of life."'16 7 Thus,
an extended postpartum stay is unlikely to make an appreciable
difference in the detection and treatment of such problems. 6
Absent evidence of increased mortality, studies of the safety of
rapid postpartum discharge have focused on the frequency of hospital
readmission. Unfortunately, readmission is a problematic endpoint.
To be sure, hospital readmission is objective, moderately frequent (at
least compared to maternal or infant mortality), readily verifiable
through medical record review, and usually indicative of a significant
problem. On the other hand, not all readmissions are preventable,
regardless of the initial length of stay,169 and if there is a diversity of
164. See supra Figures 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
165. The flaws with the studies include their small sample size, the almost universal
absence of randomization, and the frequent lack of controls. See Braveman et al., supra
note 145, at 720 ("In practice, however, interpretation of 'early discharge' seems to differ
across institutions; recommended screening criteria are inconsistently interpreted or
applied; and routine postdischarge follow-up varies widely."); Catz et al., supra note 152,
at 743 ("Available studies are compromised by inadequate sample size, inconsistent risk
factors, variable outcomes measures, differing interventions, and a general lack of
appropriate comparison groups ... there are not even uniform and universally-accepted
definitions of numerous key terms including 'early discharge.' ").
166. See Susan A. Beebe et al., Neonatal Mortality and Length of Newborn Hospital
Stay, 98 PEDIATRICS 231, 234 (1995) ("We could not demonstrate a significant association
between neonatal mortality and length of newborn hospital stay."); Britton et al., supra
note 118, at 292 ("Among published studies of infants discharged early, mortality rates are
low and not significantly different from those of accompanying controls or the general
population of infants from which the study groups were drawn.").
167. Beebe et al., supra note 166, at 234.
168. See id. ("Although we cannot conclude that no infant would benefit from a longer
hospital observation time, certainly the majority of infants who die in the neonatal period
have signs or symptoms present within 18 hours of birth.").
169. See Edmonson et al., supra note 128, at 299 (noting that the readmission rate "may
not be a suitable outcome measure [because] many neonatal readmissions occur for such
1999]
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opinion about the necessity of hospitalization for treating certain
medical conditions, readmission rates could give a quite distorted
impression.170 Unless the study is designed carefully, it may miss
some readmissions (detection bias), and without randomization, it is
quite difficult to know whether the results are actually attributable to
the early discharge (selection bias).'7' Because readmission is rare, a
large study is required to detect a significant difference in readmission
rates. 72 Thus, readmission is both overinclusive and underinclusive
as an endpoint for assessing the safety of rapid postpartum
discharge. 73
In 1994, the Department of Health and Human Services
Maternal and Child Health Bureau (MCHB) reviewed all of the
available studies on postpartum discharge. MCHB concluded that
there was no evidence indicating that rapid postpartum discharges
were unsafe, but there was also no evidence indicating that they were
safe. 74 Another group of scholars came to essentially the same
conclusion after conducting their own comprehensive review of
scientific literature on the issue. 75  Strikingly, both reviews
nonpreventable conditions as community acquired infections").
170. See id. ("Analysis of jaundice-related readmissions is particularly plagued by
selection and detection biases and a lack of consensus about the definition, detection, and
treatment of jaundice in most newborns."); see also Britton et al., supra note 118, at 294
(noting the possibility "that a patient re-admitted at one center might [have been treated]
as an outpatient at another").
171. For example, if infants kept longer than 48 hours are significantly sicker than
those discharged earlier, the observation that readmission rates are identical does not
necessarily mean that the risk of readmission is identical. The significance of an
abbreviated postpartum hospitalization on readmission rates is also likely to be sensitive
to the period of time over which the probability of readmission is evaluated.
172 See Braveman et al., supra note 145, at 721. For example:
At a rehospitalization rate of two percent among the group with the best
outcome, at least 14,000 patients would be needed in each of two groups to detect
a 25% increase in rehospitalizations related to early discharge, an effect that
would have considerable medical and economic implications; more than 4000 in
each group would be needed to detect a 50% increase.
Id.
173. Stated differently, the fact that an individual was readmitted does not necessarily
indicate that a longer postpartum hospitalization was appropriate, and the fact that an
individual was not readmitted does not necessarily indicate that a drive-through delivery
was appropriate.
174. See Kessel et al., supra note 125, at 741 ("Failing to prove that shorter hospital
stays are unsafe (especially in the face of numerous methodological flaws) is not the same
as proving they are safe.").
175. See Braveman et al., supra note 145, at 724 ("The currently available literature
provides little scientific evidence to guide discharge planning for most apparently well
newborns and their mothers... [but] there is no evidence to support the general safety or
advisability of early discharge in the absence of stringent selection criteria and
postdischarge nurse home visits.").
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determined that there was also no clear evidence demonstrating "the
safety, efficacy, and effectiveness of the hospital and posthospital
practices that were previously standard" before early discharges
became common.1 7
6
A study outlined in testimony before Congress and published in
abstract form evaluated the probabilities of readmission and of
emergency department (ED) visits for approximately 15,000 births in
New Hampshire in 1993.177 The 24% of infants who were discharged
within forty-eight hours of birth were more likely to be readmitted
(1.61%) and seen in the ED (2.04%) than those discharged after a
longer period of time (1.09% and 1.17%, respectively). 78 The most
frequent causes for readmission were jaundice (47%), infection
(23%), and gastrointestinal problems (8.8%). The study did not
separately evaluate Cesarean sections and vaginal deliveries, which
complicates the analysis somewhat.17 9 Although this study was the
source of the widely circulated "sound-bite" that drive-through
deliveries caused a 50% increase in the likelihood of readmission and
a 70% increase in the likelihood of a visit to the ED, the absolute
number of readmissions and ED visits was quite small.'
Another unpublished study encompassing approximately 29,000
maternal discharges and 155,000 infant discharges in 1993 found that
the incidence of readmission for both mothers and newborns was
unrelated to initial length of stay, with the exception of infants who
were delivered by a Cesarean section and were discharged within
176. Id.; see also Kessel et al., supra note 125, at 741 ("There are no objective scientific
data to determine the appropriate length of stay now or in the past.").
177. See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 30-32, 80-81 (statements
of Dr. Judith E. Frank, Department of Pediatrics, Dartmouth Medical School). The
abstract was published as Judith Frank et al., The Risk of Readmission and ER Visits in
Newborns with Early Discharge: A Population Based Study, 37 PEDIATRIC RES. 255A
(1995). The final paper is Judith Frank et al., Neonatal Hospitalization and Emergency
Room Visits Associated with Early Discharge: A Population Based Study (1996)
(unpublished study, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter New
Hampshire Study].
178. If one expresses these figures in terms of increased risk, there was a 50%
increased risk of readmission and a 70% increased risk of being seen in the ED. See
Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 30-31 (statement of Dr. Judith E.
Frank).
179. Nevertheless, given the figures on the regional distribution of postpartum
hospitalization following a Cesarean section, it seems unlikely that many women who
delivered by Cesarean section were discharged within 48 hours in New Hampshire. See
supra figure 5 and accompanying text.
180., See Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 31 (statement of Dr. Judith
E. Frank).
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twenty-four hours.' 81 The overall readmission rate for mothers was
0.4%, and for newborns was 1.7%. l1 The readmission rate was 1.7%
for infants with a one-day postpartum stay, 1.9% for a two-day
postpartum stay, and 2.0% for a three-day stay.183
Another study found that 2.2% of newborns and 0.45% of
women were readmitted within the first month of the newborn's life,
but the readmission rate did not vary by length of stay, type of
coverage, region of the country, or age of the mother.' 4 The primary
cause for newborn readmission was jaundice, which typically occurred
within the first three days of discharge. 85 Infections were the second
most common cause of readmission, but they typically occurred
fifteen to twenty-eight days after discharge.'86 The authors concisely
observed that "because the majority of newborn and maternal
readmissions occurred more than three days after delivery, an
additional day in the hospital after delivery probably would not avert
most newborn and maternal readmissions."' 7
Another researcher evaluated the frequency of readmission in
approximately 19,000 births in Califomia.1' One interesting wrinkle
in this study was that the data allowed the author to determine the
actual number of hours postpartum at which mother and infant were
discharged. A majority of the women were discharged within twenty-
four hours, and some were discharged as early as eight hours after
giving birth. The probability of readmission was unrelated to the
length of stay, even for exceedingly short postpartum
181. See FOSTER & SCHNEIDER, supra note 132, at 11. Less than 1% of mothers who
delivered by Cesarean section were discharged after a one-day stay. Even with this
elevated risk of readmission, it was cheaper to discharge all infants, and readmit the few
infants who required inpatient services. See id. at 6.
One weakness of the empirical literature in this area is that a significant number
of the studies are unpublished. Publication is one of the traditional benchmarks for
assessing the evidentiary reliability of a study. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. Corp.,
509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (noting that "publication (or lack thereof) in a peer-reviewed
journal [is a] relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific
validity" of a study).
182 See FOSTER & SCHNEIDER, supra note 132, at 4.
183. See id.
184. See Gazmararian & Koplan, supra note 134, at 76-77.
185. See id. at 77.
186. See id at 77-78.
187. Id. at 79.
188. See Peter I. Juhn, Newborn Length of Stay and Hospital Readmission: Does Early
Discharge Lead to Adverse Outcomes?, in HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH: IMPLICATIONS
FOR POLICY, HEALTH CARE DELIVERY, AND CLINICAL PRACTICE, PROCEEDINGS OF




hospitalizations.8 9 Infants discharged before twenty-four hours had a
readmission rate of 2.7%, while those discharged twenty-four to
forty-eight hours after birth had a readmission rate of 3.3%.19°
Another unpublished study of approximately 110,000 normal
newborn births by the National Perinatal Information Center found
that the risk of readmission increased as the length of the postpartum
hospitalization decreased. 19' Although actual rates of
rehospitalization were low, the authors calculated that a one-day stay
increased the risk of rehospitalization by 25% to 50% relative to a
longer stay.19
A retrospective study examined the impact of home nursing
visits after early discharge and determined that such services were
associated with a twofold decrease in the number of acute care visits
within fourteen days of discharge. 93 However, the study was too
small to determine whether the decrease was statistically significant.
The authors speculated that the home nursing visits allowed for
earlier recognition and prevention of problems that otherwise would
necessitate an acute visit. The authors also recounted anecdotal
evidence that providers "stated that they generally discharged babies
even earlier than previously once routine home visiting was instituted,
because of the virtually assured follow-up."'194
As noted earlier, the GAO issued a report on postpartum stays
in September 1996.195 The GAO had been asked to identify the risks
attributable to abbreviated postpartum stays, examine whether health
plans were taking action to ensure quality postpartum care, and
determine what actions the states were taking to ensure patient
protection. 6 The GAO summarized the available research on the
safety of rapid postpartum discharge as follows:
[R]esearch on the safety of short postpartum stays is
inconclusive. More specifically, there are mixed results on
the association between newborn length of stay and
rehospitalization, one indicator of adverse outcomes....
[T]here is no conclusive evidence that discharging women
189. See id
190. See id
191. See Schwartz & Kellogg, supra note 147, 14.
192. See id.
193. See Paula Braveman et al., Health Service Use Among Low-Risk Newborns After
Early Discharge with and Without Nurse Home Visiting, 9 J. AM. BD. FAMILY
PRACrrTONERS 254, 256-57 (1996).
194. Id at 258.
195. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 1.
196. See id.
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and their babies less than 48 hours after childbirth has or
does not have adverse effects on the health and well-being
of mothers and newborns."9
Much of the text of the report focused on the importance of
ensuring a full range of maternity services, rather than the length of
the postpartum hospital stay. The report expressly noted that "most
of the experts we contacted agree that the debate over postpartum
hospitalization needs to focus on overall quality of maternity care
rather than the length of stay."'198 The focus of the GAO's
conclusions was nicely captured by the title of the report:
"Appropriate Follow-up Services Critical With Short Hospital
Stays. "199
The July 23-30, 1997, issue of the Journal of the American
Medical Association contained the two most exhaustive studies of the
issue performed to date, as well as a commentary by several authors
of earlier articles on the subject. The first study evaluated the risk of
rehospitalization after a discharge less than thirty hours postpartum
following a normal vaginal delivery in Washington from 1991 to
1994.200 The authors noted that "the vast majority of newborns
discharged home from the hospital remained healthy [but
approximately] 2% ... of all newborns developed subsequent medical
problems severe enough to warrant rehospitalization within the first
thirty days of life."' Newborns discharged at less than thirty hours
were more likely to be readmitted, with the risk highest in the first
week following discharge. 2°2 Infants born to first-time mothers also
had an increased risk of admission within the first month
postpartum. °3  The authors estimated that eight of every 100
rehospitalizations within the first week of life "may be attributable to
early discharge or may be preventable if the risk of early discharge
was eliminated."2 °4
The second study examined rehospitalizations for feeding-related
problems within twenty-eight days of normal vaginal deliveries in
Wisconsin from 1991 to 1994.205 The authors focused on the risk of
197. Id at 1-2,6.
198. Id at 3.
199. Id.
200. See Lenna L. Liu et al., The Safety of Newborn Early Discharge: The Washington
State Experience, 278 JAMA 293,296-98 (1997).




205. See Edmonson et al., supra note 128, at 299.
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readmissions for feeding-related problems in an attempt to address
the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of global readmission
rates20 6 and because they believed that "feeding-related readmissions
could be considered sentinel events that more specifically reflect the
impact of early postpartum discharge on preventive newborn care."'2°7
As in the other studies, the rate of readmission was modest. During
the study period, early discharges increased threefold, but feeding-
related readmissions remained stable.28 The likelihood of a feeding-
related readmission was enhanced if the infant was breast-fed,
firstborn, preterm, or born to mothers who were poorly educated,
unmarried, or on Medicaid. 209 Once these other factors were
controlled for, "early postpartum discharge had little or no
independent effect on the risk of feeding-related hospital
readmission. '210 The authors observed that the majority of feeding-
related readmissions occurred during the first week of life and
speculated that "the timing of routine clinic-based or home-based
postpartum follow-up visits may prove to be more crucial than the
timing of hospital discharge."21' The authors also noted that
"[u]nfortunately, [the Newborns' Act] fails to address either the
funding or the timing of postdischarge medical attention. 212
The commentary accompanying the two studies evaluated their
strengths and weaknesses.213 The commentary noted that although a
definitive answer would require a large prospective randomized
study, "it is reasonable to conclude that discharging apparently well
newborns from the hospital before approximately the third day of
life, at least in the absence of documented substitute services at an
alternate site, is likely to result in moderately but not dramatically
increased risks of hospital readmissions. '' 214 However, "the difference
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. See id at 302.
209. See id
210. Id
211. Id at 303.
212. Id.
213. See Paula Braveman et al., Early Discharge and Evidence-Based Practice: Good
Science and Good Judgment, 278 JAMA 334,334 (1997).
214. Id at 335. Since the publication of this commentary, two small studies, one large
study, a literature review, and a special issue of Clinics in Perinatology have appeared.
Their results have generally confirmed these conclusions. See Elizabeth J. Bragg et al.,
The Effect of Early Discharge After Vaginal Delivery on Neonatal Readmission Rates, 89
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 930, 931, 932 tbl.2 (1997) (noting that the adoption of a
structured early discharge program, including a home visit by a nurse, had no statistically
significant effect on the rate of readmission, despite the fact that median length of stay
dropped from 49 hours to 30 hours; approximately 1% of newborns required readmission;
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between a postpartum stay of 24 hours and a stay of 48 hours is
unlikely to be a critical determinant of newborn or maternal health
outcomes.
215
As these studies reflect, a modest percentage of postpartum
women and newborn infants will be readmitted, and a small
percentage of postpartum women and newborns will die, regardless of
the length of their initial hospitalization-a fact that makes clear the
perils of an anecdote-driven approach to the issue.216 Even if rapid
postpartum discharge increases the number of readmissions, the
"number needed to treat" helps place the readmission sound bite in
context.217 In order to prevent one incremental readmission (which
will last on average 2.5 days), we would have to provide extended
postpartum hospitalization for at least 232 well newborns, and
perhaps as many as 866.218
The major preventable causes of readmission are jaundice,
infection, and dehydration.219  The available empirical evidence
suggests that the risk of readmission for jaundice is the same if the
infant is discharged at any time earlier than seventy-two hours. 22° The
and approximately 65% of readmissions were attributable to infection or jaundice,
regardless of length of stay); Kenneth E. Grullon & David A. Grimes, The Safety of Early
Postpartum Discharge: A Review and Critique, 90 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 860, 860
(1997) (concluding that early postpartum discharge appears to be safe for carefully
selected consenting patients, but current data do not support or condemn generalized use
of such practices); Kotagal et al., supra note 129, at 1150 (finding that rapid postpartum
discharge had no effect on readmission rates in the Ohio Medicaid population from 1991
to 1995); Susan F. Meikle et al., Rehospitalizations and Outpatient Contacts of Mothers and
Neonates After Hospital Discharge After Vaginal Delivery, 179 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 166,169-70 (1998) (finding no effect of postpartum length of stay on infant
readmissions, but finding a higher rate of maternal readmission associated with a longer
initial hospital stay); 25 CLINICS PERINATOLOGY, 257, 257-527 (1998) (devoting an entire
issue to "[e]arly [p]erinatal [h]ospital [d]ischarge ... [i]ssues and [c]oncerns").
215. Braveman et al., supra note 213, at 335; see also M. Bruce Edmonson et al., Early
Discharge of Newborns, 278 JAMA 2066,2067 (1997) ("[R]outine discharge at 48 hours or
longer following an uncomplicated nursery stay may be an economically inefficient way to
reduce the risk of neonatal readmission.").
An article in Newsweek communicated these results to the public in damning
terms: "Congress may have shot the wrong target.... [E]arly discharge is not a major
danger. As the new studies make clear, inexperience is the major cause of preventable
health problems. Keeping babies in the hospital for several days is one way to combat that
problem, but not a very efficient one." Cowley & Springen, supra note 1, at 65.
216. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
217. Edmonson et al., supra note 215, at 2067.
218. See Alvah R. Cass & Robert J. Volk, Early Discharge of Newborns, 278 JAMA
2064,2064-65 (1997); Edmonson et al., supra note 215, at 2067.
219. See Gazmararian & Koplan, supra note 134, at 77-78.
220. See M. Jeffrey Maisels & Elizabeth Kring, Length of Stay, Jaundice, and Hospital
Readmission, 101 PEDIATRICS 995, 996-97 (1998).
[A]lthough the American Academy of Pediatrics recommends closer follow-up
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risk of infection is actually increased by a lengthier stay in the
hospital, 1 and the risk of dehydration is not really addressed by
postpartum stays of forty-eight hours.m2 Thus, mandated coverage of
postpartum hospitalization of the specified lengths has little or no
nexus with the detection and prevention of problems likely to result
in a bad outcome.' Moreover, it is a singularly inefficient way of
addressing the problem of maternal inexperience. 4
for infants discharged <48 hours, we found no increase in risk of readmission to
hospital for those infants whose length of stay was <48 hours compared with >48
hours to <72 hours.... It seems that discharge at any time <72 hours significantly
increases the risk for readmission with hyperbilirubinemia when compared with
discharge after 72 hours.
Id. at 996; see also Paula A. Braveman, Short Hospital Stays for Mothers and Newborns, 42
J. FAMILY PRACrICE 523, 523-24 (1996) ("Neonatal jaundice often does not peak until
the 3rd day of life, and bilirubin levels prior to that time are not always good predictors of
the peak level."); Braveman et al., supra note 145, at 720 ("Jaundice usually peaks at
around 3 days after delivery, and several neonatal cardiac and gastrointestinal problems
do not manifest until the second or third day of life."); Errol I. Soskolne et al., The Effect
of Early Discharge and Other Factors on Readmission Rates of Newborns, 150 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 373, 376 (1996) (finding significantly lower risk of
readmission for newborns discharged 72 hours postpartum, but no effect from discharge at
24, 36, or 48 hours postpartum).
221. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 11 ("Studies show that the chances of a
newborn infection increase the longer the newborn remains in the hospital."); Britton et
al., supra note 118, at 294 (noting that medical problems such as infections, which appear
long after a discharge, "commonly arise de novo and are often unrelated to events of the
immediate newborn period"); Lord, supra note 99, at 99 ("[Ihe faster mother and child
check out, the less likely they are to pick up hospital germs."). In addition, the bacteria to
which mother and infant are exposed in the hospital are much more likely to be drug-
resistant than bacteria in the community.
222- See Braveman et al., supra note 145, at 720 ("Breast milk may not have come in by
the second or third postpartum day, and newborns may feed inconsistently before that
time."); Boodman, supra note 46, at 12 (" '[D]ehydration never happens until after two to
five days.' " (quoting Dr. Augusto Sola)).
223. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 23 ("Extending hospital stays to 48 hours
may provide for more medical surveillance, but it does not include the period when many
neonatal problems usually occur-at 3 days of age."); Braveman et al., supra note 213, at
335 ("If the goal of postpartum/postnatal services is optimal maternal and child health,...
then it can be argued based on current physiologic knowledge that hospital discharge
should be considered 'early' when it occurs before 3 or 4 days after delivery, not only
before 2 days."); Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 180 ("Ironically, keeping a mother
and baby in the hospital for a second day increases the likelihood of discovering jaundice
but still misses a critical period for identification of the problem."); Maisels & Kring, supra
note 220, at 996 ("These findings ... suggest that undue emphasis has been placed on the
48-hour time period."); William B. Pittard & Kitty M. Geddes, Newborn Hospitalization:
A Closer Look, 112 PEDIATRICS 257, 257 (1988) ("Only four of the 52 readmission
diagnoses among infants discharged moderately early could potentially have been
identified (not prevented) before discharge with an extended newborn hospitalization.").
224. Because of this simple fact, medical commentators who have examined the
empirical literature have pointed out that the widespread enthusiasm for additional days
of postpartum hospitalization is ultimately unhelpful. See, e.g., Kessel et al., supra note
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An additional argument made against drive-through deliveries is
that short hospital stays do not provide sufficient time for instruction
on breast-feeding. The actual impact of rapid postpartum discharge
on breast-feeding is unclear.2" The available studies have small
sample sizes and come to inconsistent conclusions. One small
randomized study found that early discharge was associated with an
increased likelihood of breast-feeding in the days immediately
following discharge, no observable differences in breast-feeding
success at fourteen days postpartum, and a non-statistically significant
increased likelihood of breast-feeding at six months after?26  A
retrospective non-randomized study found that early postpartum
discharge had no impact on breast-feeding prevalence at twenty days
postpartum, 7 but another prospective case surveillance study found
that women who were discharged early were more likely to
discontinue breast-feeding during the first two weeks of life.m
Another small study found no difference in breast-feeding rates
between women discharged at twenty-four hours or less and those
discharged later when there was support for breast-feeding in the
hospital and after discharge.229  Still another study found no
correlation between the length of hospitalization and the rate of
125, at 740 ("Discharge of infants and mothers when they are ready is the correct
approach; a focus solely on the timing of discharge is inappropriate."); Edmonson et al.,
supra note 215, at 2067 ("Routine discharge at 48 hours or longer following an
uncomplicated nursery stay may be an economically inefficient way to reduce the risk of
neonatal readmission.").
225. As one commentator has observed:
Although longer hospital stays afford more time to provide breast-feeding
instruction and establish successful lactation, conclusive data are lacking to
support the notion that early discharge has an adverse effect on breast-feeding
duration. Other factors, including prior breast-feeding knowledge, hospital
practices, family support, and follow-up services, may be more important than
time of discharge.
Marianne R. Neifert, The Optimization of Breast-Feeding in the Perinatal Period, 25
CLINICS PERINATOLOGY 303,304 (1998).
226. See U. Waldenstrom et al., Early and Late Discharge After Hospital Birth:
Breastfeeding, 76 AcrA PEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 737,729-30 (1987).
227. See J. Bernier et al., Early Postpartum Discharge and Breastfeeding, abstracted in
149 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. P78, P78 (1995).
228. See A. Gadomski et al., Outcomes of Early Hospital Discharge, abstracted in 149
ARCIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. P99, P99 (1995). The authors did not identify
any adverse impact of early postpartum discharge on morbidity or health care utilization.
See id.
229. See Martha J. Miller et al., Success in Breast Feeding by Early Discharge Mothers
Is Associated with Intensive Support, 41 PEDIATRIC RES. 205A, 205A (1996). The support
included an in-hospital lactation consultant, a home nursing visit, and a home phone call
from a lactation consultant. See id.
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breast feeding at three months postpartum. 3 ° Of course, the more
general issue of whether hospitals actually provide a supportive
environment for breast-feeding is not addressed by the Newborns'
ActP'
Another argument made against drive-through deliveries is that
they undermine the nation's system of screening for genetically
inherited metabolic diseases?'2 Reality is more complex. Every state
requires metabolic screening for a variety of genetic diseases,
including phenylketonuria ("PKU"), before an infant is discharged
from the hospital 33 This strategy made perfect sense when infants
stayed for longer periods of time, but the incidence of false-negative
tests for PKU increases when the testing is performed less than
twenty-four hours after the infant has eaten for the first time.234 Of
course, it does not follow that the only solution is an extended
postpartum stay. Some states have mandated rescreening of all
newborns within two weeks of birth? 5  In states that have not
230. See Julie A. Gazmararian et al., Maternity Experiences in a Managed Care
Organization, HEALTH AFF., May/June 1997, at 198,204.
231. Indeed, in one of the studies, women complained that the presence of other
mothers and hospital routines disrupted their ability to initiate breast-feeding. See
Waldenstrom et al., supra note 226, at 731. In another study, the authors were unable to
demonstrate any effect of "hospital supportiveness of mothers with short lengths of stay"
on the prevalence of breast-feeding. Bernier et al., supra note 227, at P78; see also Lord,
supra note 99, at 99 ("Breast-feeding tends to go more smoothly at home than on a busy
maternity ward.").
232. See Charles & Prystowsky, supra note 73, at 746 ("HMOs have destroyed the
integrity of the National Newborn Screening Program for Genetic Disease, a veritable
triumph in preventive medicine.").
233. See Sinai et al., supra note 148, at 607.
234. See Kessel et al., supra note 125, at 740 ("[T]he earlier a phenylketonuria
specimen is taken, the higher the false-negative rate."); Sinai, supra note 148, at 607.
("Early newborn discharge puts infants at risk for delayed or even missed diagnosis of
PKU because of decreased sensitivity of screening .... Screening performed at 12 hours
would miss 30% of infants with PKU and screening between 12 and 24 hours of age would
miss 10%.").
Of course, it is not at all clear that this problem can be solved by letting physicians
make individualized decisions as to the time of discharge, unless the "individualized"
decision is that every infant will stay for the requisite number of hours specified in the
Newborns' Act. Nevertheless, if the PKU test is inaccurate when blood samples are taken
too early, what is the justification for drawing blood to perform an inaccurate test?
235. See Sinai et al., supra note 148, at 606. But see NAT'L HEALTH POLICY FORUM,
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 683, POSTPARTUM STAY: A NO-WIN
FOR MANAGED CARE? 6-7 (1996). The National Health Policy Forum questioned the
value of rescreening because in 1987, "'only 2 cases of PKU [were] detected of 536,689
infants screened by a second test in 13 states,' and 'no cases of PKU [were detected] for
618,075 infants screened a second time in 1988." Id. (quoting the Council of Regional
Networks for Genetic Services). It therefore cost approximately $7 million to catch a
single case of PKU through rescreening-raising serious questions about the cost-
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mandated rescreening, some pediatricians have been slow to make
the necessary adjustments to ensure that newborns are appropriately
tested. 6  This problem certainly should be addressed, but the
Newborns' Act is a peculiar and costly way to do so.' It is also worth
noting that pre-discharge PKU testing was mandated in the first place
because careful economic analysis demonstrated it was cost-effective
to do such screenings when infants were already going to be
hospitalized during the time period in which the test could be
performed accurately. The cost-benefit analysis is likely to look quite
different if infants must stay in the hospital an extra day for the test to
be valid. It is exceedingly unlikely that allowing physicians to make
individualized discharge decisions will do anything whatsoever about
this problem. 53s
The more general issue raised by the interaction of drive-through
deliveries and genetic screening for metabolic diseases is whether
pediatric and obstetric practice patterns have adjusted to deal with
the realities of rapid postpartum discharges. The traditional model of
pediatric care required a physical examination within eighteen hours
of birth and again less than twenty-four hours before discharge.?39 A
regular well-baby visit was then scheduled within fourteen days of
discharge.24 Similarly, the traditional model of obstetric care
required follow-up within four to six weeks of discharge.241 These
guidelines made sense in a world in which women and infants stayed
effectiveness of this policy.
236. See Sinai et al., supra note 148, at 608.
Many institutions and practitioners never rescreen, whereas some rescreen all
infants regardless of their individual risk. Still others perform repeated screens
on a select high-risk population of newborns.
The data show that awareness of the necessity for repeated screens is not
universal, and specific knowledge of the AAP recommendations on this matter is
poor.
Id.
237. It is noteworthy that an article on the subject focused on solving the problem by
educating physicians, rescreening, or changing the cut-off for a negative test. See id. at
608. Conspicuous by their omission were any mention of the benefits of mandating
insurance coverage of an additional day in the hospital or of allowing physicians the
discretion to decide when infants were ready to be discharged.
238. Of course, if physicians exercised their discretion by keeping everyone in the
hospital for the full time period specified in the Newborns' Act, the problem could be
solved; however, that was not supposed to be the point of the Newborns' Act. See 142
CONG. REC. 9903 (Sept. 5, 1996) (Sup. Docs. No. xl.1:104/2nSess./v.142/pt.16) (statement
of Sen. Bradley) (rejecting the claim that the Newborns' Act will require women to stay in
the hospital for the full period for which coverage is mandated).





in the hospital for five days postpartum, but ACOG and AAP
believed they were insufficient in a world of rapid postpartum
discharges.242 Although ACOG and AAP have adopted new
guidelines, it appears that many pediatricians and obstetricians have
been slow to change their scheduling of follow-up visits to
compensate for the short length of hospitalization. In one recently
published study,
[O]nly a minority (39%) of the obstetricians surveyed
routinely performed extra follow-up visits for women
discharged early after vaginal delivery. On the other hand,
68 percent performed extra follow-up after post-Cesarean
early discharge, perhaps because of the increased risk status
of these mothers. Furthermore, although the current
guidelines recommend follow-up within 48 hours of
discharge, only one-half of the obstetricians surveyed
advised follow-up at this time.2 43
Obstetricians also appear to be making early discharge decisions
based almost entirely on medical criteria, even though the sponsors of
the Newborns' Act presumed that physicians would consider family,
environmental, and social risk factors-and the clear position of AAP
and ACOG is that such elements need to be considered.244 Although
these problems should be addressed, it is both peculiar and costly to
do so by mandating coverage of an extended postpartum
hospitalization. Indeed, the failure of the involved professionals to
adjust their practices to changed circumstances suggests that leaving
the issue to their sole discretion may cause more problems than it
solves.2 45
242- See id.
243. John R. Britton, Postpartum Early Hospital Discharge and Follow-Up Practices in
Canada and the United States, 25 BIRTH 161, 167 (1998); see also Brown & Johnson, supra
note 102, at xviii (noting that in 42 infants with kernicterus, "only one infant had been
given an appointment for early follow-up, and that appointment was not kept"); M. Jeffrey
Maisels & Elizabeth Kring, Early Discharge from the Newborn Nursery-Effect on
Scheduling of Follow-Up Visits by Pediatricians, 100 PEDIATRICS 72,72 (1997) ("Although
follow-up practices have changed in response to shorter newborn hospital stays, a
significant proportion of pediatricians are not following the American Academy of
Pediatrics guidelines for the follow-up of short-stay infants.").
244. See Britton, supra note 243, at 167 ("Although current AAP/ACOG guidelines
advise that 'family, environmental, and social risk factors' be assessed before making early
discharge decisions, many obstetricians appear to be unlikely to perform such an
assessment."). As noted previously, these factors were frequently offered to explain why
individualized discharge decisions were necessary and were prominently featured in the
findings accompanying the Newborns' Act. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
245. When obstetricians had sole discretion as to whether a Cesarean section was
necessary, they performed far too many of them, causing the Public Health Service to
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An equally important issue, which also is not addressed by the
Newborns' Act, is whether the substantive content of an extended
postpartum hospitalization accomplishes its intended purpose.246
Opponents of early discharge insist that extended stays allow for
more extensive educational efforts, but have offered no evidence to
show that such efforts actually occur. Anecdotal reports suggest that
postpartum education currently leaves much to be desired, but it is
not clear that abbreviated postpartum hospitalizations are
responsible.247 Little effort has been made to look inside the black
box of the hospital maternity ward. In one study, postpartum stays
were lengthened because obstetricians had a monopoly on the
performance of circumcisions, and mothers and infants were simply
embrace a goal of decreasing their incidence from 25% to 15% of all deliveries by the year
2000. This target will almost certainly not be met. See Curtin & Kozak, supra note 123, at
261 ("The decline in the Cesarean birth rate appears to have stalled at around 21 to 22
births per 100 deliveries during the period 1994 to 1996.").
Interestingly, a program that set objective criteria for the most common
indications for a Cesarean section, coupled with retrospective case review and a stringent
requirement for a second opinion, resulted in a substantial decrease in Cesarean section
rates at a single hospital without adverse consequences for mothers and infants. See
Steven A. Myers & Norbert Gleicher, A Successful Program to Lower Cesarean-Section
Rates, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1511, 1511 (1988). These simple rule-based strategies
worked better than the unconstrained discretion of the affected professionals.
To be sure, the failure of unconstrained discretion to generate optimal results is by
no means unique to obstetricians. Physicians and legislators may believe that care that is
specially tailored to individual patients is medically superior, but more than 40 years of
empirical research has documented that in many cases, clinical judgment rarely
outperforms simple prediction rules. See David Hadorn, Response to Callahan, in BASIC
BENEFITS AND CLINICAL GUIDELINES 45, 48-49 (David Hadorn, ed., 1992). ("[S]imple
clinical prediction rules have proven superior to physician judgment in the diagnosis of
acute abdominal pain, acute myocardial infarction, streptococcal tonsillitis, pneumonia,
intracellular vs. extracellular causes of jaundice, presence of ankle fracture, survival after
diagnosis of Hodgkin's disease or coronary artery disease, and many other settings."
(citations omitted)).
246. See Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 195 ("There was little discussion in
these debates about the actual content of the postpartum care to be provided during those
mandated longer hospital stays."). AAP has suggested that one of the benefits of an
extended postpartum stay is the ability to evaluate mothers and to identify
"inexperienced, inept, or other potentially harmful behavior." GAO REPORT, supra note
82, at 9. However, as noted previously the empirical evidence does not suggest that many
physicians consider these elements in making discharge decisions. See supra note 244 and
accompanying text.
247. See Gil L. Solomon, Length of the Hospital Stay for Mothers and Newborns, 334
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1134, 1134 (1996) ("In the hospitals where I am an attending
physician, postpartum education usually consists of minimal guidance about breastfeeding,
a handout about common postpartum problems (usually prepared by the physician), and a
short talk before discharge. I would not categorize these measures as intensive
education.").
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waiting for their obstetrician to be available.2' The Newborns' Act
simply takes on faith that good things will happen if more women
spend more time in the hospital postpartum, even though proponents
of extended postpartum stays have presented no evidence to support
that belief.249
One final question is whether drive-through deliveries might be
ill-advised in certain patient populations. Some commentators have
suggested that drive-through deliveries are particularly perilous when
they involve women who are poor or minorities °0 In one study of
rapid postpartum discharge in a low-income population, the risk of a
missed post-discharge appointment was approximately 10%, and
hospital readmission rates were elevated l However, other studies
suggest the contrary. Two small, randomized controlled trials of
rapid postpartum discharge in a Medicaid population indicated that
rapid postpartum discharge is not associated with any increased risk
of adverse outcomes,212 and at least one study found that African-
American women actually had longer postpartum stays than
24. See Inturrisi & Lambert, supra note 145, at 11. When responsibility for
performing circumcisions was transferred to pediatricians, postpartum hospitalizations
were shortened dramatically, with no impact on newborn health. See id.
249. To be sure, similar questions should be raised about the substantive content of
post-discharge services. See Susan A. Egerter et al., Follow-Up of Newborns and Their
Mothers After Early Hospital Discharge, 25 CLINICS PERINATOLOGY 471, 479 (1998)
(explaining that "research to date provides little useful information to guide follow-up
practices under current conditions"). In its report, the GAO noted that many health plans
provide a home visit by a nurse within 48 to 72 hours after discharge. GAO REPORT,
supra note 82, at 10. However, not all health plans have the necessary infrastructure to
deliver these services, and some managed care arrangements place the obligation to
arrange such services on the mother. See id at 10-11.
250. See Catz et al., supra note 152, at 744 ("Early discharge plans may have their
greatest impact on socioeconomically and educationally disadvantaged populations,
precisely those whose ability to compensate for increased costs and responsibilities is most
uncertain.").
251. See Britton et al., supra note 118, at 293-94.
In a study of low-income mothers discharged with their infants 24 to 36 hours
postpartum, 10% failed to return for a follow-up visit within 48 hours, even
though they had signed a contract agreeing to do so. This population had been
carefully screened for medical risk factors, yet still had a high rate of hospital re-
admission. Possibly, similar low-income groups who are less carefully screened
might be at even greater risk for unidentified medical or social problems.
Id. The study in question is Paul D. Conrad et al., Safety of Newborn Discharge in Less
Than 36 Hours in an Indigent Population, 143 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDHOOD 98 (1989).
252. See Cynthia Brumfield et al., 72-Hour Discharge After Cesarean Delivery: Results
in a Selected Medicaid Population, 7 J. MATERNAL FETAL MEDICINE 72, 73-74 (1998);
Cynthia Brumfield et al., 24-Hour Mother-Infant Discharge with a Follow-Up Home
Health Visit: Results in a Selected Medicaid Population, 88 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
544,544 (1996).
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European-American women already.2s3 Another study found that
rapid postpartum discharges had no adverse effects on a population
that was made up mostly of Medicaid recipients.P A large
retrospective study of Ohio Medicaid births came to the same
conclusion s5 Finally, if drive-through deliveries are actually more
hazardous for disadvantaged populations, it is truly extraordinary that
Medicaid beneficiaries were excluded from the Newborns' Act and
from the laws passed by a clear majority of the states that have
legislated in this area. 6
In light of the empirical research outlined in this section, it
should come as no surprise that a report on postpartum
hospitalization practices, prepared pursuant to a requirement in the
Newborns' Act, offers no real praise for the coverage provisions
specified by the Act. 57 The report does assert that the Newborns'
Act is an "important achievement," but it provides no evidence to
indicate why this conclusion is correct. Indeed, the report implicitly
criticizes the Newborns' Act for its focus on the number of hours of
postpartum hospital care, instead of the "needs of the mother and
newborn and ... the content and quality of the care they receive."''2s
The first recommendation of the report is to "broaden the focus of
concern beyond the issue of length of stay to the multiple important
factors affecting maternal and infant health," and the third
recommendation is to "ensure the delivery of health care needed
after leaving the hospital, regardless of length of stay."259 Likewise,
the report implicitly criticizes the manner in which the campaign
against drive-through deliveries was waged by observing that "the
goal of postnatal and postpartum services should be to achieve
optimal newborn and maternal health in the short- and long-term,
and not only to prevent rare occurrences such as hospital readmission
or catastrophic events leading to death."2'
As this discussion demonstrates, there is no real evidence
253. See FOSTER & SCHNEIDER, supra note 132, at 3 ("[BIlack women and babies were
less likely to be discharged within the first 24 hours and were substantially more likely to
have a three-to-seven day stay than other patients.").
254. See Bragg et al., supra note 214, at 932.
255. See Kotagal et al., note 129, at 1150 (finding that the mean length of stay declined
by 27%, but rehospitalization rates within 7 and 14 days of discharge decreased by 20%).
256. See supra notes 86, 111 and accompanying text.
257. See SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM. ON INFANT MORTALITY, DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PRELIMINARY REPORT FOR NEWBORNS' AND MOTHERS'
HEALTH PROTECrION ACT 2-5 (1998).
258. Imt at 24.




supporting the pattern of postpartum care that the Newborns' Act has
enshrined as federal law 6' Past practices have more to do with the
existence of insurance coverage and provider preferences than with
any real medical risks-with the result that patient preferences have
been largely ignored in the framing of guidelines for postpartum
care.262 Part III.C turns to this issue.
C. What Do Postpartum Women Want?
Although physicians and health services researchers have
focused on the risk of readmission to assess the desirability of rapid
postpartum discharge, it does not follow that the readmission risk is
all that we should be concerned about-especially in light of the fact
that the readmission rate is simultaneously underinclusive and
overinclusive.2 63 Indeed, by focusing on readmission rates, the
empirical studies have effectively missed, or at least unduly
discounted, many of the concerns that have been voiced about drive-
through deliveries. These concerns include the desire for a modest
postpartum period of rest and recuperation, sufficient time to provide
education about nursing and infant care, and maternal comfort about
one's ability to care for the newborn infant after discharge. These
factors are much more difficult to assess than the rate of maternal and
infant readmission, but deficiencies in these areas can affect many
more postpartum women and infants than readmission. The
legislative focus on horror stories and the medical profession's focus
on large scale studies of readmission risk has obscured a more basic
set of questions: What do postpartum woman actually think about
the care they receive? Do postpartum women value forty-eight hours
in the hospital? Do they believe they are getting enough rest and
recuperation in forty-eight hours? Would they be satisfied with less,
or do they want more? What kind of education do they actually
receive during the time they spend in the hospital? In short, what do
261. See Braveman et al., supra note 145, at 724 ("[T]here is no clear evidence for the
safety, efficacy, and effectiveness of the hospital and posthospital practices that were
previously standard."); Catz et al., supra note 152, at 743 ("It was agreed that there is an
inadequate science base to determine the safety and appropriateness of discharge
strategies both old and new."); Kessel et al., supra note 125, at 741 ("There are no
objective scientific data to determine the appropriate length of stay now or in the past.");
Parisi & Meyer, supra note 118, at 1637 ("Admittedly, the ideal postpartum hospital stay
has not been determined, even in low-risk cases.").
262. See Catz et al., supra note 152, at 743 ("While early discharge protocols have been
driven principally by financial imperatives arising out of managed care or other cost
containment programs, both provider preferences and the availability of insurance
coverage probably encouraged longer stays in the past.").
263. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
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postpartum women want?264
Unfortunately, there have been few studies of postpartum
women's preferences and attitudes.265 The largest and most recent
study involved a telephone survey of approximately 5200 women who
had given birth during a four-month period in 1995.21 Approximately
60% of the study population were discharged in less than twenty-four
hours, 35% were discharged between twenty-four and forty-eight
hours, and 5% were discharged in more than forty-eight hours.267
Table 1 describes the survey respondents' answers when asked




ASSESSMENT OF ACTUAL POSTPARTUM STAY
(% RESPONDING)
Actual Length of Stay (Hours)
Stay Was: <24 25-48 >48
Too Short 63.9% 47.8% 24.5%
About Right 33.4% 49.1% 69.2%
Too Long 2.7% 3.1% 6.3%
A substantial majority of women who were discharged in less
than twenty-four hours and a near majority of women who were
discharged in less than forty-eight hours believed their postpartum
stay was too short.269 The reasons cited for wanting to stay longer
included: needing more rest (94%); not feeling well (64%); needing
more information on infant care (36%) and self-care (28%); lack of
adequate support at home (27%); lack of comfort in caring for the
infant (24%); believing the infant was sick (16%); and simply wanting
264. See Diony Young, First Class Delivery: The Importance of Asking Women What
They Think About Their Maternity Care, 25 BIRTH 71, 71 (1998) (bemoaning the lack of
data on what women think about their maternity care, but noting that not all women want
the same thing).
265. The available data tend to be customer satisfaction surveys, which are problematic
for a variety of reasons, including selection bias.
266. See Gazmararian et al., supra note 230, at 199.
267. See id. at 199.
268. See id. at 203 exhibit 3.
269. Because data were collected in 1996, when public concern about drive-through
deliveries was at its height, one cannot exclude the possibility that women's assessments of
the length of their postpartum hospitalization was affected by public debate on the issue.
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more time in the hospital (15%).270 Table 2 illustrates the new
mothers answers' when asked to specify their optimal stay, and given
a choice of less than twenty-four hours, twenty-four to forty-eight
hours, or greater than forty-eight hours.2 71
TABLE 2
ASSESSMENT OF OPTIMAL POSTPARTUM STAY
(% RESPONDING)
Optimal Stay Actual Length of Stay (Hours)
Would Be: <24 25-48 >48
<24 Hours 37.6% 7.6% 12.4%
25-48 Hours 47.9% 56.8% 23.9%
>48 Hours 14.5% 35.6% 63.7%
These figures indicate a clear lack of enthusiasm among
postpartum women for drive-through deliveries. The market's failure
to respond to this unhappiness significantly strengthens the argument
for a regulatory response, but if one probes behind these figures, the
picture becomes considerably more complicated.272
Because one of the major purposes for an extended postpartum
stay is parental education, the study investigated whether women
believed they had received adequate information prior to discharge
on such matters as bodily and emotional changes, breast- and bottle-
feedings, infant bathing and care, screening tests, immunizations,
umbilical cord care, sleep cycles, signs of illness, and follow-up
appointments. Remarkably, there was absolutely no connection
between length of stay and whether the women believed they had
received adequate information; approximately 60% of women were
dissatisfied with the amount of information they received, regardless
of their length of stay.273
270. See Gazmararian et al., supra note 230, at 202-03.
271. See id. at 203 exhibit 3.
272. It is important to note that other surveys have come to considerably more positive
results. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (reporting a high degree of satisfaction
with rapid postpartum discharge among managed care enrollees).
273. See Gazmararian et al., supra note 230, at 200. There may be a coding issue
lurking in this study. The authors coded as "inadequate information" a response
expressing dissatisfaction with the information received on any of eight subjects. Because
the study employed a binary coding system, it did not indicate the degree to which women
were particularly satisfied or dissatisfied with the information they received or whether
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The authors also asked whether women would be willing to go
home in less than twenty-four hours after a future delivery and
whether they would be more willing to do so if they received a variety
of post-discharge services, such as access to a twenty-four hour
hotline, a follow-up phone call or home visit by a health care
professional, and housekeeping services.274 Table 3 reflects the
cumulative preference distribution of the women who were
surveyed.2 75
TABLE 3
CUMULATIVE WILLINGNESS TO BE DISCHARGED WITHIN 24
HOURS(% RESPONDING)
Actual
Stay Not Willing, if Receive Number of Services:
(Hours) Willing 0 1 2 3 4
<24 4.8% 42.5% 48.8% 60.1% 79.5% 95.2%
24-48 9.5% 24.2% 31.5% 45.9% 69.4% 90.5%
>48 9.0% 25.2% 32.9% 40.2% 65.8% 91.0%
Interestingly, a sizeable percentage of women were willing to go
home whether or not they received any services, although willingness
to leave without services was significantly affected by how quickly the
woman had been discharged on the prior admission.276 More
importantly, an overwhelming majority of women were willing to be
discharged within twenty-four hours, so long as they received some
level of post-discharge support. Women who were simply unwilling
to go home early were disproportionately married, college-educated,
with multiple children, more than thirty-five years old, and lived in
the Northeast or North Central regions-hardly the demographic
group one would be most concerned about from a relative risk
perspective.2 77
length of stay affected the number of subjects on which they reported receiving
inadequate information.
274. See id. at 203.
275. See id at 203 exhibit 3.
276. See id. at 203.
277. See id. at 200-01.
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D. How Much "Safety" and at What Cost?
The critical questions to ask about the Newborns' Act are how
much safety are we really purchasing and is that safety worth the
cost?27  Life is full of tradeoffs. Money spent on extended
postpartum stays is money that is not available to be spent on other
services that might benefit more infants and mothers-or on other
health services that might benefit more people or save more quality-
adjusted life years.7 9 More globally, money spent on health insurance
premiums is unavailable for other social goals, including education,
police, roads, and the like."8
These questions take on greater significance because of the way
in which the campaign against drive-through deliveries was waged.
The prohibition on drive-through deliveries was driven by a few high-
profile anecdotes offered by physicians and trumpeted by the news
media l l The self-interested nature of the proposed reform attracted
little or no attention, but physicians gained an invaluable legislative
precedent-that insurers and MCOs should not dictate the manner or
means of medical treatments.' The benefit of this precedent to
278. The issue was nicely framed during the hearings on Senate Bill 969 in an exchange
between Senator Bradley and a representative of an HMO:
Sen. Bradley: [T]he issue is are we better off-is the mother better off-with
an additional 24 hours.
Dr. Levine: And how much better off, and how many mothers.
Sen. Bradley: Yes. Those are all relevant questions.
Newborns' and Mothers' Hearing, supra note 24, at 47; see also Nduka U. Udom & Charles
L. Betley, Effects of Maternity-Stay Legislation on 'Drive-Through Deliveries,' HEALTH
AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 208, 215 ("[T]he issue in evaluating the effects of maternity-stay
legislation is whether the increased costs are worthwhile.").
279. To be sure, there is good evidence that the costs of such legislation are largely
borne by those who receive the mandated benefits. See Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence
of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 622, 639 (1994).
280. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care
and Unfair Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 49, 49 (1996)
("Moreover, the public has a host of welfare needs, including better housing, education,
and environmental protection, but has a limited purse. If we are to have any money left to
pay for these other goods, we must place greater limits on spending for health care
services.").
281. The physicians thus acted as "availability entrepreneurs." Timur Kuran & Cass
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 687-88 (1999)
(describing the role of "availability entrepreneurs" in skewing the regulatory agenda).
282. To be sure, obstetricians did not gain financially from the mandated coverage,
because their fees were not tied to the length of a hospitalization. Pediatricians may or
may not have gained, depending on whether they were able to bill for the "extra" visit
necessitated by a rapid postpartum discharge. Both groups gained indirectly because it
was easier and more convenient for them to deliver the services they deem medically
necessary while mothers and infants are in the hospital. To assess the impact of such
matters on the degree to which a professional organization supported or opposed the
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physicians, who felt increasingly beleaguered by managed care, was
incalculable.'
Although the campaign against drive-through deliveries was led
by physicians, it was framed for the public as an uprising of concerned
mothers.24 The fixation on anecdotes of a few bad outcomes and the
bipartisan enthusiasm for "motherhood" ensured that the full scope
and significance of the issue of rapid postpartum discharge and the
implicit tradeoffs that would result from its prohibition would be
ignored or deemed immaterial.' Yet, only by systematically
assessing the benefits and costs of such regulatory actions can we
avoid misdirected regulatory efforts and prevent the adoption of
policies that create costs without commensurate benefits.rs 6
Newborns' Act, see infra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
283. See Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 197 (noting that laws "set some
important precedents that may have a much more profound impact on health policy than
is currently imagined ... [including the signaling of] a growing legislative interest in
limiting insurers' control over clinical decision making").
284. Compare 142 CONG. REC. S9912 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Mikulski) ("This whole movement around providing care for 48 hours or 96 hours or
whatever is medically appropriate came from mothers themselves."), with Charles &
Prystowsky, supra note 73, at 747 ("We [physicians] had no recourse but to seek
appropriate legislation."), Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 186, 188-89 (noting that
physicians approached state and federal legislators to seek such legislation), and Karen E.
Kun & Edward Muir, Drive By Deliveries: Legislating Practice, 112 PUB. HEALTH REP.
277,280 (1997) ("[A]dvocacy by parents, individual physicians, the American Academy of
Pediatrics, and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists was influential in
the decision of legislators to introduce legislation.").
285. As two commentators ruefully observed, "[A] reliance on personal experience is
hardly a new factor in legislative decision making, but in an era where so many conscious
efforts have been made to improve decision making by increasing the information
resources of legislators, it is disappointing to see systematic research exerting so little
influence." Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 196 (citation omitted).
Because of their anecdotal focus, legislators were effectively engaging in "selective
attention." Cass R. Sunstein, Which Risks First?, 1997 U CHI. LEGAL F. 101, 104 ("Too
often government focuses on pieces or sides of a problem, failing to see that what is at
work is a complex whole.... The problem of selective attention is aggravated by the role
of the media, which quite generally focuses on sensationalistic pieces of problems .... ").
The campaign against drive-through deliveries exemplifies this problem. As one
commentator has noted:
Public debate and the corresponding legislation have focused almost exclusively
on concerns about length of stay and have given inadequate attention to the
broader issues about what kinds of home-, office-, and hospital-based services
and what kinds of connections among these different services are needed for
both mother and child in the early days following birth.
Braveman, supra note 220, at 524. The net result was that the tradeoffs implicit in the
Newborns' Act and state statutes were ignored. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health
Tradeoffs, 63 U. CI. L. REv. 1533, 1535, 1554-55 (1996) (arguing that health-health
tradeoffs usually are ignored).
286. Opponents of drive-through deliveries typically claim that the expenses are
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Despite enthusiastic public and congressional support for the
Newborns' Act, there is little or no evidence on the benefit side of the
ledger for postpartum stays of the specified length. The empirical
studies conflict to some extent on relative risk, but if there is any
medical benefit from extended postpartum hospitalization, it is quite
small. Although some commentators have argued that extended
postpartum hospitalization provides important social benefits, the
evidence does not appear to support that claim either. Post-discharge
home visits or appointments to be seen by a health care provider
within two days of discharge can accomplish the objectives
purportedly served by an extended postpartum stay-and may even
be an improvement on such a stay if rapid discharge lowers the risk of
an infection. If the goal of an extended postpartum stay is simply to
ensure adequate time for bonding and rest, those purposes could be
accomplished by providing women with a voucher for an overnight
stay at a luxury hotel.
Thus, the primary support for extended postpartum stays is little
more than the collective clinical judgment of some (but by no means
all) members of the medical profession and our collective "common
sense" about what postpartum women need. Such judgments may
well be better than nothing, but they have been wrong before-
sometimes spectacularly so. In addition, the widespread regional
justified or that the nation should "err on the side of safety." See Newborns' and Mothers'
Hearing, supra note 24, at 10 (statement of Sen. Bradley) ("[W]here do we err-do we err
on the side of $900 less in costs, or do we err on the side of the health and safety of the
mother and newborn? I think that we should come down for the safety of the mother and
the newborn."); Parisi & Meyer, supra note 118, at 1637 ("The additional costs absorbed
by the hospital seemed trivial in comparison with concerns about the potential medical
consequences of the shorter stays covered by insurers.").
Obviously, such statements fall well below the standard of a formal cost-benefit
analysis. Furthermore, those advocating that we should "err on the side of safety" would
have more credibility if they were actually footing the bill. See supra notes 86-89 and
accompanying text.
287. Some hospitals have effectively done precisely that by building or contracting for
luxurious step-down facilities. See George J. Annas, Women and Children First, 333 NEW.
ENG. J. MED. 1647, 1650 (1995) (noting that Tampa General Hospital in Florida offers
maternity patients 48 hours of post-discharge care in a hotel-like unit at no additional
cost); Andr6e Brooks, Recovering, with All the Amenities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, at F7
(describing the growth of medical hotels and post-operative recovery centers).
288. Consider for a moment what everyone (including doctors) "knows"-that walking
helps shorten labor. Wrong. See Steven L. Bloom, Lack of Effect of Walking on Labor
and Delivery, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 76, 76 (1998). Little harm probably resulted from
this advice, but one cannot say the same for all medical fads. See Duncan Neuhauser,
Medical Technology Assessment as Social Responsibility, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 878,
878 (1986) (citing numerous examples of harm resulting from failure to conduct adequate
assessments of medical and surgical interventions); see also supra note 74 (recounting the
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variation in postpartum practice patterns suggests that the (at least
partially self-interested) assessment of the involved professionals
concerning the appropriate length of a postpartum stay should be
evaluated with a jaundiced eye. 89 It is no accident that early
discharge laws were supported by physicians and nursing groups who
provided hospital-based services and opposed by nursing groups who
provided home care services.2 0  As one set of commentators dryly
noted:
For those (physicians and nurses) associated with hospital-
based care, an extra day of hospitalization is a perfectly
sensible policy, while those involved in home care see it as a
waste of limited resources. As is often the case in health
policy issues, self-interest and concern with patients' well-
being were likely entangled.291
The cost side of the ledger is significantly more concrete, even
after one nets out the costs of incremental readmissions and post-
discharge visits. Childbirth is the most common reason for
hospitalization in the United States; approximately 4 million children
are born each year in this country.29  Most discussions of the
economic implications of rapid postpartum discharges begin and end
by multiplying 4 million births by an average figure for inpatient
hospitalization of $1000 per day to arrive at the understandable
conclusion that $4 billion per incremental day of hospitalization is a
powerful incentive to accelerate postpartum discharge.293 Matters are
not quite so simple.
history of routine in utero monitoring).
289. As I have explained elsewhere, one should "be cautious about generating a
normative baseline for the cost/quality mix of professional services based solely or even
largely on the assessment of the affected professionals. Given their track record,
professional pronouncements on the appropriate and/or necessary level of quality should
be viewed with a jaundiced eye." Hyman, Professional Responsibility, supra note 29, at
399.
290. See Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 187 (noting that nursing groups "took
positions on this legislation according to whether or not they provided hospital or home
care services").
291. Id.
292. See Trends, supra note 125, at 335.
293. The $4 billion figure was circulated widely and generally is attributed to Robert
Torricelli, currently the junior Senator from New Jersey. See Newborns' and Mothers'
Hearing, supra note 24, at 56 (statement of Dr. Palma E. Formica, AMA Board of
Trustees); Congress Takes on Insurers over Hospital Birth Stay, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Sept. 13, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 4087548; Editorial, Ensure Care for
Newborns: Mom's Entitled to at Least 2 Days in Hospital, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 17, 1995, at
2B, available in 1995 WL 5508117; Legislators Rush to Get Minimum Hospital Stays for
Mothers, Newborns, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), July 17, 1995, at 3A, available
in 1995 WL 8821411.
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To begin, both mother and infant must be hospitalized, so the
cost might be as high as $8 billion per year. Of course, not all
mothers want to stay in the hospital for forty-eight or ninety-six
hours, regardless of their legal and contractual entitlement to do so,
and some women have a medical reason to remain in the hospital
longer than forty-eight or ninety-six hours.2 94 Thus, the universe of
potential beneficiaries predictably will be less than the total number
of births. It also seems likely there will be considerable regional
variation in the number of women who will take advantage of such
coverage, depending on local physician practice norms and whether
post-discharge follow-up services are available.295
The only way that MCOs incur expenses at the specified rate
($1000 per incremental day) is if hospitals price their delivery-related
services per diem. 96 More generally, the price of $1000 per day is
based on nationwide average hospital charges. The actual cost (let
alone marginal cost) of providing an extra day of care is likely to be
considerably less than $100097 In many markets, managed care
organizations probably have the bargaining power to drive per diem
charges closer to cost.
298
On the other hand, if hospitals actually were willing to charge
marginal cost for each incremental day of hospitalization, it is unclear
294. If women voluntarily leave the hospital in less than 48 or 96 hours or if the
MCO/insurer would have voluntarily covered a stay of at least 48 or 96 hours, no
incremental costs are incurred as a result of postpartum stay legislation.
295. See Tom Philp, New Moms Face Short Stay in Hospitals Despite Law,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 17, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Scmuto-Bee
file (reporting that California-based providers do not expect to change their practice of
discharging women in 12 to 24 hours, despite passage of the Newborns' Act). But see Tim
Bonfield, Law May Give Birth to New Difficulties: 48-Hour Stay for Births Begins Today,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 17, 1996, at B1, available in 1996 WL 2264659 (noting a
physician's statement that "if you discharge at 36 or 24 hours and something less than
positive happens, it could be considered a violation of a standard of care").
296. If hospitals priced their services on a different basis, such as a fixed rate for
vaginal delivery regardless of length of stay or a high charge for the first 24 hours of
admission and variable cost thereafter, MCOs would become indifferent as to the length
of a postpartum hospitalization.
297. As Professor Uwe Reinhardt has questioned, "[How] can $1,000 be the real cost
of keeping a healthy mother and her baby an extra day ... ? Aside from some food, a
change of linen and a bit of tender loving care, what extra items would that $1,000 cover?"
Uwe Reinhardt, When Trenton Plays Obstetrician, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1995, § 13, at 15
(N.J. edition).
298. See David R. Olmos, Maternity Rules Raise Questions on Care, Cost, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1996, at Al ("Hospital officials are concerned that insurers will use their
marketplace clout to push the cost burden down to them .... Insurance companies can
still leverage the oversupply in the market and say, 'We'll pay you $600 a day for a two-
day stay.'" (quoting Jim Lott, spokesman for the Health Care Association of Southern
California)).
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why MCOs and insurers would be quite so keen on rapid postpartum
discharge. 99 Regardless, mandating coverage of a second postpartum
day actually makes it more likely that hospitals can insist on being
paid more than marginal cost, because MCOs no longer have the
option of simply refusing to purchase such care.300
Modeling the impact of these elements is a difficult task.
Although the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) never scored the
Newborns' Act, it did score Senate Bill 969, which was the vehicle in
the Senate for consideration of the issue.301 The CBO estimated that
Senate Bill 969 would affect 900,000 births3° and would impose costs
on the private sector attributable to an additional 400,000 inpatient
days (at $400 per day) and 200,000 home visits (at $100 per visit), for
a total of $180 million per year.30 3 In addition, the CBO estimated
that the law would require the Medicaid program to pay for an
additional 80,000 inpatient days (at $300 per day) and 80,000 home
health visits (at $75 per visit) for a total of $30 million per year 14
299. See generally Reinhardt, supra note 297, at 15 ("[T]he insurance companies in
New Jersey and elsewhere are obsessed with reducing the length of hospital stays. New
Jersey hospitals charge these companies about $1,000 for an extra day, at a time when
hospitals are rich in empty beds. That could understandably lead to an obsession.").
300. See Uwe Reinhardt, "Efficiency and Civility in Managed Care" or "How Much
Jello Can a Mother Eat?," 56 MED. CARE REs. & REv. 47, 53 (1999) ("For the hospitals,
this government intervention represents, of course, an official license to foist on the health
insurance industry additional, essentially discretionary hospital days at a high per diem
charge, that is, at very high profit margins."). If multiple hospitals are competing to
contract with the MCO, this effect will be less significant.
301. The CBO's analysis is included in S. REP. NO. 104-326, at 11-17 (1995) (Sup.
Does. No. Y1.115:104-326).
302. Specifically, the CBO estimated that there were 4 million births annually in the
United States, of which approximately 33% were paid for by Medicaid. Of the 2.7 million
non-Medicaid births, 500,000 were to uninsured mothers. Of the remaining 2.2 million
births, about 20% already were covered by state laws requiring extended postpartum
stays. Of the remaining 1.75 million births, approximately 50% stayed less than the
required amount of time. The CBO report estimated that approximately two-thirds of this
group of 900,000 women who had stayed less than the required time would need either an
additional day in the hospital or a post-discharge visit and that the ratio would be two-
thirds hospitalization and one-third post-discharge visit. See id.
303. See S. REP. No. 104-326, at 16.
304. See iL at 13. It is unclear why the CBO determined that Senate Bill 969 would
require 80,000 additional inpatient days and 80,000 post-discharge visits because Senate
Bill 969 does not apply to state Medicaid programs. The CBO was unable to clarify this
point, but given the disparity in projected utilization in the private market and Medicaid, I
presume that the CBO was attempting to account for the spill-over effects of Senate Bill
969 on obstetrical practice patterns, regardless of the specifies of the coverage mandate.
The CBO also was unable to explain why they estimated that Medicaid deliveries would
require an equal distribution of extra days in the hospital and post-discharge visits, while




The costs attributable to federal employee benefits accounted for an
additional $7 million.30 State and local governments would also incur
additional costs of approximately $3 million per year? 6 Thus, the
total cost of Senate Bill 969 was estimated at approximately $220
million per year 3 7
An updated estimate was released in October 1998, when the
Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services
jointly issued regulations implementing the Newborns' Act. Because
the Act did not encourage the substitution of post-discharge visits for
hospitalization to the same degree as Senate Bill 969,308 the
regulations noted that it was possible that "those who would have
chosen a follow-up visit under Senate Bill 969 will elect[] to remain in
the hospital for an additional day ... .309 However, the regulations
noted that it was also possible that "mothers and physicians [would]
determine that some of the follow-up care is unnecessary," even
though discharge preceded the mandated forty-eight hours of
coverage.10 In addition, since the enactment of the Newborns' Act,
an additional twelve states had enacted prohibitions on drive-through
deliveries, thereby reducing the costs directly attributable to the
federal legislation.31' The regulations accordingly widened the range
of cost projections for the Newborns' Act to between $130 million
and $200 million per year. 2
These estimates are subject to a number of important caveats.
First, because both the CBO and regulations were scoring only the
305. See idL at 14.
306. See icL at 11-17.
307. If one expresses the costs in terms of percentages, the CBO estimated that Senate
Bill 969 would cause an increase in health insurance premiums of approximately 0.06%,
which would cause employers and employees to reduce coverage or drop benefits for
other services, with the net result that employer contributions for health insurance would
increase by 0.02%. See S. REP. No. 104-326, at 12. Because most of this increase would
be passed through to employees in the form of lower wages, federal income and payroll
tax revenues were projected to drop as well, by about $26 million per year. See id.
308. As noted previously, the original version of Senate Bill 969 required the insurer to
cover postpartum hospitalization of 48 or 96 hours unless post-discharge services were
provided and both the mother and attending provider agreed that discharge was
appropriate. The Newborns' Act is silent on the issue of post-discharge services and
simply leaves the issue of discharge up to the attending provider in consultation with the
mother. Presumably, Congress assumed that the attending provider and mother would
consider the availability of post-discharge services in deciding whether discharge was
appropriate.
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independent effect of the Newborns' Act, they excluded from
consideration the costs attributable to such mandates in the states
that had passed legislation. Similarly, the CBO did not consider the
impact of the Newborns' Act on the cost of care provided to the
uninsured. From a social perspective, all of these costs are real and
must be considered part of the cost of the campaign against drive-
through deliveries, even if they are not solely attributable to the
Newborns' Act. Second, despite the aura of certainty fostered by the
use of specific figures for the number of inpatient days and outpatient
visits, the figures are little more than educated guesswork. The
determination that 400,000 incremental inpatient days and 200,000
post-discharge visits would be required for 900,000 insured deliveries
and 80,000 inpatient days and post-discharge visits would be required
for the 1.3 million Medicaid deliveries is plausible, but there was no
back-up for these figures and far higher figures are not unreasonable.
The foundation for determining the nominal cost for incremental
days of hospitalization ($300-$400) and post-discharge visits ($75-
$100) was equally unclear.3  In addition, hospitals have shown little
interest in charging marginal cost for incremental days of postpartum
hospitalization-just as they have shown no interest in charging
marginal cost for treatment in the emergency department. 4
A number of studies have examined the cost of mandating
coverage of an extended postpartum hospitalization in a systematic
way.315 Because each of these studies employed different data sets,
involved distinct populations, and considered different aspects of the
cost equation, they are offered as independent perspectives on the
313. A number of commentators have estimated the marginal cost of an additional day
of hospitalization. These estimates are generally consistent with the CBO's and have
ranged from $100 to $300 per day. See Annas, supra note 287, at 1650 (estimating that the
marginal cost of an incremental day is "probably closer to $100 than $1,000, at least if the
hospital has excess maternity-bed capacity"); Thomas Maier, 2-Day Maternity Stays
Promised, NEWSDAY, June 22, 1995, at 6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Newsday
(New York, NY) file (estimating the marginal cost of $300 for an extra day at the
University Medical Center in Stony Brook, New York).
314. See Hyman, Consumer Protection, supra note 3, at 433 n.82.
From an economic perspective, it makes sense to use marginal cost instead of
charges to score the true cost of inappropriate ED usage-but only if hospitals
are actually prepared to charge marginal cost, and there is no excess capacity in
the system. There is considerable evidence to indicate that neither of these
preconditions are satisfied, although these points are not widely appreciated.
Id
315. Other studies have evaluated the costs of particular short-stay protocols and of
desired post-discharge services. See, e.g., Julie A. Gazmararian & Jeffrey P. Koplan,
Economic Aspects of the Perinatal Hospital Stay, 25 CLINICS PERINATOLOGY 483, 486-94
(1998) (summarizing various studies).
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cost of mandating extended postpartum stays. My own computation
of the cost of the Newborns' Act and similar initiatives is based on an
integration of the conclusions of each of the individual studies and is
presented at the end of this section.
The most exhaustive study was conducted by the staff of the
hospital rate-setting commission for the state of Maryland.316 The
study demonstrated that Maryland's statute mandating coverage of
extended postpartum hospitalizations had increased length of stay
following a vaginal delivery from 1.45 days to 1.99 days (an increase
of 37.6%) and increased length of stay following a Cesarean section
from 2.99 days to 3.5 days (a 17.2% increase). 17 Charges went up by
$250 for a vaginal delivery (a 10% increase) and $225 for a Cesarean
delivery (a 6.3% increase).1 Although these figures are based only
on the cost of maternal hospitalization, they confirm that the
incremental cost for an additional day of hospitalization is well below
the average per diem charge. However, the universal increase in the
length of stay to forty-eight hours following a vaginal delivery and the
sizeable increase in length of stay following a Cesarean section
suggests that the CBO was too optimistic in its assumption that more
than half of postpartum women would be willing to be discharged
before their coverage was exhausted. From a social-cost perspective,
the legislation increased the amount spent on inpatient maternity care
in Maryland by $5.5 million, exclusive of any incremental costs
associated with post-discharge visits and newborn hospitalization.319
Another study assessed the costs of hospitalization associated
with such legislation based on data from Illinois during 1995 and
1996.320 The study used hazard rate estimates to arrive at marginal
mean hospital charges of $990 for the second day following a vaginal
delivery and $1922 for the fourth day following a Cesarean section 2'
As noted previously, in Illinois, 56% of women with vaginal deliveries
were discharged after one day, and 72% of women with
uncomplicated Cesarean deliveries were discharged in less than four
316. See Udom & Betley, supra note 278, at 208.
317. See id at 210-11.
318. See id. at 214-15. In Maryland, charges are equivalent to costs because of the
state's rate-setting system.
319. See id. at 208.
320. See Raube & Merrell, supra note 146, at 922. Thus, the study omitted the cost of
physician, outpatient, and home-based services.
321. See id at 923. For newborns, the figure was $497 for the second day of
hospitalization. Because longer stays are associated with sicker infants, the cost for the
fourth day of hospitalization was significantly higher ($1591). See id.
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days.322 Based on varying assumptions about the number of avoided
readmissions and the percentage of women who would take
advantage of a lengthier postpartum stay, the authors arrived at
figures ranging as high as $200 million or 20% of the cost of all birth-
related admissions and readmissions.'
Another study evaluated adjusted average charges based on
varying lengths of stay during 1993.4 The authors determined that
for the second day of newborn hospitalization after a vaginal delivery,
hospitals charged approximately $300 per day.3z Comparable figures
were incurred for maternal hospitalization. 36
Another study that was discussed during the congressional
hearing on Senate Bill 969 evaluated the avoided charges associated
with early discharge in New Hampshire in 1993.327 The study
employed a per diem rate of approximately $2075 per day for the cost
of hospitalizing mother and infant for an additional day.-, Of
approximately 15,000 births in New Hampshire in 1993, 3600 mothers
and infants were discharged in less than forty-eight hours. The study
determined that these discharges lowered hospitalization costs by
nearly $7.5 million. The charges associated with readmission and
treatment in the ED totaled $183,000 for infants discharged in less
than forty-eight hours. The study concluded that early discharge
saved nearly $7.3 million on the treatment of the infants in
question.329
New Jersey's Department of Health and Senior Services
conducted a study evaluating the impact of a prohibition on drive-
through deliveries enacted in 1995.330 New Jersey's electronic birth
certificate data allowed the authors to determine precisely how many
hours postpartum an infant had spent in the hospital.3 31 The authors
evaluated results from four hospitals, which represented
approximately 8% of the births in New Jersey.332 After the law was
322. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
323. See Raube & Merrell, supra note 146, at 922.
324. See FOSTER & SCHNEIDER, supra note 132, at 2.
325. See id at 10.
326. See id
327. See New Hampshire Study, supra note 177, at 2.
328. See id. The figure was obtained from the New Hampshire Hospital Association
and represented the average per diem charge in the state. See id.
329. See id. The study considered total ED and readmission charges, but not
incremental charges attributable to early discharge.
330. See V. Dato et al., Average Postpartum Length of Stay for Uncomplicated





enacted, average length of stay after a vaginal delivery increased from
1.4 to 1.8 days, and average length of stay for a Cesarean delivery
increased from 2.8 days to 3.3 days.33 This study suggests that many
postpartum women (at least in the northeastern parts of the United
States) will remain in the hospital for almost as long as they have
coverage.
Another study by a health plan in Connecticut evaluated the
consequences of legislation prohibiting rapid postpartum
discharges. 34  Average postpartum length of stay after a vaginal
delivery increased from 1.62 days to 2.12 days, and the percentage of
women staying in the hospital for twenty-four hours or less dropped
from 33.2% to 6.5%.11 Before the legislation was enacted, the health
plan had a program that allowed mothers discharged less than thirty
hours postpartum to receive nursing visits, nanny care, and extra
pediatric office visits.336 The average cost of this program was well
below the cost of an incremental day of hospitalization. The authors
estimated "the savings at approximately $1000 per mother, as
compared with a 2-day hospitalization for eligible mothers who chose
not to participate in the program. 3 7
Finally, a study at a single public hospital in Indianapolis
assessed the impact of shortened postpartum hospitalizations on the
cost per vaginal delivery for a population made up overwhelmingly of
Medicaid patients.338 The introduction of Medicaid managed care in
Indiana brought about a 22% decrease in average postpartum
hospital length of stay, from 2.68 to 2.13 days. However, costs
declined by much less-12% -or about $280 per delivery. 9
Considering all of this information, it is still difficult to arrive at a
hard figure for the true financial cost associated with mandating
coverage of extended postpartum hospitalizations. The oft-discussed
$1000 per day estimate is far too high if one is considering the
marginal cost of incremental days of postpartum maternal
333. See id at 701.
334. See Joseph V. Cook Jr. et al., Letter to the Editor, Early Discharge of Newborns,
278 JAMA 2065, 2065 (1997).
335. See id.
336. See id The authors determined that of 77 mothers, 1 did not use any nursing
visits, 5 used one visit, 70 used two visits, and 1 used three visits. Twenty-five mothers did
not use any nanny care, 2 used an average of eight hours, and 50 used sixteen hours. See
id.
337. Id.
338. See Ming Tai-Seale et al., Drive-Through Delivery: Where Are the "Savings"?, 56
MED. CARE REs. REv. 30passim (1999).
339. See id. at 39-40.
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hospitalization, but one must include the costs attributable to both
mothers and infants, weigh whether hospitals will charge only
marginal cost when MCOs are forced to purchase the requisite
number of days of postpartum hospitalization, and net out the costs of
incremental post-discharge services, emergency department visits,
and readmissions. In like fashion, one must consider how many
women will choose to stay in the hospital until their postpartum
coverage is exhausted and weigh the impact of regional variation in
practice patterns. Some of these difficulties offset one another, while
others are cumulative.
Rather than provide a specific figure for the total costs
attributable to the legislation that resulted from the campaign against
drive-through deliveries, I offer an upper and lower bound, which I
readily admit is subject to considerable uncertainty. I estimate that
the combined marginal cost for hospitalizing mother and newborn for
an extra day, less the cost of post-discharge visits, and incremental
readmissions and emergency department visits is no lower than $300
and no higher than $600. The number of women and infants who will
take advantage of these provisions is particularly difficult to quantify,
especially in light of the variations in regional practice patterns and
the basic question of how dynamic those practice patterns actually
are. 40  However, absent the Newborns' Act and similar state
legislation, it seems likely that, over time, an overwhelming majority
of the deliveries in the United States would have postpartum lengths
of stay shorter than those specified in these statutes. The data suggest
that most women will choose to take advantage of this coverage,
although regional variation in practice patterns is likely to have an
offsetting impact. Overall, I estimate that postpartum
340. The data presented in Part III suggest that practice patterns can be quite dynamic,
but there are reports indicating resistance to the changing of local norms in response to
the Newborns' Act, at least in California. See Philp, supra note 295, at Al. However, since
the start of the campaign against drive-through deliveries in 1995, the length of a
postpartum hospitalization has reversed a multi-decade decline and actually increased.
See supra Figure 1. The average length of stay was 2.1 days in 1995 and 2.4 days in 1997.
See Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Longer
Hospital Stays for Childbirth (last modified June 4, 1999) <http://www.cdc.gov/nchswwwl
products/pubs/pubd/hesats/hospbirth.htm>. The National Center of Health Statistics
report is quite clear on the magnitude of the change:
The number of women hospitalized for 1 day or less for childbirth dropped from
1.4 million (37%) in 1995 to 951,000 (25%) in 1997. Stays of 2-3 days increased
from 2.0 million (54%) to 2.5 million (64%) during this period. Those with
vaginal deliveries accounted for almost the entire decrease in stays of 1 day or
less and increase in stays of 2-3 days. Women with Cesarean deliveries had an
increased number of 4-day stays.
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hospitalizations will be lengthened for approximately 75% of those
who give birth, or 3 million deliveries. Combining these two
elements, I estimate that extended postpartum stays have a social cost
somewhere between $900 million and $1.8 billion every year341
This figure is consistent with the results obtained from
generalizing the results of single states. Maryland experienced a cost
increase of $5.5 million (for approximately 23,000 deliveries) when it
mandated coverage of extended postpartum hospitalizations.' 42 If the
same cost distribution holds for all 4 million births in the United
States, the cost would be $956.5 million per year. 3 This study did not
consider the cost of infant hospitalization, rehospitalization, or
emergency department visits, nor did it include the offsetting cost of
post-discharge services." At the same time, and as previously noted,
in Maryland charges more closely approximate actual costs (but not
marginal costs).
In New Hampshire, there were 3600 rapid postpartum discharges
out of 15,000 deliveries 45 The avoided cost was $7.2 million. If the
same cost distribution is assumed for all 4 million births in the United
States, the estimated savings would be $1.9 million per year. 46 The
study is flawed by its use of charges instead of costs and the extremely
low percentage of drive-through deliveries in New Hampshire
compared to the rest of the country. It does, however, include the
costs associated with maternal and infant hospitalization, as well as
the costs for post-discharge emergency department visits and
readmissions (the last of which are overstated, because the study
employed the costs attributable to all emergency visits and
readmissions and not just incremental visits or readmissions
attributable to the rapid postpartum discharge).
Using the midpoint of the range in the Illinois study, one arrives
at a figure of approximately $1.3 billion. 7 Although this study
341. The calculation is: $300 per extra day x 3 million incremental days of
hospitalization = $900 million; $600 per extra day x 3 million incremental days of
hospitalization = $1.8 billion.
342. See Udom & Betley, supra note 278, at 208.
343. If it costs $5.5 million for 23,000 births, how much would it cost for 4 million
births? The calculation is: $5.5 million 23,000 births = $293.13 per birth. $293.13 x 4
million births = $956.52 million in total cost.
344. See Udom & Betley, supra note 278, at 209-210, 214-15 (noting the limitations of
the study).
345. See supra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
346. Again, if it cost $7.2 million for 15,000 deliveries, how much does it cost for 4
million deliveries? The calculation is $7.2 million 15,000 births= $480 per birth. $480 x 4
million births = $1,920,000 in total costs.
347. See Raube & Merrell, supra note 146, at 923.
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includes the charges associated with incremental maternal and infant
admissions and readmissions, it excludes the cost of all post-discharge
services, including post-discharge ED visits, and is based on charges,
not costs. Finally, researchers from Prudential Health Systems
estimated that the mandated coverage of extended postpartum stays
would increase costs by $900 million to $2.2 billion per year.'38
If one expresses this estimate of $900 million to $1.8 billion as a
percentage of the total cost of health care in the United States, it
turns out to be a relatively modest .12% to .24%3 49 As a percentage
of the amount currently spent on postpartum hospitalizations, it is a
substantially greater amount.350 All such strategies, which involve
presenting the cost of extended postpartum hospitalization as a
percentage of some other (far greater) number, are deeply deceptive;
the real issue is what are we buying for our $1 to $2 billion per year-
and the answer appears to be not much. Indeed, if the cost is so
modest, it is rather striking that a majority of the states and the
federal government were willing to mandate coverage for everyone
except the 40% of births in the United States to mothers on
Medicaid352-and a majority of the states passing legislation behaved
the same with regard to state employees. 3
From a distributional perspective, a prohibition on drive-through
deliveries effectively compels the insurer to transfer resources from
the common (insured) pool to those who take advantage of the
extended postpartum hospitalization. In Maryland, those individuals
were white women, between the ages of nineteen and thirty-five, with
348. See Gazmararian & Koplan, supra note 315, at 496.
349. If the costs of Medicare and Medicaid for the elderly and disabled, are excluded,
the percentage increases to a range of .18% to .35%.
350. See Olmos, supra note 298, at Al (noting the estimate of a Watson Wyatt
Worldwide benefits consultant that extending maternity stays for normal vaginal deliveries
from 24 to 48 hours would increase hospital bills by 18%); Udom & Betley, supra note
278, at 211 (finding that the statute resulted in a 10% increase in charges for vaginal
deliveries and a 6.27% increase in charges for Cesarean deliveries).
351. See Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 32 (outlining difficulties
with expressing the costs of consumer protection in dollars per month).
352. To be sure, Congress subsequently included Medicaid beneficiaries within the
protections of the Newborns' Act-but only beneficiaries who were enrolled in a Medicaid
managed care plan. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Because most of the
states now have this portion of the Medicaid population in a managed care program, the
Balanced Budget Act effectively extended the protections of the Newborns' Act to the
Medicaid population. However, because states share the cost of the Medicaid program
with the federal government, Congress was being virtuous in part at the states' expense,
even though the majority of states had already indicated their unwillingness to incur such
expenses. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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private health insurance, who delivered in rural and suburban
hospitals.354 As noted previously, similar results were obtained in
another study: women who insisted on forty-eight hours of
hospitalization were more likely to be married, college educated, with
multiple children, and more than thirty-five years old. 5  It is very
hard to make the case that such women are particularly in need of a
governmental mandate to protect their interests-or that they face
significant risks as a result of drive-through deliveries.
It is, of course, a different question whether the drive to shorten
postpartum stays is the best way for MCOs to decrease the nation's
health bill. The inevitable adaptive responses by health care
providers will have to be addressed,356 and preventing premature
births may offer more "bang for the buck" than encouraging rapid
postpartum discharge.3 7 Some blame for the mess should be directed
at hospitals, who caused much of the problem by pricing their services
on a per diem basis even though incremental costs are relatively
modest after the first day of postpartum hospitalization.358  The
354. See Udom & Betley, supra note 278, at 215.
355. See Gazmararian et al., supra note 230, at 203--04.
356. See Marbella et al., supra note 128, at 34 (noting that the proportion of full-term
Wisconsin newborns who were classified as sick doubled in the year that early discharge
policies were implemented). The authors suggested the trend was caused by one of two
possibilities:
[E]ither physicians are responding to these [early discharge] policies by
classifying more newborns as sick in order to justify having the newborn stay in
the hospital for extra time beyond what is allowed by the new discharge policies,
or ... hospitals are classifying these newborns as sick to get the reimbursement
from the insurance carriers.
Id. at 34-35.
357. See id. at 35. Because premature births account for 6.3% of total births but 48.8%
of total hospital delivery charges, Professor Marbella and her colleagues suggest that
"[e]fforts to reduce premature births in managed care populations may have a greater
impact on controlling medical costs than efforts to discharge full-term deliveries earlier."
Id. at 34-35.
358. As Professor Uwe Reinhardt has observed:
Because the incremental costs per in-patient day during the convalescent phase
of a hospital stay tend to be relatively low, flat per diems are a truly perverse
form of pricing. One seeks to recover with the highest allocation of hospital
overhead from precisely those inpatient days that are more discretionary from a
clinical perspective and, therefore, are more dispensable from the perspective of
a highly price-sensitive payer, such as an IMO. One need not have a doctorate
in economics to predict the untoward behavior that this perverse pricing scheme
will trigger. In the end, the extraordinarily high price charged for a discretionary
patient day will drive even church-going HMO executives to kick new mothers
and their babies out of the hospital, because that will save their own HMO
$1,000-$1,500 and because, these executives seem to believe, it also will save the
nation $1,000-$1,500. Unfortunately, it saves society much less.
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Spending More Through 'Cost Control:' Our Obsessive Quest to Gut
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standards employed by MCOs in formulating their determinations as
to what constitutes medically necessary care may also require further
consideration.35 9 Yet none of these points detract from the reality
that the campaign against drive-through deliveries was fundamentally
misguided.
E. What Is the Regulatory Cost?
To this point, the analysis has focused on the financial costs
associated with legislating postpartum length of stay. It is also worth
noting the regulatory costs associated with such legislation.
Legislative and regulatory time and attention are in short supply. It is
hard to make the case that a prohibition on drive-through deliveries
was the best use of these scarce resources, particularly in light of the
absence of empirical evidence indicating there is any benefit from
such coverage. Worse still, the whole campaign was a distraction
from the far more pressing need to address problems with the overall
quality of medical care provided in the United States. The adoption
of the "doctor-knows-best" model implicit in the Newborns' Act
makes it considerably less likely we will be able to address these
quality problems or that we will do so in a meaningful way. As
outlined in part IV, these problems developed and flourished because
treatment decisions were left almost entirely to the clinical judgment
of individual physicians-and the profound irony of the Newborns'
Act is that it seeks to return us to those glorious days of yore. The
net result of the Newborns' Act is thus the worst of all worlds- a non-
solution which misses the real problem and simultaneously makes it
less likely the real problem will ever be addressed.
the Hospital, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1995, at 145, 149.
359. Not surprisingly, MCOs have a predictable incentive to place the burden of
proving what constitutes necessary care on those resisting cost-containment-exemplified
by the succinct subtitle of an article authored by one managed care executive: "In God we
trust, all others bring data." Charles M. Cutler, Research Needs for Managed Care,
HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 93, 93. Physicians are less than enthusiastic about this
approach to clinical practice. See, e.g., Braveman et al., supra note 213, at 336 ("We need
to reflect on where the burden of proof should be when definitive studies have not been
conducted and cannot be conducted quickly if at all, but good judgment based on available
knowledge tells us that a service is needed."); Kessel et al., supra note 125, at 741 ("The
burden of proof should be based on 'first do no harm.' ... Failing to prove that shorter
hospital stays are unsafe (especially in the face of numerous methodological flaws) is not
the same as proving they are safe. The latter is what is necessary.").
Of course, the coverage market will quickly look radically different depending on
which of these views is adopted. If our goal is to attain "optimal" outcomes, the coverage
will be richer and more expensive than it will be if our goal is to cover only cost-justified
interventions. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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IV. REGULATING MANAGED CARE: QUALITY OR SYMBOLISM?
The campaign against drive-through deliveries played out an
increasingly familiar script. A few horror stories are offered to
indicate the problem. Provider groups complain bitterly that MCOs
are interfering with their clinical judgment. Blanket claims are made
about the declining quality of care delivered by MCOs. Politicians
and self-styled consumer advocates emerge to insist that those in
managed care should receive the highest quality of care available.
One would be hard pressed to conclude that there were any quality
problems with American medicine before the arrival of managed care
or that the elimination of managed care would not solve everything
that is wrong with the quality of American medicine.
In reality, there are longstanding and severe quality problems
with American health care that developed and flourished well before
managed care appeared on the scene. Although it did not attract
much attention, the President's Advisory Commission on Consumer
Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry recently issued a
final report titled Quality First: Better Health Care for All
Americans.360 The report notes that American health care is dogged
by persistent quality problems relating to overutilization of certain
services, underutilization of other services, unexplained variations in
service utilization, and errors in health care practice.36' The report
further observed that quality of care is not related to the institutional
arrangements through which care is delivered: "Both the best and the
worst health care our system has to offer can be found in managed
care plans, as it can in traditional fee-for-service (or indemnity)
arrangements. '362 As one prominent commentator titled his article in
the Journal of the American Medical Association, "Managed Care Is
Not the Problem, Quality Is. "363
The extent to which there are fundamental problems with the
quality of health care that are attributable to the discretion accorded
individual providers is actually quite extraordinary. "Millions of
people do not receive care they need and suffer needless
360. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND QUALITY IN THE
HEALTH CARE INDUS., QuALITY FIRST: BETrER HEALTH CARE FOR ALL AMERICANs
(1998) (Sup. Docs. No. HE 20.6502:Q2/2), available at <http:llwww.hcqualitycommission.
gov/final> [hereinafter QUALITY FIRST].
361. See id. at 21; see also Mark R. Chassin et al., The Urgent Need to Improve Health
Care Quality, 280 JAMA 1000, 1001 (1998) (noting that "quality problems are serious and
extensive").
362. QUALITY FIRST, supra note 360, at 21 (citations omitted).
363. Robert H. Brook, Managed Care Is Not the Problem, Quality Is, 278 JAMA 1612,
1612 (1997).
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complications that add to health care costs and reduce
productivity."3" Almost 20,000 people die every year from heart
attacks because they did not receive effective interventions after an
earlier heart attack.36 Millions of Americans also "receive health
care services that are unnecessary, increase costs, and often endanger
their health.' '366 Medical error rates are also unacceptably high and
include "missed diagnoses, errors in the interpretation of laboratory
or imaging studies, medication administration or prescribing errors,
surgical errors, and errors in the care furnished by doctors, nurses,
and other health care professionals. 367 Approximately 80,000 deaths
per year are attributable to infections acquired in the hospital, and
many of these infections are caused by pathogens transmitted by
health care workers who have not washed their hands between
patients, but compliance with recommended hand-washing practices
is quite low. 36 If one were trying to design a healthcare system in
which the very training of physicians maximized variability in quality
without reference to cost, one would be hard pressed to do a better
job than has been accomplished in the United States. 69
When one considers the Newborns' Act against this backdrop, it
suddenly becomes less of a "mom-and-apple-pie" piece of legislation.
364. QUALrrY FIRST, supra note 360, at 22.
365. See id. Predictably enough, the failure to treat these patients appropriately after a
prior heart attack has a distinct regional overlay. Although aspirin was prescribed at
hospital discharge for approximately 78% of patients judged ideal for that therapy,
prescription rates in individual regions ranged from approximately 52% to 96%. See
Gerald T. O'Connor et al., Geographic Variation in the Treatment of Acute Myocardial
Infarction: The Cooperative Cardiovascular Project, 281 JAMA 627, 630-31 (1999). More
extreme distributional patterns were observed for two other drugs, Beta blockers and
ACE inhibiting agents. Beta blockers were prescribed to approximately 50% of patients
judged ideal for this treatment, but prescription rates in individual regions ranged from
0% to 92.7%. See id. at 631. ACE inhibiting agents were prescribed to approximately
60% of patients judged ideal for this treatment, but prescription rates in individual regions
ranged from 6.7% to 100%. See id
366. QUALITY FIRST, supra note 360, at 22.
367. Id at 23.
36& See John M. Boyce, Editorial, It Is Time for Action: Improving Hand Hygiene in
Hospitals, 130 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 153, 153 (1999).
369. As one prominent commentator has noted:
[FIrom the beginning when we educate medical students, we segregate out those
medical students who are good from those who are poor. We select the students
who are good to receive their residency training in those institutions with the best
supervision by the most sophisticated physicians. We send less good students to
those institutions that provide lower levels of supervision. The above policies do
not reflect a concern over reducing future variations in practice. Then we
wonder 10 years later why there is so much variation in quality of care as a
function of an individual physician or an individual hospital.
Brook, supra note 363, at 1613.
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Bluntly stated, if there are quality problems with American medicine
that are attributable to the unconstrained discretion of physicians,
why on earth would one try to solve these problems by mandating the
coverage of more hours of such care? Wouldn't it make more sense
to directly address the quality of care that is provided, whether within
the hospital or without? To be sure, Congress is under no obligation
to tackle problems in any particular order, but there are reasons to
wonder about a reform strategy that ignores the overwhelming
evidence of quality-based problems with most of American medicine
and focuses instead on an area in which the evidence for quality-
based problems is hardly colorable. Moreover, by embracing a
"reform" based on the sanctity of physician discretion, the Newborns'
Act makes it much more difficult to address the quality-based
problems with American medicine, which, in fact, often are
attributable to the unconstrained discretion accorded physicians.
Unfortunately, the Newborns' Act is not an aberration. The
backlash against managed care may have been sold to the public as a
response to concerns about quality, but the legislation that has
emerged has more to do with provider lobbying, "gut instincts,
negative anecdotes, and popular appeal" than with quality.370 Indeed,
the unfortunate reality is that quality has been used as a stalking
horse by provider groups who are disguising less public spirited
objectives. 371 For obvious reasons, health care providers prefer a
return to the days of unconstrained discretion and professional
dominance. Sweeping assertions that managed care has destroyed the
quality of American medicine dovetail nicely with that objective.372
370. See Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 4 (quoting Hyman,
Consumer Protection, supra note 3, at 425-26).
371. See id.
372. Such conduct is hardly unique to the medical profession. For example, the staffing
of railroad trains is dictated by "crew consist" agreements between the railroad and the
unions. See Douglas M. McCabe, Current Strategic Issues in Transportation Labor-
Management Relations and Human-Resources Management: The Crew Consist Issue
Revisited, 55 TRANsP. PRAc. J. 54, 54 (1987). The negotiation of these agreements is
frequently contentious; one commentator has described the issue as "the most explosive
labor dispute at the operating level of individual railroads." 1d. When the railroads
succeeded in changing the crew consist agreements to their satisfaction, one of the affected
unions persuaded the State of Wisconsin that safety reasons justified the enactment of
legislation requiring the presence of an additional person on trains operated within the
state:
Calling it the "The United Transportation Union Bill," Wisconsin Gov. Tommy
G. Thompson signed into law Monday, Dec. 15, a landmark rail safety bill
requiring two persons in all railroad operations in the state. Wisconsin becomes
the first state in the country with such a law to promote rail safety. The new law
requires a certified railroad locomotive engineer and a qualified railroad
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Legislators have been quick to take the bait; the consumer protection
legislation that was offered by both Republicans and Democrats in
the 106th Congress demonstrated an overwhelming preference for
safeguarding physician decision-making from MCO interference.3 73
An extended postpartum stay appears to be "just what the doctor
ordered"-but to a first, second, and third approximation, such stays
are for the providers' benefit-not the patient.374
V. WHO WON WHAT FROM THE NEWBORNS' Acr?
Post-enactment assessment of the Newborns' Act has been
marked by a tone of decided self-congratulation. The Newborns' Act
is invariably presented as a self-evident victory for consumers in
general and women in particular. The Newborns' Act was just
"common sense,"375 and it made it clear to MCOs that they are
required to behave in a socially responsible fashion.376
Unfortunately, as outlined previously, this glowing picture bears
no relationship to reality. The Newborns' Act is a remarkably silly
piece of legislation. From an economic perspective, the law
effectively requires MCOs and insurers to spend money on hospital
stays that do not appear to provide any clear benefit-let alone
benefits in excess of the costs. The law also constrains the ability of
MCOs and insurers to arrange for post-discharge care that does, in
fact, provide a benefit well in excess of its costs. From an
autonomy/liberty perspective, the law effectively prohibits the parties
trainman on every railroad train or locomotive operating in the state. "It just
makes common sense to have two people on a train," said Thompson.
United Transp. Union, Wisconsin Governor Signs "UTU BILL" for Rail Safety, (last
modified Jan. 4, 1999) <http:lwww.utu.orgIDEPTSIPR-DEPTNEWSNEWS97/2-
BILL.HTM>.
Rail safety statutes of this sort were common earlier in this century. See generally
Douglas M. McCabe, The Crew Consist Dispute in the Railroad Industry: Developments in
Transportation Labor Relations and Public Policy, 52 TRANsP. PRAC. J. 370, 374-75
(1985) ("By 1959, sixteen states had 'full crew laws' and seven others empowered their
public utilities commissions to regulate crew consists."). As with the Newborns' Act, no
evidence was offered indicating that train wrecks were more frequent or more severe
when there was only one person operating the train. See id. Instead, "common sense" was
all that was required.
373. See Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 10-15.
374. Cowley & Springen, supra note 1, at 65. "Politically, the act was just what the
doctor ordered." Id.
375. See 142 CONG. REC. S9904 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1996) (Sup. Does. No.
xl.1/A:142/121) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
376. See Annas, supra note 289, at 1650 ("The symbolic legislative initiatives on the
length of hospital stay after childbirth ... are a shot across the bow of marketplace
medicine.").
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to an insurance contract from making the coverage arrangements they
find most beneficial. From a feminist perspective, 377 the Newborns'
Act infantilizes women by allocating decision-making authority to the
attending provider and precluding any and all incremental payments
from the insurer to the mother in exchange for an early discharge. 7
The law also does nothing to address the quality of care rendered
during the postpartum hospitalization, nor does it encourage the
development of better systems (or any systems for that matter) for
delivering post-discharge postpartum care. Indeed, the Newborns'
Act largely destroys the incentive to develop such systems.37 9 Worse
still, even if an MCO is willing to develop a system for delivering
post-discharge postpartum care, it must demonstrate that the post-
discharge visit replicates the services that would have been offered in
the hospital-even if women would prefer a different package of
services or if a different package of services would be more cost-
effective.8  This implicit legislative bias is particularly problematic
because many physicians are unenthusiastic about the development of
post-discharge services to begin with.3
377. Admittedly, there is more than one feminist perspective. For a concise review of
the varying camps within feminism, see Nancy E. Shurtz, Gender Equity and Tax Policy:
The Theory of "Taxing Men," 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 485, 488 n.7 (1998).
The critique presented in this Article is based on an equality-feminist perspective.
378. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Many Women Wary of Congress's Newfound Interest in
Female Health Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1997, at A9 (noting a "sense of paternalism" in
Congress with regard to women's health issues). By prohibiting incremental payments or
services, the Newborns' Act prevents mothers from contracting out of extended coverage
in exchange for something they might value more highly than an extra few hours in the
hospital-whether that something is a visit from a nurse, nanny, or lactation consultant, a
car seat, or cash.
379. See Mariel Garza, The 48 Hour Fix, REASON, Feb. 1999, at 52,52.
[The Newborns' Act] has made it tougher... to convince health plans that [post-
discharge] care is important, even though, on average, it takes only one low-cost
home visit to determine if the baby is off to a good start. Suddenly, all a health
plan had to do to be a good guy was to let women stay in the hospital for two
days after delivery. "They think, 'We've met the letter of the law and we don't
have to do anything now'"....
Id. (quoting Lucinda Williams, co-founder of Professional Nurse Associates).
380. See Newborns' Regulations, supra note 110, at 57,548. The regulations noted that
the Newborns' Act prohibits payments in cash or in kind to encourage early discharge, but
stated that
a plan or issuer does not violate this prohibition by providing after-discharge,
follow-up services to a mother and newborn discharged early if those services are
not more than what the mother and newborn would have received if they had
stayed in the hospital the full 48 hours (or 96 hours).
Id.
381. See Braveman, supra note 220, at 524 (explaining that "most physicians have
viewed home-based care as the province of nurses, and may be less than enthusiastic about
incorporating postpartum nurse home visiting into their routine practice if they see it as a
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The principal beneficiaries of the campaign against drive-through
deliveries are physicians, who have successfully regained a degree of
professional discretion and the ability to dictate at least some of the
terms of trade.3" They have used the campaign against drive-through
deliveries as a model for further anecdote-driven anti-managed care
efforts3" and the Newborns' Act as a precedent for additional
threat to their role or income").
382. At first glance, it might appear that hospitals necessarily benefited from the
Newborns' Act because they are effectively ensured a continuing volume of postpartum
hospitalizations of a more predictable length. See Olmos, supra note 298, at Al (noting
that the prohibition on drive-through deliveries has allowed some hospitals "to fill empty
beds or open wards previously taken out of service"). In fact, many hospitals have faced
significant dislocations as a result of the Newborns' Act. As one group of commentators
noted:
[A]n unanticipated consequence of early discharge legislation has put some
hospitals in a difficult position. In a number of cases, hospitals have significantly
reshaped their maternity wings by constructing labor, delivery, recovery and
postpartum rooms (LDRPs), which are the only rooms a mother uses while in the
hospital for maternity care. LDRPs are more expensive to construct and
maintain than traditional hospital rooms, but with 24- to 48-hour stays, their
occupancy turns over so often that they become economically feasible and also
serve as a valuable marketing tool for hospitals. Doubling the length of stay has
put great pressure on maternity areas to find space for all the mothers.
Declercq & Simmes, supra note 18, at 187; see also Ryan, supra note 116, at 288 (noting
that the increased length of postpartum stay has resulted in overcrowding, so hospitals no
longer offers private rooms); Julia Prodis, 2-Day Stay Wins Praise of Doctors, Mothers,
COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Sept. 29, 1996, at 5A ("Most hospitals should be able to
accommodate longer stays without causing crowding, although some hospitals that scaled
back their maternity wards over the past few years because of the shorter stays probably
will have to expand.").
383. See Hyman, Consumer Protection, supra note 3, at 426-40.
Almost any discussion of consumer protection and managed care results in some
anecdotes about a terrible outcome that could have been averted had the MCO
only authorized a visit to the ED .... Empirical data on the severity of the
problem was sketchy at best, but the American College of Emergency Physicians
("ACEP") used a number of horrific anecdotes to argue that access to the ED
had to be-safeguarded with consumer protection laws.
Id.; see also Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 8-12 (recounting various
episodes in which self-interested provider groups circulated bad anecdotes to promote
their regulatory agendas).
Perhaps the supreme irony of the campaign against managed care is that it has
caused physicians to embrace proof-by-anecdote-even though the systematic rejection of
this sort of proof is the foundation of modern medicine. See Gina Kolata, On Fringes of
Health Care, Untested Therapies Thrive, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1996, at Al (noting that
scientists and medical researchers reject alternative medicine because of its anecdotal
basis). If the history of medicine and attempts to enact tort reform are any guide,
skepticism about anecdotal evidence is well founded. See supra note 288; Michael J. Saks,
Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And
Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147,1159-61 (1992). Saks observed that:
[A]necdotal evidence is heavily discounted in most fields, and for a perfectly
good reason: such evidence permits only the loosest and weakest inferences
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restrictions on the market power of MCOs.3s Ironically, what was
sold to the public as "consumer protection" turns out to be provider
protection3 5
Of course, politicians also benefited from the passage of the
Newborns' Act and analogous state legislation. By voting in favor of
such laws, state and federal politicians symbolically demonstrated
that they were in favor of motherhood and opposed to the restrictions
imposed by managed care-positions that coincided with voter
sentiments and concerns. At the federal level, it seems likely that this
effect was magnified by the reality that many in Congress were facing
the voters for the first time after two government shutdowns. By
using the legislation as a proxy for a variety of issues raised by the
growth of managed care and by excluding the populations which
would result in on-budget costs, legislators positioned themselves as
guardians of the public interest and did so at someone else's expense.
The only real lesson of the Newborns' Act appears to be that we
want MCOs to cut costs in ways that are less visible-hardly an ideal
incentive, all things considered. Indeed, the potential for overly
vigorous cost-containment by MCOs is such that it is far more
sensible to encourage MCOs to cut costs in a manner that is open and
obvious. 6 Unfortunately, the Newborns' Act creates precisely the
wrong incentives, because it signals that overly transparent cost-
cutting will result in a legislative backlash. As such, cost-cutting
which is well hidden will not be questioned. The Newborns' Act may
have stemmed the tide of short postpartum stays, but it undermines
the very goal of quality managed care at an affordable price at which
it was ostensibly aimed.
about matters a field is trying to understand. Anecdotes do not permit one to
determine either the frequency of occurrence of something or its causes and
effects .... Anecdotes have the power to mislead us into thinking we know
things that anecdotes simply cannot teach us.
Id.
384. See supra note 117 and accompanying text; infra note 402 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
386. See Gail B. Agrawal, Chicago Hope Meets the Chicago School, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1793, 1812-14 (1998) (noting arguments that the moral legitimacy of managed care
depends on the ex ante agreement to contain costs, but suggesting that the choice of
insurance product is not necessarily indicative of such an agreement, especially in light of
marketing efforts of MCOs); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient
Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming November 1999) (arguing that MCOs have an incentive
to cheat on quality given the nature of the health insurance coverage market and that
legislation may well make sense as a way of addressing the problem).
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VJ. A NARRATIVE PERSPECTIVE
For those who prefer narrative scholarship, I offer a story.W
Once upon a time, there was a group of professional providers. These
providers had considerable discretion in how they did their jobs.
Because the providers frequently were called upon to make fine
distinctions involving matters of life and death, they underwent years
of post-graduate training and were carefully selected on the strength
of their intellect, educational achievement, and the like. For many
years, the providers had been allowed to exercise their best judgment
as they saw fit, without much external oversight.
Unfortunately, empirical studies revealed that there was a
considerable degree of variation among providers in how they
handled similar cases, including variation in the length of stay at
treatment facilities. The providers insisted that there were good
reasons for the variation and argued that the country was better off if
each provider was left free to exercise his discretion to the best of his
(considerable) abilities. All complaints were dismissed with the
observation that only providers were competent to judge one
another's efforts, and that the public should continue to allow
providers to exercise their discretion, pay for the results, and be
satisfied that the providers were "doing the right thing."
Those footing the bill finally grew impatient with the
intransigence of the providers and decided that the best way to
systematize provider behavior was to eliminate their discretion in
many cases. Accordingly, after several years of study, they
introduced guidelines specifying the appropriate length of treatment
for a wide variety of cases. Some flexibility was maintained by
providing for variation in cases that were considerably more or less
severe than normal, but providers still found their professional
387. Narrative scholarship has been booming, despite criticisms of its typicality and
truthfulness. See generally Hyman, Lies, supra note 23, passim (using the Emergency
Medical Treatment Active Labor Act as a vehicle for considering the effects of narrative
on legislative action). Those who are uncomfortable with the application of fables and
metaphorical imagery to sensitive issues like health care have not been paying attention to
the literature. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 app. at 274-76
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (employing the fable of the people of Gourmand, who
devoted all of their resources to increasingly fine restaurants, to illustrate the difficult
economic issues raised by medical care); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Review, 13 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 182, 182-84 (1988) (using the metaphor of changing a light bulb to explain
different systems of health care organization and financing); Uwe E. Reinhardt, That'll Be
$135 for Your First Lecture, WASH. POsT, Apr. 26, 1988, at Health Insert 20 (providing a





Needless to say, the providers were less than thrilled with this
development and resisted it mightily. Some quit, arguing that the
degree of discretion given to providers was what had attracted them
to the job in the first place and that they were unwilling to continue if
they could not exercise that discretion. Others argued that the
guidelines simply were wrong because the specified treatments
reflected a poor balancing of costs and benefits. Still others claimed
that those drafting the guidelines had no business meddling in such
matters because they lacked the required expertise. Others argued
that it was simply impossible to arrive at rational guidelines because
each and every case was unique and needed to be handled as such.
Using these arguments, the providers steadfastly resisted the
guidelines. After the providers won some of the preliminary
skirmishes, legal action ultimately vindicated the right of those paying
the bills to constrain the discretion of the providers.
The narrative bears a striking resemblance to the debate over
drive-through deliveries, with the single exception that the providers
lost on all counts in the narrative, but have done considerably better
with drive-through deliveries. It is tempting to dismiss the narrative
as a work of fiction, designed simply to make a larger point about the
relative indeterminacy of professional judgment and the tradeoffs
between uniformity and professional discretion. That facile
interpretation is insufficient; the narrative is not a work of fiction, but
is instead an accurate rendition of the circumstances surrounding the
drafting and implementation of the federal sentencing guidelines.3 8
The sentencing guidelines changed the world of criminal justice
"[f]rom an indeterminate sentencing system under which judges were
given broad authority to decide whether an offender would be
incarcerated and for how long ... to a binding sentencing guideline
38& See Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1381-82 (1998). Of
course, the debate over the degree to which we wish to confer discretion on judges (and
regulators) is not unique to the sentencing guidelines context. For example, legislatures
have striven to bring greater uniformity to family law, particularly in the area of custody
and support arrangements, by enacting certain presumptions. See Carl E. Schneider,
Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89
MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2264-82 (1991) (analyzing the costs and benefits of legislative
intervention, in the form of statutory presumptions, into child custody decisions).
Depending on the issue and the perspective of those commenting, these interventions into
the discretion of those involved are either presented as appropriately constraining the
unbridled discretion of unaccountable judges and regulators, or unnecessary intrusions
reflecting a mix of legislative bias and ignorance.
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regime that substantially restrains judicial discretion." '389 After
criminal defendants challenged the guidelines on a variety of
constitutional grounds, a clear majority of the 300 federal district
judges who ruled on the issue struck down the sentencing
guidelines.3 ° The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the validity of
the guidelines,3 91 but many judges remain deeply unhappy that their
sentencing discretion has been constrained by "bureaucratic
penalization." 3 2 One judge has resigned in protest, and two senior
judges refuse to impose sentences in drug cases.393 Judges who serve
on the United States Sentencing Commission reportedly are viewed
as traitors by many of their colleagues. 94 Judge Cabranes has
condemned the guidelines as "a byzantine system of rules" that
"ignore individual characteristics of defendants and sacrifice
comprehensibility and common sense on the altar of pseudoscientific
uniformity. '395  Recently, Justice Breyer, "an architect and longtime
supporter of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, issued a detailed
critique ... and called for Federal judges to regain some of their
traditional discretion to make the punishment fit the crime. '396
Yet, the sentencing guidelines remain the order of the day in
389. Sisk et al., supra note 388, at 1377.
390. See id at 1403 (noting that approximately 61% of the federal district and appellate
court judges who considered a constitutional challenge to the sentencing guidelines struck
them down).
391. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,412 (1989).
392. Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1254 (1997); see also Henry J. Reske, Judges Irked by Tough-on-
Crime Laws, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 18, 18 (finding that more than 50% of district judges
support elimination of the sentencing guidelines).
393. See Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at
A22; Saundra Torry, Some Federal Judges Just Say No to Drug Cases, WASH. POST, May
17, 1993, at F7; Saundra Torry, Some Judges Decide a Lifetime on the Federal Bench Is
Too Long, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1992, at Washington Business Insert 5. The Washington
Post Business Insert article notes that:
Former U.S. District Judge Jay Lawrence Irving of San Diego quit Dec. 31, 1990,
in what he now calls "a kind of protest" over the lack of discretion and the
"outrageous" penalties he was forced to impose, particularly on youthful, first-
time defendants. Raul Ramirez, who quit at 45 after a decade on the bench in
Sacramento, said the guidelines turned judges into "nothing more than
computers wearing robes."
Torry, supra, at 5.
394. See Naftali Benavid, Breyer's Role as Sentencing Pioneer Still Rankles, LEGAL
TIMES, May 16, 1994, at 7 ("Many judges regard as a traitor any colleague who serves on
the U.S. Sentencing Commission....").
395. Jose A. Cabranes, Letter to the Editor, Incoherent Sentencing Guidelines, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 28,1992, at All.
396. Linda Greenhouse, Guidelines on Sentencing Are Flawed, Justice Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21,1998, at A12.
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federal courts throughout the land, while health care providers have
conversely persuaded Congress to let them dictate the terms of
trade-at least when it comes to postpartum care. The only
conclusion I can reach is that our society trusts physicians more than
it trusts federal judges, although it is the latter who have life tenure,397
and the former whose misdeeds are maintained in a national
databank .3 9  Go figure.
CONCLUSION
The anecdotes that led Congress and a majority of states to
prohibit drive-through deliveries were heartbreaking, but
extraordinarily unrepresentative. As such, they provide further proof
that isolated observations do not provide a sound basis for
legislation-or much of anything else. Focusing on the "bad-
outcomes" anecdotal numerator, without factoring in the "millions-
of-successful-deliveries-at-lower-cost" empirical denominator, is a
recipe for public policies that are either silly or symbolic-and usually
both.399 When bad anecdotes are combined with romantic notions
about the way health care should be delivered in a perfect world, the
only certainty is that consumers will end up paying more.
The "consumer protection" law described in this article involves
helpless babies and sympathetic postpartum mothers, but the depth
397. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... ).
398. The National Practitioner Databank contains records on malpractice settlements
and disciplinary actions undertaken against physicians. It is not available to the public, but
hospitals are required to check it when they grant admitting privileges and thereafter on a
biannual basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 11135 (1994). Some of this information is also available
from private vendors. See Medi-Net, <http://www.askmedi.com> (offering information on
individual physicians, including "records of sanctions or disciplinary actions taken against
a physician's license, if any, from all states" for $12.50 each).
399. Professor Korobkin has argued that consumer protection legislation is a sensible
way of handling a number of specific imperfections in the market for health care coverage,
including bounded rationality and principal-agent problems. See Korobkin, supra note
388, passim. Because I have responded to Professor Korobkin's arguments in another
article, see Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 16-36, and because the
institutional choice issues raised in his article go well beyond the scope of this Article, I
have not addressed the more general question of whether markets or regulation provide
the second-best solution across the universe of consumer protection against managed care.
It is worth noting that symbolic blackmail aside, any issue that is significant
enough to catch the attention of the legislature is also the kind of issue that is likely to be
addressed by normal market forces. More importantly for purposes of the issue of drive-
through deliveries, Professor Korobkin analyzes the problem of consumer protection
against managed care on a purely theoretical level and correctly observes that each
consumer protection initiative must be assessed individually to determine whether it is
necessary and appropriate.
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and sincerity of our feelings about a subject are no guarantee that a
good law or wise policy will result. Indeed, such issues are
particularly prone to legislative posturing and opportunistic
overreaching, regardless of the actual significance of the "reform. "400
Legislation of this sort is also exceedingly difficult to repeal.401 Once
legislators start down this crowd-pleasing path, there is no telling
where they will end up.4 2
More generally, calling something "consumer protection" does
not make it so. Even when there is some incremental consumer
benefit, it is often not worth the resulting dislocation, cost, and loss of
flexibility. When legislators faced even a portion of the costs of their
decisions, their principled opposition to drive-through deliveries
suddenly developed some interesting (and quite large) loopholes.
Equally importantly, the decisions and tradeoffs made by individual
citizens are often quite different than the ones the legislators make on
their behalf, even when the legislators behave themselves-and they
do not always do so.
Of course, one could still argue that the government should get
to decide such matters because it is not subject to the same economic
constraints and conflicts of interest as the insurer/MCO.4 3 Even if
400. See Kassirer, supra note 13, at 1747.
Not only are complexity, lack of context, and expertise an issue, but legislators
frequently respond politically to the emotional appeals of their constituents.
(How could health-maintenance organizations insist on sending tired-out moms
home in 24 hours? ... ) This is decision making by emotional and opportunistic
consensus, not by studied, thoughtful reasoning based on evidence.
Id.
401. The Newborns' Act directs the President to create a commission to report on the
continued need for the statute. Congress did not see fit to wait for that commission to
report, nor were they willing to "sunset" the provisions of the Newborns' Act. See S. REP.
No. 104-326, at 6 (1995) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5:104-326). Congress's failure to sunset the
Newborns' Act means that we are almost certainly stuck with extended postpartum stays
for the foreseeable future. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17
ECOLOGY L. Q. 233, 287 (1990) ("Once Congress has taken the position that public health
must be protected at any cost, it is difficult for the legislature to adopt a more moderate
position. Position-taking by other legislators and charges of trading lives for dollars will
deter many legislators from supporting such amendments.").
402. See Peter Passel], When Politicians Seek to Please on Medical Benefits, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1996, at D2. Passell concludes:
Legislating a two-day minimum maternity stay will raise health insurance costs
by just a fraction of 1 percent. The real danger here is the precedent in an era of
tight government budgets. Elected officials who cannot please constituents with
additional spending or tax cuts still have the option of currying favor by
mandating private benefits. As long as there is a plausible rationale along with
emotional appeal, minimum-benefit creep will be hard to resist.
Id.
403. See Annas, supra note 287, at 1649 ("Because the market has no inherent
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one concedes the premise of this argument and ignores the inherent
problems associated with the aggregation of consumer preferences
(whether at the state or federal levels), it is precisely because
governmental agents are likely to be relatively indifferent to cost (so
long as they are not footing it as an on-budget expense) that we
should be skeptical about their fidelity to the real interests of their
principals. Scarcity is a fundamental reality of human existence, and
"those for whom price is no object are never those who ultimately
foot the bill."'
Alternatively, the Newborns' Act could be viewed as a sub-
optimal law that is justified by the defusing of a far more destructive
backlash against managed care.405 Although there are many laws
which could conceivably be explained by this phenomenon, the
Newborns' Act is not one of them. Indeed, the Newborns' Act
inflamed the backlash against managed care and provided a template
for further regulations.4 6
Finally, it is worth noting that policy considerations of this sort
are not unique to the regulation of managed care. Consider the
problem of the IRS's pursuit of "innocent spouses," which has
occupied Congress and the Clinton administration of late. Taxpayers
who sign a return are jointly and severally liable for any deficiency, so
the IRS is free to pursue either individual for any unpaid taxes, even
if the couple divorces.' The law allows "innocent spouses" to escape
responsibility for these deficiencies if they satisfy a series of
morality, whenever the market is used to produce and distribute goods and services,
government regulation is required to protect the welfare of both workers and
consumers."). Alternatively, one could rely on one's health care provider to fulfill this
role.
404. Hyman, Consumer Protection, supra note 3, at 456.
405. See Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 217 (1998) (noting the
phenomenon of government "strategically tempering otherwise efficient rules and
institutions to finesse away a more destructive backlash").
One difficulty with Professor Roe's analysis is that it is fundamentally non-
falsifiable. One can not distinguish between a legislature that passes an inefficient law
because it does not know the difference or has been captured and a legislature that is
"strategically tempering otherwise efficient rules and institutions to finesse away a more
destructive backlash." Id.
406. See supra note 117 and accompanying text; see also Hospital Length of Stay Act of
1999, H.R. 989, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring insurers and employee benefit plans to
"provide coverage for the length of an inpatient hospital stay determined by the attending
physician... in consultation with the patient to be medically appropriate").
407. See I.R.C. § 6013(a) (1994). Joint and several liability has the obvious
administrative advantage of providing two people from whom the IRS can seek to collect,
instead of just one.
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exceedingly strict standards."°  The IRS has aggressively litigated
such cases, and frequently pursues ex-wives for tax deficiencies
attributable to returns prepared by their ex-husbands. The narrative
accounts of the legal, financial, and emotional costs imposed on these
women are truly awful.40 9
Various solutions to this problem have been suggested, including
incremental tinkering with the innocent spouse provisions, abolishing
joint returns, and retaining joint returns but adopting proportional
liability for any deficiency.410 Congress was keen to undertake
fundamental reform of this area, although the House and Senate
differed on whether to tinker with the existing provisions (House) or
adopt proportional liability (Senate).41' The statute emerged from the
Conference Committee as a hybrid of both approaches.41 2
Despite its deserved reputation for sensitivity to women's issues,
the Clinton administration was lukewarm on incremental reform,
vehemently opposed proportional liability, and flatly rejected the
elimination of joint returns.413  The administration's Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy, Donald C. Lubick, has publicly taken a
remarkably tough-minded statistical view of the problem:
Lubick was also critical of reform proposals which have
tended to focus on the needs of very small groups of
taxpayers. In this regard, he said that the administration
cannot support various plans extending relief to "innocent
spouses." While many of their problems are compelling,
408. See id. § 6013(e). By common consensus, the innocent spouse provisions are too
strict in that some spouses who did not know of the unreported income and did not benefit
from it can still be held liable for the taxes. See Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse
Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L.
REv. 317 (1990); Jerome Borison, Innocent Spouse Relief- A Call for Legislative and
Judicial Liberalization, 40 TAX LAW. 819 (1987); Stephen A. Zorn, Innocent Spouses,
Reasonable Women and Divorce: The Gap Between Reality and the Internal Revenue
Code, 3 MIcH. J. GENDER & L. 421 (1996); Toni Robinson & Mary Ferrari, The New
Innocent Spouse Provision: 'Reason and Law Walking Hand in Hand'?, TAX NOTES, Aug.
17, 1998, at 835.
409. See, e.g., Proposals to Reform the Innocent Spouse Tax Rules: Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Finance, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 32-23 passim (1998) (reporting four
women's emotional testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance describing the
IRS' efforts to make them pay for their former spouses' tax debt).
410. Academics, the American Bar Association, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, and the New York State Bar Association have favored either
proportional liability or the elimination of joint filing status. See Robinson & Ferrari,
supra note 408, at 841-42.
411. See id. at 843-44.
412. See I.R.C.. § 6015 (West. Supp. 1999); Robinson & Ferrari, supra note 408, at 844-
45.
413. See Robinson & Ferrari, supra note 408, at 838.
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Lubick said the number of innocent spouses is too small to
reorganize the code under a proportional liability scheme.
He noted that a recent General Accounting Office study
indicated that of the 49 million joint returns filed, there were
only 35,000 situations in which a divorced couple was
assessed more than $500 by the Internal Revenue Service.
Assuming that a spouse was actually innocent in half of
those situations, Lubick questioned the wisdom of reforming
the code for the benefit of only 17,000 taxpayers. 14
Thus, the position of one prominent member of the administration is
that "the fix for dealing with 17,000 of 49 million cases seems
inordinately costly." '415
There are many parallels between drive-through deliveries and
the innocent spouse provisions. Both involve vulnerable and
sympathetic groups who feel they have been victimized by impersonal
forces beyond their control. Both involve a small number of really
bad outcomes (which may or may not be attributable to the existing
rules), mixed in among a far larger population for which the existing
rules seem to work out just fine. Both involve a problem that can be
fixed with legislative action, but at a significant cost. In both cases,
Congress was outraged about the status quo. In one case, however,
the Clinton administration eagerly embraced the proposed reform,
and in the other, it did its best to shoot it down. It would be nice if
there were some principled distinction between the two cases, but the
disparity in the handling of these issues has more to do with whether
the costs of reform fall on-budget or off-budget than with the merits
of the issues.
What then should have been done about drive-through
deliveries?416  Doing nothing is an underappreciated strategy.
Perhaps longer postpartum stays are a good idea, and perhaps they
414. Id. at 841 n.71.
415. ILd.
416. The more general questions raised by the regulation of managed care, the
complexities created by the aggregation of consumer preferences, the separation of the
ultimate consumer (patient) from the more immediate payor (insurer/employer), and the
linkage between insurance coverage and employment are beyond the scope of this Article.
In a series of other articles, I have addressed these points. See Hyman, With Friends Like
These, supra note 9; Hyman, Consumer Protection, supra note 3; Hyman, Regulating
Managed Care, supra note 6; Hyman, Scenes from a Maul, supra note 6. If the Newborns'
Act is any indication, and my analysis of a wide range of consumer protection initiatives
convinces me it is quite representative, these problems are unlikely to be addressed
effectively-let alone solved in anything close to an optimal fashion-by detailed
regulations specifying the nature of acceptable treatments and minimum insurance
coverage standards. The understandable instinct to regulate should be tempered by the
realities of the legislative arena. See Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 6, at 3.
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can be done cost-effectively. Perhaps shorter postpartum stays with a
follow-up visit from a nurse are a better solution, all things
considered. Perhaps hospitals should abandon per diem pricing and
adopt a more rational system of charging for their services. Perhaps
there are alternative uses for our health insurance premiums that are
more beneficial in promoting health, even if they are less loaded with
symbolic appeal. Perhaps insurance companies should just stay out of
the middle, specify a sum certain they are willing to pay for deliveries,
and let patients shop for the birthing experiences (whether inpatient,
birthing center, outpatient, or home) they want. Perhaps a "virtuous"
HN4O or contingent fee arrangement can solve these problems.
No law prevents those involved from employing some or all of
these strategies. Prior to the Newborns' Act, some hospitals had
started offering prix fixe postpartum stays,417 and since the Newborns'
Act, some insurers have started compensating hospitals on a flat-rate
basis.418 Prior to the Newborns' Act, many MCOs and hospitals
offered a visiting nurse or some other post-discharge arrangement if
the patient stayed for less than forty-eight hours postpartum, 419
although a number of these programs were discontinued once the
Newborns' Act effectively forced MCOs to pay for forty-eight or
ninety-six hours of postpartum coverage.420 A number of MCOs have
417. See Kuper, supra note 59, at 684--86 (cataloging hospitals promising to provide a
"free" second day); Seaman, supra note 59, at 511 n.128 (same); Smith & Karash, supra
note 155, at B1 (same); Stephanie L. Stein, Challenge to HMO's Maternity Limits, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 14, 1996, at 13L19 (noting new policies at several hospitals to guarantee
postpartum women stay of at least 48 hours regardless of the amount paid by the insurer).
418. After New Jersey enacted its legislation, a number of insurers responded by
setting a flat rate they would pay for each delivery. See Ryan, supra note 116, at 280.
Legislators were outraged and suggested that this conduct should not be allowed. See id.
One wonders what they were expecting to happen.
Another commentator has decried the growth of such flat fee arrangements, and
argued that without a per diem guarantee, hospitals "are likely to pressure mothers into
early discharge or suffer the financial impact of lost revenues." Veronica D. Feeg, The
Bittersweet Maternal Health Policy Victory, 22 PEDIATRIC NURSING 366,366 (1996).
419. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 13-16.
420. As the report prepared by the GAO reflects:
Medical staff at one New Jersey HMO told us patients have learned they can
extend their stay (to slightly less than 48 hours) and still receive a follow-up visit
at home. According to the staff, the law has significantly increased the HMO's
expenses because it must cover a slightly extended in-patient stay as well as the
costs associated with home visits. As a result, they are concerned that they may
have to implement the 48-hour minimum stay and discontinue their home visit
program.
Id. at 16; see also Egerter et al., supra note 249, at 479 ("Some have warned that legislation
requiring that insurers cover either a minimum 48-hour stay or compensatory follow-up
after shorter stays will result in more newborns and mothers being discharged at 48 hours
without any clinical evaluation on the important third and fourth postpartum days.");
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promised to be particularly virtuous with regard to such matters.42'
It is quite clear that many health care providers are unhappy with
the growth of managed care and their concomitant loss of autonomy
and income. Not surprisingly, they have used a variety of strategies
(including what is usually, but incorrectly, labeled "consumer
protection" legislation) in their efforts to maintain the old order.
Such efforts obscure the necessary choices, but do not eliminate them;
bad decisions are the inevitable result because some of the relevant
considerations and choices have been declared off-limits.
Where then should we go from here? Although some
commentators have suggested that the prohibition on drive-through
deliveries presents a model for the future aggressive regulation of
managed care,422 a more common assessment is that "legislation by
body part" is unlikely to lead to beneficial results and that a more
"holistic" approach is required.4' 3 It is clear that "legislation by body
part" is a strategy doomed to failure because the correlation between
symbolic appeal and practical utility (let alone the legislature's ability
or willingness to distinguish between the two) is tenuous at best.
Ryan, supra note 116, at 287 (advancing similar arguments).
421. See Stuart Auerbach, Doctors' Alliance Has a Remedy for Managed-Care Limits,
WASH. PoST, Dec. 30, 1996, at F12 (noting the formation of a "virtuous" HMO); Rachel
Kreier, How and Why Doctors on L.L Formed Their Own H.M.O., N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1996, at 13L14 (same).
422. See Feeg, supra note 418, at 366.
Although micromanagement of per diem solutions to troubling discharge
practices should not be the government's goal, if it takes addressing [diagnostic
related group] by [diagnostic related group] to establish minimum stay policies
that protect the public, then so be it. We should take them on one-by-one, keep
an eye on who's who, buckle-up our seat belts, and get ready for the long road
ahead until we find a better way.
Id.
423. An equally important question relates to the use of anecdotal evidence in
addressing these matters. Some advocates insist that such emotionally laden evidence
(which invariably takes the form of horror stories about managed care) is both necessary
and sufficient to resolve the selection of targets requiring legislative reform, and the
specification of the appropriate remedies. See Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra
note 6, at 8-12 (analyzing such claims). A more nuanced approach would acknowledge
the role of emotion in public policy but emphasize its limits.
Barring the unlikely development of a generalized sense of "statistical
compassion," anecdotal evidence will continue to play a major role in the
formulation of public policy. As such, we need to develop strategies for dealing
with the infirmities of both statistics and narrative.... For anecdotes, the short
version is "be exceedingly skeptical," "consider the source," and "don't
generalize without additional (non-anecdotal) evidence."
Hyman, Lies, supra note 23, at 850. Any other approach simply ensures more legislation
like the Newborns' Act. See D. Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based Public
Policy, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 75-79 (1997) (arguing that emotion has a place in
framing public policy, but it must be appropriately employed).
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Even a more "holistic" approach is likely to make everything worse,
unless the tradeoffs are explicitly put on the table. Unfortunately,
"consumer protections" are popular precisely because we are
unwilling to admit to ourselves that such tradeoffs must be made-
and will necessarily be made by default if we choose not to make
them (or have them made by our agents) on the merits.
If a prohibition on drive-through deliveries had been passed in
the early 1960s, it would have mandated coverage of approximately
six days of postpartum hospitalization after a vaginal delivery. There
was nothing magical about 144 hours of postpartum hospitalization
and there is nothing magical about 48 hours of postpartum
hospitalization. The legislative and regulatory focus should be on
what occurs during the hospitalization and the institutional
arrangements available post-discharge, not on how long postpartum
women and their newborn babies can stay in the hospital. Of course,
it is far easier to do a sound-bite demanding "coverage of forty-eight
hours of postpartum hospitalization," but that does not change the
fact that this strategy will do little or nothing to decrease the
frequency of bad outcomes and nothing to improve quality of care.
The Newborns' Act effectively eliminates the incentive to
develop and cover appropriate post-discharge care and undermines
the incentives to engage in appropriately visible cost-containment,
while simultaneously giving the public a false sense of security about
the merits of the existing care and coverage-positions that are the
precise opposite of what any sensible policy in this area should
accomplish.4 4 To be sure, given the lack of enthusiasm for cost-
containment in any particular case and the potential for symbolic
blackmail, it may be impossible to deploy a system that is fully
transparent in its cost-containment efforts. It does not follow,
however, that we should embrace legislation that will actually make
things worse.
Justice Frankfurter believed that "the responsibility of those who
exercise power in a democratic government is not to reflect inflamed
424. See GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 21 ("[R]equiring insurers to ... cover
hospital stays of 48 hours for vaginal births ... may be giving the public a false sense of
security."); Braveman et al., supra note 213, at 336 ("[While the spirit of the [Newborns'
Act] may be laudable, its content does not solve the most important problems regarding
the need for early postpartum/postnatal services. The legislation may give the public a
false sense of security."); Edmonson et al., supra note 215, at 2067 ("In the short run,
legislative efforts to regulate LOS [length of stay] are unlikely to have much impact on




public feeling, but to help form its understanding."42s If the bipartisan
campaign against drive-through deliveries is any guide, Justice
Frankfurter's view seems to be no longer operative. Indeed, quite the
opposite appears to be the case.
In the end, there are only three useful insights to be drawn from
this mess, and one need not be an expert on law, medicine, or much
of anything else to understand them:
1. Sound bites and unrepresentative anecdotes do not result in
good legislation;
2. Outrage is cheap, but health care is expensive; and
3. Don't mess with motherhood.426
425. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 26 (1958).
426. See Evelyn Nieves, Public Furor over Nursing Baby in a Car, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1996, at 45 (recounting the case of a woman who was nursing her baby in her car when
a police officer instructed her to "cut it out or go somewhere else" and arguing that the
officer "had violated a golden rule, one that sent powerful H.M.O.'s ducking when they
tried to force new mothers out of the hospital within 24 hours: Do not mess with
motherhood").
1999]
100 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78
